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ABSTRACT 
COPYCAT THEORY: 
TESTING FOR FISCAL POLICIES HARMONIZATION IN THE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN COORDINATING COMMUNITY (SADC) AND  
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (SSA) 
By 
CHRISTINE EGA MOLOI 
December 2006 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace 
 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to test empirically whether fiscal policy 
mimicking exists in developing countries and whether such mimicking leads to policy 
harmonization. This is done by studying the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Region and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The dissertation uses panel data and 
applies the generalized method of moments (GMM) and the generalized spatial two-stage 
least squares (GS2SLS) methodologies to a spatial setting to test for the spatial 
interactions.  The study also tests for evidence of spatial interaction in the assessment of 
government efficiency by voters in neighboring countries, where efficiency is measured 
using the price/quantity ratio of public goods provision.  We find evidence of fiscal 
policy copycat behavior in both the SSA and SADC regions and mimicking is also 
 xviii 
 
present in some tax revenues as well as in expenditure levels.  This leads us to conclude 
that there is some form of fiscal harmonization taking place in these developing 
countries. We also find evidence of spatial interaction in the assessment of governments’ 
efficiency in the provision of public goods. Overall, we conclude that there is evidence of 
some fiscal mimicking behavior as a developing world phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
That a jurisdiction’s policies may be influenced by other jurisdictions’ policies 
has been explored by a number of authors of late.  Empirical studies have found evidence 
that both tax and expenditure policies are copied among neighboring jurisdictions. 
However, most studies have been carried out at a local government or county level and in 
developed countries.   A few studies that are related to this phenomenon have been 
carried out at the state level in the United States and these include, among others, Alm, 
McKee et al. (1993), Baicker (2001), Besley and Rosen (1998), Case, Hines et al. (1989), 
Case, Rosen et al. (1993) and Rork (2003). A study that was carried out by Goodspeed 
(2000) looked at thirteen OECD1 countries but estimated the impact of horizontal and 
vertical externalities at the county local level.  
According to Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), mimicking can occur both on the 
expenditure and revenue sides of the budget.  However, the existing literature tends to 
focus more on the revenue (tax) side, thus fitting into the fast growing positive literature 
aimed at explaining actual tax choices from a politico-economic perspective.  The mimic 
models assume that politicians’ tax setting behavior and expenditure decisions are 
dominated by electoral considerations.  
There are a number of reasons why both voters and politicians will be particularly 
sensitive to fiscal policies in nearby jurisdictions.  First, information on close-by 
jurisdictions’ policies spreads more easily than information on far-away jurisdictions, 
even though with electronic commerce, it is now much easier for information to spread to 
                                                 
1 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
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distant jurisdictions very fast. Second, geographical neighbors are more likely to 
experience similar shocks, such as tax-base and business cycle shocks.  Geographic ties 
could actually be more important in developing countries particularly where these 
countries tend to have strong cultural, historic and commercial ties. Thirdly, Besley and 
Case (1995) point out that in a world where voters make comparisons between states, 
incumbents may look to other states’ taxing behavior before changing taxes at home.  
This in turn gives rise to a kind of (yardstick) competition between jurisdictions, each 
caring about what the other is doing.   Tax-setting behavior is thus affected by electoral 
competition, whereby states would reduce tax rate increases that put them out of line with 
their neighbors.  Case, Hines et al. (1989) point out that when states perceive that their 
spending levels are out of line with those of similarly situated states, they will often 
demand for change that will re-align their spending levels with these other states. Further, 
with globalization and regional economic integration sweeping across continents, 
objectives of these regional blocs such as harmonizing their various policies could lead to 
some mimicking or spatial interaction behavior as regions try to attain these objectives. 
Hence, mimicking could either be mandated or just voluntary, depending on how 
successful or how deep the integration process has gone.   
With regard to tax burdens on people, the Tiebout model and its emphasis on 
voting with one’s feet could be used to explain local official’s concern with tax burdens 
in neighboring jurisdictions.  However, the Tiebout mechanism need not lead to any 
mimicking behavior because the mechanism asserts that fiscally related movement 
among jurisdictions is motivated not by the burdens alone, but rather by the entire fiscal 
package which includes the level of public services relative to tax burdens.  It is also the 
 3 
 
case that some people could just “ like”  the tax package they have and will not move or 
vote with their feet. According to the Tiebout model, jurisdictions need not maintain 
similar tax burdens as long as they offset that with similar services.  Ladd (1992) explains 
that some jurisdictions purposefully keep tax and spending burdens low relative to their 
neighbors specifically to differentiate their community fiscally from the others.   
Empirical studies that have been undertaken in this area (and most are relatively 
recent) have mainly been on the U.S. states’ and local government tax policies and they 
have shown that fiscal policies are copied among neighboring jurisdictions. Fewer studies 
have been undertaken on expenditure mimicking by jurisdictions and they have also 
found the presence of such mimicking. To indicate that tax mimicking is not atypical of 
the U.S. system but rather a general characteristic of decision making in a context of 
centralized government, some studies were carried out in Belgium (Heyndels and 
Vuchelen 1998) and England (Revelli 2001) and the general results were in line with the 
findings in the U.S., that such mimicking does exist elsewhere as well.  More studies on 
fiscal policy mimicking outside the U.S. followed and these have been carried out in 
countries such as France, Spain, and Switzerland and even regionally in the OECD.   
However, it would appear that little or no such study has been undertaken at a 
country level or for a group of countries, where some characteristics are quite 
heterogeneous. The majority of the studies were carried out at county and state levels, 
where characteristics tend to be relatively homogeneous. Nor has such a study been 
carried out for developing countries. A study at a country level was done by Redoano 
(2003) on European Union countries in which the author tested for evidence of 
interdependence among these countries when setting their public expenditures and taxes.  
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In fiscal policy, the behavior of governments is such that they either compete against one 
another for economic development or political strength, or they cooperate in their policies 
for the benefit of all jurisdictions involved, even across countries.  Regional cooperation 
enhances, among other things, more equitable economic development especially where 
some areas or sub-regions are lagging behind in development or their access to markets 
and other resources is limited.    
The purpose of this study is to develop and empirically test a model of fiscal 
policy mimicking and determine if there is evidence of fiscal policy harmonization in the 
SADC and Sub-Saharan African (SSA) regions by looking at both the expenditure and 
tax setting structures. The SSA region comprises of 47 countries of which the majority 
belong to one or more regional blocs which aim to promote, among other objectives, 
sustainable and equitable economic growth, socio-economic development and 
cooperation or integration among the member countries involved. Other objective issues 
covered by these blocs include the harmonization of macroeconomic policies, promotion 
of intra-regional trade and political considerations. While some of these blocs have been 
in place for quite a long time and even before some of the member countries attained 
independence, they did not make much stride with regard to attaining their objectives. 
However, the SSA countries have recently been inspired by the success of integration 
efforts in Europe and the Americas (Maruping 2005). Post-independence economic 
integration will also help these countries gain bargaining power and economic strength to 
be able to survive the threat of marginalization that comes with the globalization process.  
Unlike the U.S., which has achieved full or deep integration of states whereby 
labor, capital and goods could cross borders virtually without any impediments, or the 
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European Union which is headed towards full integration, the SSA region is nowhere 
near achieving such a degree of integration, even within the different economic blocs.  
The objective of Africa’s regional integration has been evolving over time and while 
most were initially focused mainly on political decolonization of Africa, this objective 
shifted to that of socio-economic integration in the post-independence period. Regional 
integration entails merging the economies involved and this requires harmonization of 
economic policies which pave the way for the merger.   
It is against this background that we are motivated to focus on these countries 
which belong to one big bloc in the form of SSA as well as other relatively smaller 
regional economic blocs within SSA. That these countries are already on a quest to 
harmonize their macroeconomic policies, including fiscal policies, makes it even more 
interesting and worthwhile to test the copycat theory on their policies. Though it can be 
argued that the objectives of these regional blocs, which are discussed in detail below, 
could act as a catalyst in driving the mimicking behavior, it is still worth the while to 
undertake this study as it will help us make policy recommendations on the best way to 
proceed with integration objectives. This study thus attempts to determine if any fiscal 
policy harmonization is taking place in Africa, south of the Sahara, and we do this by 
way of testing for spatial interactions in government expenditures and revenues among 
these countries. All these regional integration blocs have as part of their main objectives, 
the harmonization of their macro-economic policies, including fiscal policies. It is 
possible that such efforts to harmonize policies could lead to mandated copycat behavior, 
but we also believe that voluntary copycat behavior could be playing a leading role 
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especially when we take into account that the economic integration process is usually a 
very slow and onerous process.  
This research thus tests for fiscal policy harmonization in the SSA region at large 
but with more focus on SADC, to determine if such harmonization has already kicked in 
or not.  Given the broad objectives of this integration, one would expect cooperation 
among the Member countries’ fiscal policies.  With these communities having been in 
existence for quite some time these countries have tended to look at their neighbors’ or 
fellow members’ policies when formulating their own, hence, our interest in studying if 
there has been any copycatting behavior with respect to fiscal policies.  If copycat 
behavior exists, we would expect tax burdens and expenditure levels to be similar across 
governments, but given that these countries are prone to substantial external shocks to 
their systems, this may not be the case. Given that the SADC region and other regional 
economic blocs are currently looking into harmonizing tax policies, among other 
macroeconomic policies, the occurrence of copycat behavior or a lack thereof would help 
determine the need to strengthen institutional structures that have been put in place, 
aimed at fiscal harmonization.  
However, while copycat behavior on taxes (and expenditures alike) could mean 
that we should expect to see some convergence in tax levels and tax structures, this may 
not be the case as there are some constraints to the extent of copycat.  These include 
factors such as each country’s economy or level of development where for instance, it 
could not be easy or practical for one country to fully mimic the income tax structure of 
its neighbor(s) because of greater tax enforcement problems especially in the poorer 
nations.  The choice of tax policies in developing countries is also greatly affected by 
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their large informal economies which makes it difficult for these countries to fully coin 
their tax policies based on those of their neighbors.  While we are not pre-empting our 
findings, we just want to bring to the attention of the reader that constraints faced by 
developing nations could impact on the extent to which these nations could mimic their 
neighbors’ fiscal policies and we revisit these issues in the subsequent sections.  
Further, the study adds something new to the study of joint determination by 
exploring the presence of spatial interaction in the joint determination of revenues and 
expenditures in the SSA countries and SADC. Previous studies on government 
expenditures and revenues have focused on the simultaneous determination of the two as 
well as on the direction of causality between them. With regard to the former, there are 
four possibilities that explain the nature of causality patterns (Hoover and Sheffrin 1992) 
existing between spending and taxation revenue. Causation could run from spending to 
taxation, i.e., where spending comes first or is determined exogenously with taxes 
adjusted to minimize distortions; taxes may cause spending; the two may be mutually 
determined, i.e., a bi-directional causality pattern; or taxes and spending may be causally 
independent.  Understanding the relationship between government spending and taxation 
is important in evaluating the government’s role in the distribution of resources.  
In their study, Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2002) use an empirical approach to 
hypothesize the simultaneous consideration of tax and expenditure policies by state and 
local government authorities. The authors hypothesize that the tax and expenditure share 
variables are simultaneously determined and they behave as complements in state and 
local budgets. Their findings indicate that revenue and expenditure distribution 
instruments are complements and they also conclude that states that use income taxes 
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more heavily than others are more likely to weigh social services more heavily when they 
make expenditure decisions.  The reverse would apply for states that rely less on income 
taxes for revenues.   
This study, though, does not focus on the direction of causality between 
government revenues and expenditures, nor does it conduct the simultaneous 
consideration of tax and expenditures policies by these countries. Rather, we use relative 
performance assessments2 or government efficiency to determine if mimicry behavior is 
present in this measure of simultaneity. Whereas the first part of the study assesses the 
spatial effects of expenditures and taxes in isolation, this second part takes into account 
the fact that voters do assess the level of spending on or taxation for public goods 
provision simultaneously with the amount of public goods that they receive from the 
government (Geys 2005). They thus assess the “price/quantity”  of government policy in 
relation to that of their neighbors and may want the two to be as close as possible. We 
thus apply the spatial interaction analysis to government efficiency by using the 
“price/quantity”  ratio of government policy as a basis for assessing relative performance 
by illustrating that this ratio of government tax revenues to public goods provision in 
country i is dependent upon the same ratio in neighboring countries.   
The rest of this study is outlined as follows.  Chapter 2 gives a review of why 
jurisdictions would engage in mimicking behavior; the motivation of this study and the 
institutional context which entails a detailed background of SADC and a briefly outlines 
other SSA regional economic blocs and their objectives.  In Chapter 3 we discuss the 
                                                 
2 We use the ratio of tax revenues to public goods provision as the indicator for relative performance 
assessments. Geys, Benny  (2005), employs a stochastic parametric reference technology to measure 
efficiency. High efficiency indicates that the government needs only few resources or taxes to generate 
high levels of public goods, while the opposite applies for low efficiency.    
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literature as it relates to mimicking behavior of jurisdictions and/or strategic interaction.  
Chapter 4 lays out the theoretical frameworks that help guide the empirical specifications 
which are discussed in Chapter 5. The data are discussed in Chapter 6 and these contain 
observations for 24 countries in SSA under government expenditures and 30 countries in 
SSA under government revenues. In addition, 11 SADC member countries are also 
analyzed. The results are presented in Chapter 7, while Chapter 8 covers the summary 
and conclusions. Chapter 9 covers policy recommendations/implications and as well as 
suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: MOTIVATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
 
What is Copy-Cat Behavior 
 
An interesting quote adopted from Meissner and Dickman (2000) goes: “Silicon 
Valley is the only place on Earth not trying to figure out how to become Silicon Valley.”  
What this quote captures is that it is usually the jurisdiction that is performing well 
economically that is not trying to copy other jurisdictions, but itself.  Our copycat theory 
is based on this behavior that jurisdictions will always try to improve their fiscal 
performance by copying their neighbors’ policies which are making those neighbors 
successful and also which are conducive or adaptable to the copying countries’ 
economies. Each jurisdiction or country in this case, wants to propel its economic 
structure to a level that is cherished by everyone and one way to achieve this is by way of 
adopting policies that are seen to be successful elsewhere. Let us take for instance the 
popularity of the Asian Tigers in the early to mid 1990s.  The world at large was 
interested in knowing what they were doing in terms of tax, other fiscal and 
macroeconomic policies to achieve such growth and this interest extended to emulation 
where possible or feasible.   
We look at copycat behavior as it applies to tax policies (competition or 
harmonization) and to government spending decisions. We focus on the presence of 
mimicking behavior of fiscal policies of these neighboring jurisdictions, barring factors 
arising from correlated random shocks that could produce correlation in neighbors’ tax 
revenues and especially expenditures, when in fact such correlation is non-existent.  
Examples are issues like drought which would result in neighbors that are affected by the 
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calamity making provisions for it in their budgets and this does not connote copycat 
behavior, hence the need to control for that.  
 
Motivation 
 
The motivation behind this study thus stems from the realization that, at least to 
our knowledge no such study has been undertaken for developing countries.  Most 
previous studies have focused in the U.S. and Europe, with these studies done mostly at a 
local level.  Further, the few studies that have looked across countries have done so at the 
local level, with the exception of Redoano (2003) whose study focuses on fiscal 
interactions among European Union states at a national government level.  
Most of the empirical literature on copy cat behavior in public finance and other 
areas has focused on local jurisdictions with very few focusing on central governments or 
across countries.  Research in this area in developing countries is completely lacking, 
both at the central and local levels, hence our interest in extending it to this sample. Our 
motivation is also driven by the structural differences that exist between developing and 
developed countries and the will to establish if such differences do extend to policy 
choices and in particular, if some interdependence in fiscal policy choices exists among 
them as it does in developed economies.  When we compare developing and developed 
countries, we find that a number of systematic differences exist between them in terms of 
economic structures and particularly fiscal structures in this case. For instance, the 
patterns of public expenditures in developing countries differ from those of developed 
countries because of the different requirements at different stages of development which 
make priorities in public spending different among the two. In developed countries the 
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bulk of government revenues that finance public expenditures are raised through taxes 
whereas in most developing countries the tax system is not well developed and they tend 
to rely on non-tax revenues as the major source of government financing. Further, the 
roles of different levels of government differ between the two with central governments 
in developing countries still assuming a large share of fiscal responsibility as marked by 
the high degree of fiscal centralization in developing countries (Oates 1999).   
Further, reasons why past studies could have focused only on sub-national 
governments could be because country studies would be harder to undertake due to a 
number of factors. First, the way sub-national and national governments finance their 
budgets is different and this could make country studies harder to undertake. National 
governments can finance their budgets with deficit spending, which sub-national 
governments cannot do and this can have implications on spending decisions for these 
jurisdictions. Second, developing countries and particularly African countries’ budgets 
are usually supported or propped up significantly by foreign capital inflows3 and this in 
turn makes the tax price artificially low. This could definitely impact on the results as it is 
possible that the tax price that we are using could not be the “true” price but is largely 
discounted due to the impact of capital inflows.         
However, despite these structural differences between the developing and 
industrialized countries and the difficulties they bring in studying developing countries, 
we believe that it would still be interesting and maybe quite a challenge to extend the 
fiscal interaction research to developing countries and to investigate whether they do 
mimic their neighbors’ policies as it is the case in developed countries.     
                                                 
3 Foreign capital inflows to developing countries and particularly Africa shot up during the 1980s and 
1990s following the financial sector liberalizations (including exchange control liberalization) in many 
developing countries. 
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In our case, therefore, we will focus on some developing countries from Africa 
and our analysis will be done at the central government level. This dissertation focuses on 
the SADC region as well as the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa which comprises a number of 
regional economic blocs most of which are looking into harmonizing their 
macroeconomic policies, including fiscal policies. This study thus attempts to determine 
if fiscal policy harmonization is taking place in Africa, and we do this by way of testing 
for spatial interactions among these countries.  The objectives of these regional 
integration blocs all point towards harmonizing their macro-economic policies which 
include fiscal policies. It is possible that such efforts to harmonize policies could lead to 
mandated copycat behavior, but we also believe that there could be some voluntary 
copycat behavior taking place, all the more so that the integration process is usually a 
very slow and onerous process. 
Our study is further enhanced by applying the spatial interaction analysis to 
government efficiency, using the “price/quantity”  ratio of government policy as a basis 
for assessing relative performance by illustrating that this ratio of government tax 
revenues to public goods provision in country i is dependent upon the same ratio in 
neighboring countries.   This builds upon literature by Geys (2005), who points out that 
rational individuals consider taxation for public goods provision and the amount of public 
goods that they receive simultaneously and not in isolation as most studies tend to 
assume. In this case we assume that rational individuals can be expected to consider both 
the level of taxation for public goods provision and the level of public goods in assessing 
their governments’ performance and we extend this to determine whether or not they do 
so in relation to policies of neighboring governments.  The study will address the 
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efficiency issue at a central government level as opposed to previous studies that were 
carried at a local government level. 
 
Why Do Jurisdictions Engage in Fiscal Mimicking 
 
Policymakers often mention tax mimicking as a justification for particular 
decisions.  According to Ladd (1992), local officials might defend a decision to raise the 
local sales tax rate based on the fact that the new rate will not be out of line with those in 
neighboring jurisdictions.  On the other hand, they may oppose an increase in a certain 
tax rate, say the property tax rate, because the resulting tax burden will be excessive 
relative to those in nearby jurisdictions.  Concern about the loss of business activity to 
neighboring jurisdictions could also lead to tax mimicking and this concern motivates 
much of the theoretical literature on tax competition that explores how competition 
among jurisdictions for a mobile tax base, such as industrial property, affects the nature 
of the equilibrium and the efficiency of public sector choices. However, Ladd (1992) 
shifts the attention away from business taxes and concentrates on individual tax burdens 
which can be used by resident voters through the political “voice”  mechanism, as a 
benchmark with which to appraise the fiscal performance of their own government. They 
do so by comparing their tax burdens with those of neighboring jurisdictions and use the 
polls to punish their officials if they impose tax burdens that are out of line with those of 
their neighbors.   
Further, tax mimicking could occur for political reasons.  For instance, elected 
officials are well aware that their jobs may or usually depend on the decisions that they 
make with regard to tax rate changes. Changes to tax bases also, like exempting food 
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from sales tax, adopting the single weight sales under corporate tax,4 among others, can 
impact on ones term in office. Governors have been unseated because of their tax policies 
and taxes appeared to be responsible for 30 percent of gubernatorial defeats in the 1960s 
and 20 percent in the 1970s in the U.S. according to evidence presented by Beyle (1983).  
Hence, it is not uncommon for tax changes to be foregone or not implemented especially 
if officials fear that they will not be able to convince the electorate that such changes are 
warranted and also if they understand that their jobs may be in jeopardy in case they try 
and fail.  Tax competition can also be political with jurisdictions using tax to lure firms 
from other jurisdictions with the objective of creating, among others, more jobs and 
revenue.    
With regard to expenditures, jurisdictions use them to compete with each other for 
businesses. Case, Hines et al.(1989) point out that jurisdictions’ spending levels do affect 
each other in that when one jurisdiction perceives its spending levels to be out of line 
with those of its neighbors or similarly situated jurisdictions, it would often adjust its 
expenditures accordingly. For example, in the U.S. we could observe such expenditures 
mimicking in education such as funding for pre-school kids, Georgia’s HOPE5 
scholarship program and others. Possible public expenditure interactions among countries 
could exist because of some form of yardstick competition rather than a form of tax 
competition due to low labor mobility across countries (Redoano 2003). Some positive 
externalities that exist among countries could make policy choices dependent and these 
could be in the form of public investments in infrastructure which tend to spillover in 
neighboring countries in the form of benefits. These neighboring countries will tend to 
                                                 
4 This refers to the administering of corporate income tax when dealing with multi-state corporations and 
how you divide their income between states. 
5 HOPE is the acronym of Helping Outstanding Students Educationally. 
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compete or even complement those policy choices by undertaking similar investments in 
similar types of infrastructure.     
However, the big question is whether the reasons give above apply to developing 
countries.  With the structural differences that exist between developed and developing 
countries, especially with regard to sources of revenue, it is not clear if voters in 
developing countries are able to distinguish the role played by domestic politicians versus 
that played by external actors such as donors, the IMF and other funding organizations or 
shocks such as droughts, wars, and others. In most developing countries and Africa in 
particular, politicians do not feel accountable to voters and would not feel threatened by 
voters voting them out for failure to deliver to the people. 
Most democratic countries have both a national government and a set of local 
governments and some have three levels of government, as follows: federal/central, state 
and local government. While most studies on tax and expenditure mimicking have 
concentrated on local and/or state governments, the study of central systems is also 
growing in importance, though little work has been done in this area. Further, with the 
evolving of new entities such as the European Union, the importance of elevating the 
study to the national level becomes more distinct. 
 
Some Background on SADC and SSA and its Economic Blocs 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) or Africa south of the Sahara is made up of 47 
countries, six of which are islands in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. Africa has had 
many different regional organizations since independence that were aimed at cooperation 
and unity and most of these have failed. Currently, all countries in the SSA region belong 
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to at least one regional economic bloc. Most of the regional blocs aim to achieve one or 
more of the integrating cooperation arrangements which include the following, as 
outlined in the (SIPRI) document: 
1. Preferential Trade Area (PTA) or Agreement which entails lower tariffs to 
imports from member countries 
2. Free Trade Area (FTA)–no tariffs on member countries’ goods 
3. Customs Union (CU)–an FTA with same tariffs on goods from non-members 
4. Common Market–a CU that allows free movement of the factors of 
production 
5. Economic Community–a single currency or monetary union whereby fiscal 
and monetary policies are unified. 
All of the above arrangements are found in the SSA region and the multiple 
economic blocs for regional integration in Africa tend to create problems in that some of 
them have the same or overlapping objectives and overlapping membership. The sub-
section below briefly looks at each arrangement and gives its background, though with 
more emphasis on the SADC region which is the major focus of this research. 
 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) comprises of 14 
countries6 namely: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  One of the policies of SADC is to promote sustainable 
                                                 
6 Seychelles opted out of SADC in July 2003 in order to strengthen its relationship with the Indian Ocean 
Organization, but for the period covered in this study, it was still a member of SADC. 
 18 
 
and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development that will ensure poverty 
alleviation with the ultimate objective of its eradication, enhance the standard and quality 
of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the disadvantaged through regional 
integration. The main strategy being followed to reduce poverty through higher levels of 
export-led growth is macroeconomic liberalization (including liberalization of trade 
policy, harmonization of tax policy and more efficient and effective forms of economic 
management) as well as promotion of investment and supply-side measures to assist the 
region to increase production. The broad strategies of SADC thus include, among others, 
harmonizing political and socio-economic policies and plans of member states. Our study 
of tax mimicking will help us determine if these countries are attaining their objective of 
harmonizing tax policies. 
Jurisdictions and regions often engage in harmonizing their policies for a number 
of reasons. Harmonization is often favored by economists because it reduces economic 
distortions that result from differential taxation.  These distortions are particularly strong 
when the same good or activity has different tax rates applied to it according to the 
different principles. Therefore, in order to allow producers and consumers to carry the 
same tax burden for the same economic activities, welfare theory calls for the imposition 
of harmonized taxes.    Unions and economic blocs whose objective is to have free trade 
would opt for harmonization.  As pointed out by Frey and Eichenberger (1996), in such 
unions, the goods produced in any country should be burdened with the same tax rates in 
order to allow suppliers to produce the goods where the real resource costs are lowest.  
Given that one of the reasons jurisdictions mimic one another is to prevent loss of 
business activity, if we do find the evidence of such behavior in the SSA and SADC 
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regions, then it will point towards the achievement of the objective of harmonizing taxes 
in the region to prevent business from being concentrated in one area or country with low 
taxes. Our findings could help the relevant authorities in these regions determine how 
much more work needs to be put in place in pursuing the goal of harmonizing policies 
and if they need to divert resources to the achievement of other objectives, if the 
harmonization is seen to be happening!          
In today’s globalized world, regional integration is viewed as a strategy for 
fostering economic development. It attempts to solve various bottlenecks, which impede 
countries from benefiting from global trade. With regional integration, countries are able 
to forge closer trading links between each other which help strengthen their capacity to 
participate in world trade than it is possible when they are on their own. Regional 
integration also enables many countries to overcome the obstacles represented by their 
relatively small domestic markets, by enabling producers to realize greater economies of 
scale and benefit from the establishment of regional infrastructures. Further, a regional 
approach in key structural areas enables participating countries to pool their resources 
and avail themselves of regional institutional and human resources, in order to attain a 
level of technical and administrative competence that would not be possible on an 
individual basis. Such key structural areas include among others, tariff reduction and 
harmonization, legal and regulatory reform, payment systems rationalization, financial 
sector reorganization, investment incentive and tax system harmonization, and labor 
market reform. Regional integration and coordination thus seek to promote regional trade 
and economic integration through liberalization procedures and harmonization of 
monetary and fiscal policies.  
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It is under this context that the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) was formed. SADC currently has 14 member states and it was formed in 1992. 
However, it started off as the “Frontline States” which were formally constituted in 1975 
and they initiated the formal establishment of structures to promote regional integration 
and cooperation.7  The Frontline States were initially directed towards the political 
liberation of the region and they met regularly to coordinate efforts, resources and 
strategies with regard to the National Liberation Movements of Southern Africa that were 
fighting against colonialism, racism and white minority-rule. This initiative was later 
extended to address military attacks and the destabilization of majority-ruled states by 
apartheid South Africa.    
Most of the countries of Southern Africa ultimately achieved political 
independence, but this was against a background of mass poverty and economic 
backwardness.  These countries were also under threat of the powerful and hostile white 
minority ruled neighbors, viz., South Africa, South West Africa (now Namibia) and 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). In light of this, the leaders of these countries saw the 
promotion of economic and social development through cooperation and integration as 
the next logical step after political independence. This led to the launching of the 
Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC)8 in 1979 and its 
commitment was to pursue policies aimed at economic liberation on the basis of a 
sustainable integrated development of member countries’ economies.  
                                                 
7 The original members of the Frontline States were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zambia. 
8 SADDC comprised of the then majority ruled countries of Southern Africa; Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia.  Zimbabwe joined in 1980 when it attained 
independence.  
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When Zimbabwe and Namibia attained independence in 1980 and 1990 
respectively, that formally ended the struggle against colonialism in the region, with the 
exception of South Africa where the process to end the inhumane system of apartheid 
was underway.  In the meantime, countries in different regions of the globe were 
organizing themselves into closer economic and political entities. These economic blocs 
were aimed at benefiting firms from economies of scale provided by large markets and to 
become competitive both internally and internationally. For firms in Southern Africa not 
to lag behind, it became imperative for a large regional market to be established so they 
too could benefit from the economies of scale. Further, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
it became evident that SADCC needed additional strengthening.  With these 
developments, the region was considered to have transformed from an era of conflict and 
confrontation to one of peace, security and stability. 
By the late 1980s, it had become apparent to the SADCC policy makers, that the 
existing de facto international organization needed a treaty or some legally binding 
instruments. In 1989, the Summit of Heads of State or Government met and decided that 
the SADCC should be formalized to give it an appropriate legal status, taking into 
account the need to replace the Memorandum of Understanding with an Agreement, 
Charter or Treaty. For this reason, a Declaration and Treaty9 was signed in 1992, which 
transformed SADCC from a coordinating conference into a development community, 
                                                 
9 The Treaty formalized SADCC to give it an appropriate legal status, replacing the Memorandum of 
Understanding.  
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SADC.10  SADC thus redefined the basis of cooperation among member states from a 
loose association into a legally binding arrangement. 
 
Table 1: The Evolution of SADC 
 
Year Frontline States    SADCC SADC 
1975 1. Angola 
2. Botswana 
3. Mozambique 
4. Tanzania 
5. Zambia 
1979 1. Angola 
2. Botswana 
3. Lesotho 
4. Malawi 
5. Mozambique 
6. Swaziland 
7. Tanzania 
8. Zambia 
1980 9.  Zimbabwe  
1990 10. Namibia  
1992  1. Angola 
2. Botswana 
3. Lesotho 
4. Malawi 
5. Mozambique 
6. Namibia 
7. Swaziland 
8. Tanzania 
9. Zambia 
10. Zimbabwe 
1994  11. South Africa 
1995 12.  Mauritius 
1997 13.  DRC 
14.  Seychelles 
 
Source: Various Reports 
 
 
                                                 
10 At its inception, SADC had nine members and during the 1990s, its membership in increased to 14 with 
the accession of Namibia in 1990, South Africa in 1994, Mauritius in 1995 and Seychelles and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997. 
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The purpose of this transformation was to promote deeper economic cooperation 
and integration to help many of the factors that make it difficult to sustain economic 
growth and socio-economic development, such as continued dependence on the exports 
of a few primary products. The urgency to transform and restructure the SADC 
economies was mainly brought about by the small size of their individual markets, the 
inadequate socio-economic infrastructure and the high per capita cost of providing this 
infrastructure.  Their low-income base also made it difficult for these economies to 
individually attract or maintain the necessary investments for their sustained 
development.  SADC thus opted for a development integration approach which 
recognizes the political economic diversities of regional integrating countries including, 
among others, their diverse production structures, trade patterns, resource endowments, 
development priorities and resource allocation mechanisms.  The approach allows 
member states to define the scope and sectors of cooperation and to identify appropriate 
strategies and mechanisms to overcome impediments to integration as well as address 
regional imbalances between member states.   
Nonetheless, the Member States have a lot in common with regard to their 
economic and social polices.  A common problem prevalent in all the Member States, 
even those with comparatively productive economies, is poverty. This means that SADC 
countries are also bound by a common determination to improve the quality of their 
people’s lives through the benefits of regional economic integration. Though some 
countries in this region are classified as middle income, they still have a reasonable 
percentage of their citizens living below the poverty datum line.  For instance 37.4 
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percent of citizens in Botswana,11 a middle income country, lived below the national 
poverty line in 2002, while 65 percent of South Africans12 lived below the poverty datum 
line in 2000.  
 
Table 2: GDP per Capita for SADC Members (constant 2000 US$) 
 
Country 
Name 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 
Angola .. .. .. .. 928 843 878 597 715 814 
Botswana 254 301 436 836 1247 1682 2487 2588 3135 3532 
DRC 324 316 327 318 252 240 205 119 89 87 
Lesotho 111 145 151 198 312 322 391 449 493 530 
Malawi 97 107 119 147 158 150 143 153 166 157 
Mauritius .. .. .. .. 1564 1838 2522 3050 3727 4161 
Mozambique .. .. .. .. 175 121 151 159 208 255 
Namibia .. .. .. .. 1967 1736 1606 1745 1802 1845 
South Africa 2105 2565 3049 3401 3436 3145 3058 2872 2910 3026 
Seychelles 2379 2485 2646 3341 4531 4485 5644 6036 7619 6881 
Swaziland .. .. 727 995 986 960 1336 1318 1336 1358 
Tanzania .. .. .. .. .. .. 267 251 269 309 
Zambia 528 613 569 554 476 417 389 318 328 354 
Zimbabwe 430 435 570 610 562 572 602 570 570 .. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2005) 
 
Table 2 above gives the GDP per capita for all the SADC member countries and 
shows how they compare to one another. While some countries have improved over time 
between 1960 and 2003, most have stalled or even worsened. The statistics indicate that 
the member countries are at different stages of development, with the majority poor and 
generally under-developed.  A number of factors have contributed to these disparate 
growth patterns in this region, and these range from civil wars which have ravaged 
countries like DRC, shrinking its GDP per capita by almost four fold over four decades; 
                                                 
11 Mmegi, October 22, 2004.  
12 Africa Recovery, Vol.14, #4 (January 2001), page 12. 
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to the discovery of precious minerals like diamonds in Botswana, which helped bolster its 
growth and hence the GDP per capita.  In some countries the discovery of precious 
minerals has resulted in illegal mining of these minerals and civil wars, which adversely 
affected the growth of the economies due to political instability and badly designed 
economic policies as resources are diverted to the wars.      
According to the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) and Regional Indicative 
Programme (RIP), the main strategy being followed by SADC to achieve poverty 
reduction through higher levels of export-led economic growth is macro-economic 
liberalization (including liberalization of trade policy, harmonization of tax policy and 
more efficient and effective forms of economic management) as well as promotion of 
investment and supply-side measures to assist the region to increase production. The 
SADC Protocol on Trade (Southern African Development Community [SADC] 1993) 
aims to achieve full implementation of the SADC Free Trade Area by 2008. According to 
this Protocol, Member States are expected to liberalize tariffs on trade according to the 
following three product groups: 
a) Immediate Liberalization or Category "A"–products under this group are to be 
reduced to "zero" or become "free" in the first year of implementation; 
b) Gradual Liberalization or Category "B"–tariff reductions on some products 
will start in the first year, others in year three, four or five. Tariffs on all products falling 
under this category will be reduced to "zero" or become "free" of import duty in year 
eight; and  
c) Sensitive Products or Category "C"–this group was split into two. However, 
almost all products in this Category are in group (i) and tariff reductions will start in year 
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eight and end in year twelve. This means that they will be "free" in year twelve. Group 
(ii) is an exclusion list and goods under the exclusion list will not be touched or reduced 
to "zero." 
The objectives of the Free Trade Area are to further liberalize intra-regional trade 
in goods and services; ensure efficient production; contribute towards the improvement 
of the climate for domestic, cross-border and foreign investment; ensure efficient 
production; and enhance economic development, diversification and industrialization of 
the region. Overall, the objective is to have 85 percent of all intra-SADC trade at zero 
tariffs by 2008 and the remaining 15 percent to be liberalized by 2012. The main 
instrument of trade liberalization is therefore the elimination of customs tariffs and non-
tariff measures on substantial intra-SADC trade. The SADC region has adopted the 
following specific strategies in order to achieve the above objectives, viz: 
1. The gradual elimination of tariffs; 
2. Adoption of common rules of origin; 
3. Harmonization of customs rules and procedures; 
4. Attainment of internationally acceptable standards, quality, accreditation 
and metrology;  
5. Harmonization of sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures; 
6. Elimination of non-tariff barriers; and 
7. Liberalization of trade in services.  
In addition to participating in regional trade agreements, SADC countries are also 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and therefore have an interest in 
multilateral tariff negotiations. For instance, South Africa signed a free trade agreement 
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with the EU in 1999. The road to regional integration is usually slow and full of bends 
and bumps.  Progress towards accelerated integration in SADC has been quite modest. In 
spite of the slow progress, however, there is still popular and widespread support attached 
to economic integration by many governments.  The fact that the SADC region is 
founded on economic structures that were based on the import substitution model is seen 
as a key factor to the slow implementation of regional integration initiatives. Most 
member countries were economically dependent on protected industries for both 
employment creation and the fiscal revenues obtained from the protective tariffs. With 
this background, it was difficult to implement protocols that called for opening up their 
markets to outside competitors.  Most countries were concerned that this would lead to 
significant losses in fiscal revenues as well as employment. Implementation has thus 
slowed down as governments tried to find alternative sources of revenue and most 
governments did so by introducing alternative non-discriminatory taxes, such as the 
Value Added Tax (VAT).   VAT is relatively new in the region and it has not been 
adopted by all the member countries yet. Table 3 gives a summary of consumption taxes 
in SADC and when VAT was adopted.      
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Table 3: SADC Countries’ Adoption of VAT and Other Consumption Taxes 
 
Country Adoption Date Rate (percent) Base Exemptions 
VAT 
Botswana 1st July 2002 10 G+S Standard 
Lesotho 1st July 2003 5-15: 14 Std G+S Standard, Other 
Malawi  12 G+ST  
Mauritius 1st July 2002 15 G+S Standard, Other 
Mozambique 1st  June 1999 17 G+S Standard, Other 
Namibia 2000 15 G+S Standard 
South Africa 1991 0-14 G+S Standard 
Tanzania 1998 20 G+S  
Zambia July 1995 17.5  Standard, Zero 
rate, Other 
Zimbabwe 1st January 2004 15 G+S  
Other General Consumption Taxes 
Angola  10 G  
DRC  13 G+S  
Swaziland  14 (VAT in 
2006/07) 
G+ST  
Seychelles     
 
Source: Various countries’ Revenue System Reports and Cnossen (2003). 
Notes: G = Goods; S = Services; ST = Services taxed selectively 
 
 
As alluded to earlier, harmonization of tax policies is one of the strategies being 
followed by SADC to achieve poverty reduction, hence this study will determine if this 
liberalization move needs to be enhanced or it is happening naturally.  Considering the 
fact that these countries joined SADCC/SADC at different points of time, the empirical 
study will incorporate time-specific dummy variables that will capture the various 
agreements dates.  
Normally, countries, especially those in the same region, would compete to attract 
business in various ways or to improve the welfare of their citizens. The presence of tax 
competition in the region need not be harmful to the integration process.  According to 
Edwards and de Rugy (2002), a country with low tax rates could be receiving “ too 
much”  investment and the citizens and policy experts of neighboring countries may 
demand the same from their government, hence the mimicking.  Tax competition leads to 
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what is commonly known as a “ race towards the bottom”  whereby it creates pressure to 
reduce tax rates globally13 and all countries gain from increased growth and higher 
incomes as investment is re-aligned from jurisdictions that had always had low tax rates 
to those that that reduce their rates.  As alluded to earlier, mimicking is done with the 
objective to achieve positive outcomes, such as improving one’s investment climate in 
the case of taxes by expanding the opportunities and increasing incentives for investment. 
This in turn translates into higher GDP as well as an improved standard of living for 
citizens and hence reduced poverty.    
Edwards and de Rugy (2002) point out that opposition to international tax 
competition, though wrapped in the language of economics, stems mainly from political 
concerns whereby it is considered to reduce the ability of governments to redistribute 
income.  As such, rising tax competition has caused governments to adopt defensive rules 
which include, among others, proposals to harmonize taxes across countries and 
restricting countries from offering tax climates that are too hospitable to foreign 
investment inflows.   
 
Other Regional Economic Blocs of Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
A number of regional integration blocs exist in Africa and especially in SSA, 
most of which tend to overlap in terms of member states as well as in terms of objectives 
they want to attain. Our focus is on the objective of harmonizing macroeconomic policies 
and specifically fiscal harmonization, which is also a necessary condition for a smooth 
                                                 
13 Edwards, C and V de Rugy (2002) point out that the average top personal income tax rate in the major 
industrial countries of the Organization fro Economic Cooperation and Development has fallen 20 basis 
percentage points since 1980 while the average top corporate income tax fell by 6 percentage points over a 
six year period.     
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implementation of economic integration, in addition to trade policies and monetary 
policies. Most of the economic blocs in SSA have, as one of their major objectives, the 
harmonization of macroeconomic policies, which include fiscal harmonization. Geda 
(2001) opines that most countries in Africa that have adopted the Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) could already be undergoing a de facto macro policy harmonization, at 
least at the level of intent, because of the identical nature of policy instruments prescribed 
by these International Financial Institutions (IFIs). We do take this point into 
consideration when we do our empirical estimations by including a dummy to capture the 
SAPs. 
Our focus on fiscal policy harmonization is embedded in the crucial role it plays 
in the process towards attaining regional integration. Its key role comes from the link 
between fiscal deficit, exchange rate and the external sector with the last two being the 
channels that link a country with the rest of the world.  This makes fiscal policy 
harmonization crucial for regional integration. In the next sub-sections we provide a 
summary of some of the major economic blocs of SSA that aim to harmonize their 
macro-economic policies.  We provide this review to show how much effort these 
regional blocs are making at harmonizing their macroeconomic policies which is actually 
mandated copycat behavior.  While it will be difficult to separate the mandate copycat 
behavior from the voluntary copycat behavior, from the review we can deduce that most 
of these blocs still have a long way to go to achieve their objectives because of failure to 
have the needed structural frameworks in place.   
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The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)14 
 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional 
group initially made up of 16 West African countries and it was created on May 28, 1975 
in Lagos, Nigeria. ECOWAS was established with the objective to promote cooperation 
and integration in order to create an economic and monetary union for promoting 
economic growth and development in West Africa. Its scope has now been extended to 
include socio-political interactions. However, the process towards achieving the aim of 
collective self-sufficiency was very slow hence the treaty was revised in Cotonou on July 
24, 1993 towards a looser collaboration. One of the major objectives of ECOWAS is the 
harmonization and coordination of the economic, scientific, technical, cultural and social 
policies of Member States; 
ECOWAS has encountered many problems some of which include political 
instability, poor governance in many member states, little or no diversification of member 
states’ economies, poor infrastructure and many regional integration blocs with the same 
objectives.  
 
Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)  
 
 
COMESA was established on November 5, 1993 in Kampala, Uganda. Its 
members are Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. COMESA replaced the former 
                                                 
14 ECOWAS members include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Mauritania 
withdrew its membership in 2000. 
 32 
 
Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which came into existence in 1981 but its origins can be 
traced as far back as the mid-1960s. In October 1965, the United Nations Economic 
Commissioner for Africa (ECA) set up a meeting for states of eastern and southern Africa 
which were politically independent to consider proposals for the establishment of a 
mechanism for the promotion of sub-regional economic integration. The meeting 
recommended the creation of an Economic Community of Eastern and Southern African 
states. Following a number of developments during the 1970s in the region which include 
the collapse of the federations in eastern and central Africa, the destabilization of the 
southern states by apartheid South Africa and the urgency to reduce economic 
dependence on the industrialized countries of the north, the region finally signed a Treaty 
establishing the PTA in December 1981 in Lusaka, Zambia. The PTA Treaty envisaged 
its transformation into a Common Market and this was realized in 1993 when the Treaty 
establishing COMESA was signed in Kampala, Uganda.  
Members of COMESA agreed to cooperate in exploiting the natural and human 
resources for the good of all their people. Its objectives include, among others, attaining 
sustainable growth and development of the member states through the promotion of a 
more balanced and harmonious development of its production and structures; promoting 
joint development in all fields of economic activity and the joint adoption of macro-
economic policies and programs to raise the standards of living of the member states’ 
citizens; as well as inter-state cooperation, harmonization of macroeconomic policies and 
integration of programs among the member states. 
 
 
 33 
 
The East African Community (EAC) 
 
The Treaty establishing the East African Community (EAC) was signed on 
November 30, 1999 in Arusha, Tanzania and came into force in 2001.  The EAC member 
countries are the Republics of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and its broad goal is to 
enhance cooperation in all areas for the mutual benefit of the member states by 
establishing a customs union as the entry point of the Community, to be followed by a 
Common Market and subsequently a Monetary Union. Ultimately, the Community 
envisages a political federation of the East African States. As with the other regional 
economic blocs, the EAC’s objectives include among others: promotion of a sustainable 
growth and equitable development of member states; rational utilization of the region’s 
natural resources and protection of the environment; and strengthening and consolidating 
the long standing political, economic, social, cultural and traditional ties by member 
states and associations between the people of the region. 
 
The Indian Ocean Commission (COI) 
 
The Indian Ocean Commission (COI), commonly known as the Commission de 
l'Océan Indien, is an intergovernmental organization whose members are the Indian 
Ocean islands of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mayotte, Reunion Island and the 
Seychelles. These islands formed this commission in order to encourage cooperation. It 
was started in January 1984 under the General Victoria Agreement and its objectives 
include: 
1. diplomatic cooperation;  
2. economic and commercial cooperation;  
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3. cooperation in the field of agriculture, maritime fishing, and the 
conservation of resources and ecosystems;  
4. cooperation in cultural, scientific, technical, educational and judicial 
fields; and 
5. Preparing the region and its economic actors to face the challenge of 
globalization. 
 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
 
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was established on 
October 18, 1983 as the major economic community in Central Africa. Its members are 
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, DRC, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tomé and Principe. Though ECCAS began 
functioning in 1985, it was inactive for several years because of financial difficulties with 
some members failing to pay membership fees and conflicts in the region.  Its objectives 
include among others: to develop capacities to maintain peace, security and stability, 
which are essential prerequisites for economic and social development; and to develop 
physical, economic and monetary integration. 
 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
 
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)15 is the Horn of Africa 
regional grouping which came into being following recurring and severe droughts and 
other natural disasters between 1974 and 1984 which caused widespread famine, 
ecological degradation and economic hardship in the region. While individual countries 
                                                 
15 Members of IGAD include Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.   
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took substantial measures to cope with the problems and also received support from 
outside, they decided to go for a regional approach that will supplement national efforts. 
Hence, the six countries of the region, through the United Nations, established an 
intergovernmental body for development and drought control in their region. 
This would create a fully-fledged regional political, economic, development, 
trade, and security entity similar to the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
However, cooperation in this region is currently on hold because of the various political 
problems which are dogging it. For instance, there is no functioning government in 
Somalia while Ethiopia and Eritrea have not yet resolved their border issues; Sudan has 
internal problems and for those member countries that are not fighting, they are 
concentrating on other regional blocs to which they are members.    
Sub-Saharan Africa has got quite a number of regional blocs as indicated in Table 
4 below and some of these are smaller blocs inside or within a bigger bloc, focusing on a 
different mandate, like the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) within SADC, an 
economic bloc.  This study will not focus on all the economic blocs separately, except for 
SADC, but it incorporates only three large ones in the empirical study due to data 
limitations as well as the problem of multiple memberships of countries to these blocs.  
Table 4 summarizes these regional blocs in terms of area size, population, GDP and GDP 
per capita.   
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Table 4: Sub-Saharan African Economic Regional Blocs 
 
African Economic Community (2004, 2005) 
GDP (PPP) ($US) Pillars 
regional 
blocs (REC) 
Area (km²) Population 
in millions per capita 
Member 
states 
AEC 29,910,442 853,520,010 2,053,706 2,406 53 
ECOWAS 5,112,903 251,646,263 342,519 1,361 15 
ECCAS 6,667,421 121,245,958 175,928 1,451 11 
SADC 9,882,959 233,944,179 737,335 3,152 14 
EAC 1,763,777 97,865,428 104,239 1,065 3 
COMESA 12,873,957 406,102,471 735,599 1,811 20 
IGAD 5,233,604 187,969,775 225,049 1,197 7 
GDP (PPP) ($US) Other 
African 
blocs 
Area (km²) Population in millions per capita 
Member 
states 
CEMAC 1 3,020,142 34,970,529 85,136 2,435 6 
SACU 1 2,693,418 51,055,878 541,433 10,605 5 
UEMOA 1 3,505,375 80,865,222 101,640 1,257 8 
UMA  5,782,140 84,185,073 491,276 5,836 5 
 
Source: Table adapted from  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_Community_of_Central_African_States 
 
Notes: 1 Economic bloc inside a pillar REC 
AEC–African Economic Community 
ECOWAS–Economic Community of West African States 
ECCAS-Economic Community of Central African States (in French, Communauté Économique 
des États d'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC)) 
SADC–Southern African Development Community 
EAC–East African Community 
COMESA–Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
IGAD–Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
CEMAC–Economic and Monetary Authority of Central Africa 
SACU–Southern African Customs Union 
UEMOA–Western African Economic and Monetary Union  
UMA–Arab Magreb Union 
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CHAPTER 3: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
This section gives a detailed overview of the mimicking literature by reviewing 
previous studies on fiscal policy mimicking and related areas. It will focus on, among 
other issues, how these studies estimated the copycat marginal effect, the control 
variables they used and their homogeneity, the choice of weight matrices as well as the 
methodologies they applied. 
As indicated above, empirical studies in public finance have started applying 
spatial models to capture mimicking behavior or strategic interactions that occur between 
governments of all levels in terms of spending and tax revenue decisions. The mimicking 
or spatial interaction behavior is captured by way of using weight matrices which help 
capture the potential spatial correlation either in the dependent variables (by way of the 
spatial autoregressive model) or in the error terms (using the spatial error model) or 
testing for spatial correlation in both the dependent variable and the errors (using the 
general spatial model). A detailed discussion of the models is given in Chapter 5.    
A large amount of empirical and some theoretical research has explained the 
copycat behavior using different underlying theoretical frameworks such as spillover 
effects as in Case, Rosen et al.(1993), strategic interaction (Brueckner 1998), tax 
competition (Wildason 1989) or yardstick competition (Besley and Case 1995 and Ladd 
1992).  However, Case, Hines et al.(1989) point out that estimating the parameters of 
these models is the same, regardless of the underlying theoretical framework.  Spillover 
effects refer to a situation where public expenditures in one state benefit residents of 
neighboring states and these could exist as externalities (Redoano 2003) in one 
jurisdiction which spillover into another jurisdiction and determine the level of 
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investment in the jurisdiction benefiting from the externalities. Strategic interaction 
occurs when conditions in which policy decisions are made in one jurisdiction are 
affected by the actions of neighboring jurisdictions. With regard to tax competition in 
mimicking behavior, jurisdictions choose tax rates (corporate, property, etc.) taking into 
account the migration of mobile capital in response to tax differentials with the 
neighboring jurisdictions while mimicking based on yardstick competition involves a 
situation where citizens can evaluate the performances of their policy makers by using 
policy choice taken by neighboring countries as their benchmark.  
 
Expenditure Mimicking 
While our study uses the explanation based on the tax competition literature on 
the revenue side, with regard to expenditures, it follows the strategic interaction of Case, 
Rosen et al. (1993) by applying this to developing countries. With regard to independent 
variables, studies that focus on the expenditure side to test for mimicking add to the 
generic estimating equation, the expenditures of neighboring jurisdictions. (A detailed 
explanation is given in Chapter 5.)  For instance, Case, Hines et al. (1989) and Case, 
Rosen et al. (1993) test the notion that state governments’ expenditures depend on the 
spending of similarly situated states.  This was one of the first papers to include the 
expenditures of neighboring states in the generic expenditure estimation equation, i.e., in 
addition to income, the jurisdiction’s grants from other levels of government, its 
demographic and/or political considerations. The expenditures of neighboring countries 
are the independent variables that are used to pick up mimicking or spatial interaction.  
This variable is interacted with the weight matrix of choice and the estimated coefficient 
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gives the mimicking behavior or spatial interaction. Other studies that focus on testing for 
mimicking behavior in expenditures have been carried out by Redoano (2003), Revelli 
(2002) and Revelli (2003).      
Mimicking behavior has been found to exist with regard to government spending 
decisions and Case et al. (1989), and Case, Rosen et al. (1993) observed that U.S. 
jurisdictions’ spending levels affected each other in that when one state perceived that its 
spending levels were out of line with those of its neighbors,16 this would often result in 
demands for change.   Similar findings were made by Revelli (2003) who, using both the 
spatial lag and spatial error models, found that spatial auto-correlation is an important 
feature of local governments’ expenditure decisions. At a country level, Redoano (2003) 
found the presence of spatial interaction in terms of government expenditures in the 
European Union.  
Studies focusing on expenditures have used different ways to define or capture the 
dependent (expenditure) variable.  For instance, Case, Rosen et al. (1993) use per capita 
dollar figures deflated using the personal consumption expenditure deflator and they 
focus on direct expenditures of state and local governments while Revelli (2003) adopts 
the same measure for English non-metropolitan districts but excludes capital expenditures 
and he also uses the logarithms of per capita current expenditure in Revelli (2003) for 
English countries and districts. Similarly, Redoano (2003) also uses per capita public 
expenditures at constant prices for both aggregate and disaggregated expenditures.  Our 
study veers from those measures by using the ratio of disaggregated expenditures to total 
expenditures.   
                                                 
16 Neighborliness does not necessarily mean geographic proximity because states may regard as neighbors 
other states that are similar to them economically or demographically, i.e., without taking into 
consideration the geographical proximity. 
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 Tax Revenue Mimicking 
 The same method of capturing expenditure mimicking behavior is used when 
dealing with tax revenues. Using the spatial lag method, mimicking behavior is captured 
using neighboring jurisdictions’ or countries’ tax revenues and a much wider set of 
literature exists for tax revenues than expenditures.   As with expenditures, we could test 
for tax revenue mimicking in the error terms as well using the spatial error model or the 
general spatial model which captures spatial interaction in both the dependent variable 
and the residuals. Empirical studies conducted in this area have shown that tax policies 
are copied among jurisdictions and to capture tax mimicking, these studies have 
concentrated on either tax rates or tax burdens as variables of interest. Studies that use tax 
rates use either the average tax rate (e.g., Hernandez-Murillo 2003) or the top rate 
especially with regard to personal income tax (Redoano 2003). Studies that have used the 
tax burden or the effective average income tax rate, calculated as a ratio of income tax 
revenue to personal income include Esteller-Moore and Sole Olle (2001), Sole Olle 
(2003) and Ladd (1992). Other taxes like excise taxes when analyzed separately or 
individually have been captured in terms of cents per gallon of gasoline or cents per 
package of cigarettes (Rork 2003). In our study we adopt the ratio method capturing the 
disaggregated tax revenues as ratios of total revenues similar to Rork (2003) who divides 
corporate income tax revenues by adjusted state gross state product (GSP) and in the case 
of personal income he divides all revenues collected from personal income by personal 
income in the state.         
As with the model for expenditure mimicking, the independent variables adopted 
in tax mimicking include, among others, the jurisdiction’s per capita income, 
 41 
 
unemployment rate, demographic variables, political variables and other economic 
variables. In our study we did not include the unemployment rate due to data limitations 
on this variable in developing countries.  Empirical studies on tax mimicking have found 
that it exists at local government as in Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) and Ladd (1992); 
state level in Rork (2003) and Hernandez-Murillo (2003); federal or central government 
level in Redoano (2003) and Ruiz (2006); and and inter-governmental or between 
different levels of government in Esteller-Moore and Sole Olle (2001).   
 
Determining the Weights for the Weight Matrices 
Spatial interaction studies use spatial weights to compute the effect of the tax 
rates or revenues and expenditures of the relevant competitors or neighbors on the home 
jurisdiction. The spatial weight matrix, W, captures the notion of proximity among 
jurisdictions by aggregating the dependent variables (tax rates/revenues or expenditures) 
of neighboring jurisdictions hence its specification imposes a certain pattern of 
interaction.  As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, neighbors in this context do not 
necessarily imply geographical proximity or contiguity only since geography might not 
be the most relevant factor in determining neighbors.  Factors like distance, 
demographics, social and economic variables could exert the most powerful mutual 
influences because of similarities amongst jurisdictions, near or far. Hence, studies tend 
to use different measures to construct the weight matrix, though the most standard is the 
border contiguity measure as in Case, Hines et al. (1989), Case, Rosen et al. (1993), Ruiz 
(2006), Redoano (2003), Hernandez-Murillo (2003), Hernandez-Murillo (2002), and 
Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), to include but a few. Other measures used to construct 
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the weight matrix include economic characteristics like GDP and GDP per capita as in 
Redoano (2003), Case, Hines et al. (1989), and Case, Rosen et al. (1993), demographic 
characteristics such as population size and race (Hernandez-Murillo 2003, Case, Hines et 
al. 1989 and Case, Rosen et al. 1993), and distance decay (Redoano 2003, Brueckner and 
Saavedra 2001 and Garrett, Wagner et al. 2005). 
In this study we adopt the two geographic measures of contiguity and distance, 
given that our sample is largely contiguous and we also include the GDP per capita and 
the poverty measure using the human development index as the poverty proxy. A detailed 
discussion of how we determined these weight matrices is covered in Chapter 5. The rest 
of this chapter gives a review of some of the studies referred to above on how they dealt 
with the issues that are pertinent to mimicking literature and the results they obtained.  
We also include a detailed summary table of literature at the end of this chapter.    
 
Previous Studies 
Case, Hines et al. (1989) and Case, Rosen et al. (1993) test the notion that state 
governments’ expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states.  This was 
one of the first papers to include the expenditures of neighboring states in the generic 
expenditure estimation equation, in addition to income, the jurisdiction’s grants from 
other levels of government, its demographic and/or political considerations. The authors 
observed that jurisdictions’ spending levels affected each other in that when one state 
perceived that its spending levels were out of line with those of its neighbors,17 it would 
                                                 
17 Neighborliness does not necessarily mean geographic proximity because states may regard as neighbors 
other states that are similar to them economically or demographically, i.e., without taking into 
consideration the geographical proximity. 
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often result in demands for change.  They constructed a simple model in which the 
optimizing level of expenditure by a state decision-maker is affected by the expenditure 
levels of that state’s neighbors. To determine which states are neighbors they explored 
several criteria for specifying the weight matrix. A weighting matrix is generated to 
measure the extent to which a state is neighbor to another state by assigning a value to 
each pair of states and this value will depend on the method used to determine neighbors. 
This is not an easy task considering that states with similar demographics may exert 
greater mutual influences because their populations are most likely to compete in national 
markets or, those similar to them economically. The authors constructed weight matrices 
based on geography, per capita income and percentage of population that is black, as 
these turned out to be the ones most consistent with the data.  
The study used annual data for the continental United States during the period 
1970-1985. Using OLS estimation they regressed real per capita income, income squared, 
real per capita total federal grants to state and local governments, population density, 
proportion of the population at least 65 years old, proportion of the population between 5 
and 17 years old, and proportion of the population that is black, as well as state and year 
indicator variables on the sum of direct expenditures of state and local governments, 
exclusive of expenditures for interest, state-run liquor and utility concerns, and insurance.  
They also applied different weight matrix measures to capture the spatial impact of 
neighbors’ expenditures. Their results confirmed that indeed states’ expenditures are 
significantly influenced by their neighbors and these results were consistent with well 
established theoretical models of benefit spillovers among jurisdictions. They found that 
the impact of a dollar of increased spending by a state’s neighbors increases its own 
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spending by about 70 cents. The authors noted that spillovers need not be confined to 
sub-federal jurisdictions, but that for national governments, there is some anecdotal 
evidence indicating that fiscal policies in one country are affected by changes in other 
countries, even without considerations of macroeconomic coordination.   
Case (1993) presents evidence to the effect that, when making a decision to 
reelect a governor, voters may look at the tax increases in neighboring states to obtain 
information on whether a tax increase is appropriate and if so how much it should be. 
Collecting direct information on whether tax changes are necessary can be quite 
expensive for voters to undertake, hence, they may look at the tax changes made in 
neighboring states. The author modeled the patterns of reelection and defeat of governors 
from 1977 to 1988 as a function of changes in state income tax liabilities18 and allowing 
for the possibility that neighboring states’ changes in tax liability during the same period 
may have an impact on the reelection odds of a given state’s governor. Using two-stage 
least squares estimation, they estimated two equations for each income category. To 
determine if the TRA86 changes would influence the results, the first estimation did not 
allow for TRA86 to affect the sensitivity of a state’s tax change to its neighbors’ tax 
changes while the second estimation did allow for the impact of TRA86. The paper 
concluded that comparisons with neighbors influence gubernatorial behavior: Governors 
are more likely to raise taxes when their neighbors are doing the same.    
One of the early studies that contributed to the literature on the determination of 
local taxes by testing the hypothesis about tax mimicking was carried out by Ladd 
(1992). She looked specifically into whether local governments consider the tax burdens 
                                                 
18 They looked specifically at the difference between the income tax liability in the governor’s reelection 
year and the tax liability in effect at the end of the governor’s first year in office. 
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in other jurisdictions when making their own tax decisions, if that was the case, there 
would be less observed variation in the tax burdens of neighboring jurisdictions than in 
comparable non-neighboring jurisdictions.  Unlike the previous studies such as Case, 
Hines et al. (1989) and Case (1993), that tested for fiscal copycatting at the state level, 
Ladd focused on tax mimicking at the local level.  
Following a number of studies on tax and expenditure mimicking in states and 
local governments in the United States, similar studies were carried out in Europe. One of 
these was by Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) who present evidence of tax mimicking 
among Belgian municipalities. By applying tax mimicking theory to a different 
institutional setting, they were able to establish the extent to which mimicking is not 
typical to the U.S. system only but rather a general characteristic of decision making in a 
context of decentralized government.   The authors focused on the choice of tax rates for 
the local income tax and the local property tax, which are the major sources of revenue. 
They looked at 589 municipalities for the 1991 budgetary year and given that Belgian 
municipalities are very small and thus institutionally homogeneous, they used geographic 
neighbors as a choice of reference. This is unlike in the U.S. where responsibilities 
among types of local governments differ considerably. The authors were also able to use 
tax rates instead of tax burdens because of the uniform definition of the tax bases in 
Belgian municipalities.   
Using 3SLS estimation to take account of mutual dependence on tax rates 
between municipalities and also to avoid potential spatial autocorrelation in the error 
terms that occur when using OLS, they modeled both local property tax and local income 
tax as dependent variables per capita income, percentage of people under 20 years, 
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percentage of people over 60 years, the municipality’s area and tax rates in jurisdictions 
of reference. To capture the mimicry behavior, they used a geographical measure that 
allows for some unequal weighting by excluding central cities (with population over 50 
000) from the set of counties neighbors. Their general results were in line with the 
findings obtained in the U.S. that tax policies are copied among states and local 
governments, thus suggesting that mimicking behavior is not exclusive to the U.S. system 
only.  They found evidence of interdependence of different tax rates and also that 
mimicking among Belgian municipalities had a geographical dimension extending 
beyond immediate neighbors. 
A study similar to that of Case (1993) was carried out by Ashworth and Heyndels 
(1997) in Belgium, whereby they investigated politicians’ opinions about the level of 
local tax rates.  Their analysis was aimed at the two most important taxes in Belgium, 
viz., local income tax and local property tax, which account for over 80 percent of all tax 
revenues and they analyzed politicians’ opinions on these.  They formulated a number of 
hypotheses which they tested by introducing questions on tax opinions in a large scale 
survey conducted among politicians who were active at the municipal level in Flanders. 
Questionnaires asked respondents to rate the taxes as to whether they felt they were 
(rather) low, average or (rather) high. The survey was conducted in 1994 and 
questionnaires were sent to all local spokesmen of the six national parties in the 308 
Flemish municipalities. Thus using a sample of 683 Flemish local politicians, the study 
undertook an ordered probit analysis of opinions on the level of local income and local 
property tax rates. The results revealed common influences on the perceptions of how 
high or low local tax rates are.  There was evidence that tax policy in neighboring 
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jurisdictions affects the perceived political cost of one’s own tax rates and that mimicking 
behavior was the expected outcome.  These results are similar to those of Case (1993) 
whereby Governors were found to consider taxes of neighboring states when setting 
theirs.   
Fewer studies on expenditure mimicry behavior have been carried out compared 
to taxes. One such study was done by Revelli (2002) who looked at spatial interactions 
among English local governments in tax setting and public spending decisions. He 
estimated both the spatial lag model, which tests for spatial interaction in the dependent 
variable and the spatial error model which tests for spatial interaction in the error terms. 
Using the border contiguity weight matrix to capture the spatial interaction, his results 
revealed that spatial effects really matter in the specification of the local public 
expenditure determination and also that local property tax mimicry brings about spatial 
auto-correlation in the residuals.  
Another study that focused on expenditures and revenues was conducted by 
Redoano (2003) on European Union (EU) countries in which he tested whether these 
countries set their public expenditures and taxes interdependently.  He bases his 
investigations on two theoretical explanations, one that there exist externalities among 
jurisdictions and hence their policies are not independent and also that countries compete 
with their neighbors in order to attract tax base. Using three weight matrix measures 
based on distance, GDP and GDP per capita to capture the spatial effects, the paper found 
evidence that tax competition occurs in Europe mainly between geographically close 
countries and also found evidence of interdependence in income taxes’ setting and public 
expenditures’ decisions. 
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Alm, McKee et al. (1993) explored the mimicry behavior of states from a 
different angle, by examining the factors that affect the probability that a state will enact 
a lottery and mimicking behavior being one of these factors.  While lotteries have played 
a major role in revenue collection in most American states, the objective of their study 
was to identify those factors that determine whether a state would introduce a lottery or 
not.  Theirs was a divergence from previous research on state lotteries which had focused 
on issues like incidence of the lottery tax, the revenue potential of lotteries and their 
administrative costs. Of particular interest in this study was the role played by fiscal 
pressure in the introduction of lotteries. The authors used discrete-time hazard function 
(duration model) estimation methods to estimate the factors that have led a state to 
introduce a lottery using data collected on all states for the period from the initial 
enactment of a lottery in 1964 to 1988.  The factors they estimated include economic, 
fiscal, demographic and political features of the states.  The results suggested that there is 
a variety of factors influencing the timing of lottery enactment and that fiscal pressures 
played an important role during the early lotteries but that their role has declined over the 
years. Instead, political features and attempts to mimic the behavior of neighboring states 
seem to have become the dominant factors in lotteries introduced recently.   
Mimicry behavior does not apply to fiscal issues only but has been found to apply 
in many areas where individual decision making is involved. Individuals’ attitudes about 
a range of activities may develop through contact with others, be it charitable giving or 
cheating on income taxes, as put by Case (1991).  In a study on farmers’ attitudes toward 
new technologies in Indonesia, Case (1991) developed an estimation scheme that allows 
individuals to be influenced by neighbors when making discrete choices. Using a random 
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sample of rural Javanese farm households from the 1980 survey of SUSENAS,19 the 
author selected a sub-sample comprising of 1,664 wet rice producing farms from 84 
districts in four rural provinces of Java.  In this study, “ neighbors”  refers to farmers who 
live in the same district in rural Java and geographic proximity was used because farmers 
are more likely to have the most contact with farmers that are close by. Using both 
standard probit estimation and probits that allow for neighbors’ influence, they found 
strong evidence for neighborhood effects.     
McGarvey and Walker (2004) revisit the Case, Rosen et al. (1993) study using 
new data and a new methodology to estimate three fiscal behavioral issues.  These issues 
are: that states’ budgetary decisions are influenced by their neighbors’ tax and 
expenditure policies; that demographic variations have an impact on spending patterns; 
and that federal grants have a larger than expected impact on state spending. They 
specified a fully parametric conditional mean function by displaying first-order spatial 
dependence and combine that with semi-parametric estimation of the moment conditions’ 
covariance.  By so doing they allowed for more general cross-sectional dependence in the 
model’s unobservables. Using panel data on 48 states from 1977 to 1999, they found 
evidence that the copycat effect was small but statistically significant. Their results also 
suggested that the copy-cat effect was very sensitive to whether a proxy for tax price was 
included in the model and when such a proxy was included, the copy-cat effect fell by 
more than half.    
Most literature on spatial effects in government tends to focus on taxation and 
expenditure levels and Geys (2005) argues that this deems such studies incomplete. He 
points out that rational individuals are likely to consider the level of spending on (or 
                                                 
19 This is the 1980 Indonesian socio-economic survey.  
 50 
 
taxation for) public goods provision simultaneously with how much public goods they 
actually receive.  He argues that they assess the “price/quantity” of government policy in 
relation to that of neighboring jurisdictions rather than concentrating on spending or 
taxation levels alone. Focusing on the ratio of tax revenues to public goods provision as a 
proxy for relative performance assessments, the author uses data on Flemish 
municipalities to demonstrate whether a spatial pattern exists among them. The 
dependent variable indicates how efficiently tax revenues are employed to generate 
public goods and this is interpreted as an indicator for the “price/quantity” of local 
governments’ policies. Their analysis reveals a significant spatial pattern in Flemish local 
government’s efficiency ratings, implying that efficiency at one local government is 
associated with efficiency at its neighbors.  
Overall, literature relating to mimicking behavior or spatial patterns in 
government’s spending and taxation decision-making suggest that such behavior exists in 
most scenarios where comparison of policies by neighboring jurisdictions, or jurisdiction 
that share similar economic or other characteristics, is possible. Most studies have found 
that spatial auto-correlation exists and it is an important feature in decision-making of 
local and state governments.  While some studies use the spatial lag model which tests for 
spatial interaction in the dependent variable and some use the spatial error model which 
focuses on the unobservables, both models have been able to show if such interaction 
exists.  A third general model that tests for both spatial lag and spatial error 
simultaneously is now being widely used and this study will follow the same approach. 
On issues regarding spatial factors, much as the definition of neighborliness is not 
restricted to contiguity or close neighbors, determining the best measure of the weight 
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matrix to capture the spatial factor is still a problem.  There is no test yet that can be used 
to help researchers choose the best weight matrix measure that applies to their particular 
case, hence determining the weight matrix is still an ambiguous exercise. This study will 
thus use different weight matrix measures, with the primary one being the geographic or 
contiguity measure.   
Most of the literature on copy cat behavior in public finance and other areas has 
focused on local jurisdictions in the empirical studies with very few focusing on central 
governments or across countries.  Research in this area in developing countries is 
completely lacking, both at the central and local levels. This could probably be attributed 
to data limitations. When we compare developing and developed countries, we find that a 
number of systematic differences exist between them in terms of economic structures and 
particularly fiscal structures in this case. For instance, the patterns of public expenditures 
in developing countries differ from those of developed countries because of the different 
requirements at different stages of development which will make one role of public 
expenditures more important that the other. In developed countries the bulk of 
government revenues that finance public expenditures are raised through taxes whereas in 
most developing countries the tax system is not well developed and they tend to rely on 
non-tax revenues as the major source of government financing. Further, the roles of 
different levels of government differ between the two with central governments in 
developing countries still assuming a large share of fiscal responsibility as marked by the 
high degree of fiscal centralization in developing countries (Oates 1999).  Given these 
structural differences between the developing and industrialized countries, it would be 
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interesting to extend the fiscal interaction research to developing countries and to 
investigate whether they do mimic their neighbors’ policies.  
Furthermore, the focus on revenue or taxation and spending levels by most studies 
has been done separately or in isolation. As explained above, studies either focus on taxes 
only or expenditures only, though a few have studied the two functions of government 
jointly.  Even then, those that have looked at both taxes and expenditures at the same time 
have still considered the revenue and expenditures levels separately when determining 
the presence of spatial interactions.  Hence, it has been pointed out that such focus on 
government taxation and expenditure levels in isolation is incomplete (Geys 2005) and it 
needs to be enhanced by looking at both taxation and spending simultaneously. While our 
study looks at the levels of revenues and spending separately, we enhance it by focusing 
on the efficiency of public provision of goods and testing for spatial effects in this 
behavior.  
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Table 5: Summary of Previous Empirical Studies and Results 
 
Author and 
Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
Alm J., et al. 
(1993): 
Examine the factors 
that affect the 
probability that a 
state will enact a 
lottery, where the 
probability is 
assumed to depend 
upon economic, 
fiscal, demographic 
and political 
factors.  
Model: 
Conditional Probability 
)(1
),0...1Pr( 1,1,
it
ittiiitit
xF
xyyyP
β ′−−=
===== −  
where: 
 ity  = discrete dependent variable which 
denotes the lottery status of state i in period t 
F(.) = cumulative normal density function 
itx  = is a vector of factor affecting the 
probability of lottery enactment  
β  = is a vector of coefficients 
∏−
=
−=
1
1
)ˆ1(ˆˆ
s
t
itisis PPQ  
where: 
itPˆ  = the single-year predicted 
probability of lottery  enactment 
isQˆ  = the probability that state i will 
enact a lottery in some period s after s-1 
periods without a lottery.  
Data: 
Methodology: 
Discrete-time hazard function (or duration 
model) estimation method. 
 
The results 
suggest fiscal 
pressures have 
played an 
important role in 
the early lotteries; 
also, an element 
of tax competition 
exists, where 
states decisions 
are affected by the 
actions of other 
states, near and 
far; and political 
considerations as 
well as 
demographic 
features of a state 
also affect lottery 
introduction.  
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Author and 
Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
Ashworth and 
Heyndels (1997) 
They investigate 
politicians’ 
opinions about the 
level of local tax 
rates by presenting 
a test aimed at 
identifying relevant 
determinants of 
both politicians’ 
beliefs and 
attitudes. They also 
test indirectly some 
central hypotheses 
of tax choice 
models from an 
analysis of 
politicians’ 
opinions. 
Model: 
ELECTMAJORIDEOO 3210 ββββ +++=
RENTTAXTAXCH 654 βββ +++  
NUMCH7β+ PRESSNEIGH 98 ββ ++  
RICHPOP 1110 ββ ++  
Where: 
O = the respondent’s opinion on the taxation 
opinion scale 
IDEO = a measure for the ideological position 
of the respondent 
Major = a dummy variable which reflects the 
political position of the respondent 
ELECT = a summary measure of the 
electorate’s ideological position 
TAXCH = the change in the tax rat since 
1988 
TAX = the actual tax rate set by the local 
authority 
RENT = the share of renters as a percentage 
of the local population and applies 
only to the local property tax 
estimation equation. 
NUMCH = the number of changes in the tax 
rate since 1988 
NEIGH = the average tax rate in neighboring 
municipalities. 
PRESS = the number of organized interest 
groups which (tried to) influence the 
respondent’s party. 
POP = the size of the local population 
RICH = the richness of the local tax bases 
Methodology: 
Ordered Probit Analysis 
Data: 
The study finds 
evidence that tax 
policy in 
neighboring 
jurisdictions 
affects the 
perceived local 
political cost of 
one’s own 
property tax rate. 
For opinions on 
the level of local 
income tax rates, 
the ideological 
position of the 
electorate and 
interest group 
activity are 
relevant 
determinants. 
 55 
 
Author and 
Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
From a survey among 683 Flemish politicians 
and aimed at the local income tax (LIT) and 
the local property tax (LPT). 
 
Baicker (2001): 
The paper estimates 
the degree to which 
state spending is 
influenced by the 
spending of 
neighboring states. 
Model:  
itittiit XEwE εβφ ++=  
where: 
itE  = state per capita general expenditures 
tE  = vector of each state’s spending in year t 
iw  = vector assigning a “ neighborliness”  
weight 
itX  = matrix of covariates including state and 
year dummies 
Data: Expenditure data from the Census of 
Government Finances; demographic data 
from the Bureau of the Census Current 
Population Reports; covers 48 contiguous 
states in the years 1983–1994. 
Interstate mobility from PUMS one percent 
sample. 
Methodology: OLS and IV 
  
State spending is 
significantly 
influenced by the 
spending of 
neighboring 
states.  States raise 
their spending by 
something 
between 37 and 88 
cents for every 
dollar increase in 
their neighbors’ 
spending. 
Besley and Rosen 
(1998): 
They analyze the 
phenomenon that 
state and federal tax 
setting decisions 
are interdependent, 
and they estimate 
the magnitude of 
Model:  
jstjsttjtsjst ZXTt ∈++++= δγβα  
where: 
jstt  = the specific rate of sales taxation on 
commodity j in each state in each year 
States do respond 
when the federal 
government 
encroaches on 
their tax bases.  
Specifically, a 10-
cent increase in 
the real federal 
unit tax on 
cigarettes lads to a 
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Author and 
Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
the responses using 
gasoline and 
cigarette tax rates.  
sα  = state fixed effect 
jtT  = the federal sales tax rate in year t, 
tX  = vector of time-varying regressors 
common to all states  
jstZ  = vector of time- and state-varying 
regressors  
jst∈  = random error term 
Data: Annual data on the continental states 
for the years 1975 to 1989 
Methodology: robust standard error 
procedure (OLS leads to downward bias in 
the standard errors) 
2.8-cent increase 
in the real state 
cigarette unit tax, 
while a 10-cent 
increase in the real 
federal tax rate on 
gasoline induces a 
4.1-cent increase 
in the real state 
gasoline tax rate.  
Brueckner (2003): 
He provides an 
overview of 
empirical models of 
strategic interaction 
among 
governments and 
clarifies the 
theoretical roots of 
such studies by 
showing how the 
empirical 
frameworks fit into 
two broad 
categories, viz; 
spillover model and 
resource-flow 
models.     
Model: 
∑
≠
++=
1j
iijiji Xzz εθωβ  
where: 
iz = the level of a decision variable chosen by 
jurisdiction i 
jz  = the vector of z ’s for other jurisdictions 
ijω = nonnegative weights 
iX = is a vector of characteristics of 
jurisdiction i. 
β and θ are unknown parameters and the 
latter is a vector 
Both types of 
models generate 
jurisdictional 
reaction functions 
and the estimated 
reaction function20 
slope is non-zero, 
which confirms 
the presence of 
strategic 
interaction. 
                                                 
20 The spillover and resource-flow models ultimately lead to the same empirical specification, despite their 
differences.  
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Author and 
Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
iε = an error term 
Methodology: 
The author suggests maximum likelihood 
(ML) methods and instrumental variables 
(IV) approach. 
Case (1991): 
presents an 
estimation scheme 
that allows 
individuals to be 
influenced by 
neighbors when 
making discrete 
choice decisions by 
testing for 
interdependence in 
farmers attitudes 
towards the 
adoption of new 
technologies in 
Indonesia. 
 
Model: 
uXY += β*                                                (1) 
uXXY ++= δβ*                                       (2) 
+−+= βθθθθβθ XnnXY ))(/()/1( 21121*  
            uWI 1)( −−φ                                     (3) 
ερδβ 1* )( −−++= WIXXY                     (4) 
where: 
*Y = expected profits  
X = farm household characteristics 
X = matrix of mean household characteristics 
in the relevant district 
W = matrix that assigns to each household its 
neighbors 
Data: 
Random sample of rural Javanese farm 
households from 1980 survey of SUSENAS21  
Methodology: 
Eq. (1) is a standard probit framework which 
constrains the coefficients on neighbors’ 
Results indicate 
the strong 
presence of 
neighborhood 
effects and appear 
to be robust to 
changes in 
specification.  
Failure to control 
for neighbors’ 
influence may 
bias estimation of 
parameters of 
interest. It appears 
that neighbors are 
important 
influences in 
farmers’ decisions 
to adopt new 
technologies.   
                                                 
21 The Indonesian Socio-Economic Survey 
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Author and 
Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
variables to zero; 
Eq. (2) allows neighbors’ right-hand side 
variables to enter; 
Eq. (3) constrains the neighbors’ variables in 
a manner implied in the equation; and 
Eq. (4) allows for spatial correlation in errors  
Case (1993): 
The paper presents 
evidence that voters 
may look at the tax 
increase in 
neighboring states 
to obtain 
information on 
whether a tax 
increase is 
appropriate and use 
this information to 
decide whether to 
reelect their 
governor.  
Model: 
εβφφφ ++++= XtPOSTtCAPtt ˆ86ˆˆ *3*21  
where: 
t = [NT x 1] vector of N states’ tax changes 
observed for T years 
X = [NT x k] matrix of year indicator 
variables and observable state economic 
and political characteristics thought to 
affect the tax change chosen 
tˆ = [NT x 1] vector representing values of 
states’ geographic neighbors’ average tax 
changes for the period. 
1φ = parameter that measures the extent to 
which states are influenced by the taxing 
decisions of their neighbors 
CAP = indicator variable that takes the value 
1 if the incumbent cannot, by law, run for 
reelection. 
POST86 = indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the year is 1987 or 1988. 
ε = error term assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean zero and constant 
variance. 
The results 
suggest that 
comparisons with 
neighbors 
influence 
gubernatorial 
behavior in that 
Governors are 
more likely to 
raise taxes when 
neighbors are 
doing the same.  
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Author and 
Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
Data:  
Generated by the TAXSIM program at the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Methodology: 
Two-stage least squares estimation. 
Case et al. (1989) 
and Case et al. 
(1993): Formalize 
and test the notion 
that states’ 
expenditures 
depend on the 
spending of 
similarly situated 
states. 
Model:  
ittijtitit uhfEXE ++++= φβ  
where: 
Eit = state i’s per capita expenditure in year t 
Xit =  its own characteristics 
Ejt = the expenditures of its neighbors 
ft and ht = the individual and year effects, 
respectively. 
β andφ  are parameters. 
For multiple neighbors, itE  is replaced with  
∑
=
n
j
jtij Ew
1
 
where: 
∑ =j ijw ,1  and 0=ijw  if state j is not a 
neighbor of state i. 
System of expenditure equations: 
Uit is a random error  
tttt uXWEE ++= βφ  
They find that 
their neighbors 
indeed 
significantly 
influence states’ 
expenditures, 
which is 
consistent with 
well-established 
theoretical models 
of benefit 
spillovers among 
jurisdictions 
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Author and 
Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
where: 
Et = (48 x 1) vector of state expenditures 
Xt = (48 x k) matrix of explanatory variables 
W = (48 x 48) weighting matrix 
Data: Pooled cross–section time series data 
itX  comprises real per capita income, income 
squared, real per capita total federal grants 
to state and local governments, population 
density, proportion of the population at least 
65 years old, proportion of population 5–17 
years old, and proportion of the population 
that is black. 
Methodology: OLS,  
Besley and Case 
(1995): The authors 
develop a model of 
political economy 
of tax-setting which 
determines the 
voters’ choices and 
incumbent behavior 
simultaneously in a 
multi-jurisdictional 
world. The model 
assumes that voters 
compare 
jurisdictions in 
order to overcome 
political agency 
problems, which in 
turn forces 
incumbents into a 
yardstick 
competition.22  
Model: 
ititititit vYzx ++Δ++=Δ − ψτϕαβτ **  
where: 
itτΔ = tax changes in state i at time t 
itx = a vector of characteristics considered to 
influence the representative voter 
itz = the incumbent-specific characteristics 
it−τ = changes in state i’s neighbors at time t 
Y = year effects 
1
* / γββ =  
1
* / γαα =  
The results show 
that vote-seeking 
and tax-setting are 
tied together 
through the nexus 
of yardstick 
competition. Tax 
changes appear to 
be a significant 
determinant of 
who is elected, 
thus reducing 
effort put into 
curbing tax 
increases that are 
out of line with 
neighbors.  
                                                 
22 Yardstick competition refers to a situation where each jurisdiction cares about what the other is doing. 
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Author and 
Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
12 / γγϕ =  and is the spatial correlation 
coefficient  
λ = the probability that an elected official is 
good 
itν = the error term. 
Methodology: 
IV estimate and 2SLS 
Data: 
Reelection bids of governors in the 
continental United States from 1960 through 
1988.   
Feld et al. (2003): 
The paper provides 
a test of tax-
mimicking in 22 
French regions 
from 1984 to 1995.  
The regions tested 
had non-negligible 
tax setting power 
since the 
decentralization in 
1986.   
Model: 
εββ +′+= TTT Xtt 21ˆ*  
and 
λεβλλβλ +′++−= − TTTT Xttt 211 ˆ)1(  
where: 
*Tt = optimal tax rate in a region for year T 
1β = a scalar that measures the influence of 
the tax policies of neighboring regions. 
Ttˆ  = the average of the neighboring regions’ 
tax rates.  
TX = vector that describes k economic and 
demographic variables of the region. 
2β = the associated vector that measures their 
influence on its tax policy 
λ  = the coefficient of adjustment 
ε  = an error term assumed to be normally 
distributed. 
 
Data: 
Panel data  
 
 
 
The results 
indicate that tax 
rates at the French 
regional level are 
positively 
influenced by the 
tax policy in 
neighboring 
regions. The 
evidence is 
compatible with 
traditional tax 
competition 
models as well as 
with yardstick 
competition 
models.  
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Author and 
Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
Feld and Reulier 
(2005): 
The paper tests for 
the existence of 
strategic tax 
setting/competition 
at the Swiss 
cantonal level.  
Model: 
εββ ++= −− 1211ˆ tgtg Xtt  
where: 
g
tt 1ˆ −  = an [NTx1] vector of the average of 
cantons geographic neighbors or weighted 
average of all other competing cantons’ taxes 
of the previous period for T years in income 
class g 
1−tX  = an [NK x k] matrix of k observable 
cantons’ economic and demographic 
characteristics of the preceding period 
ε   = error term, normally distributed with 
mean zero and constant variance. 
1β  = indicates to what extent a canton's tax 
policy is influenced by the tax policy in 
neighboring or all other competing cantons. 
Data: 
Yearly panel data set of the 26 cantons from 
1984 to 1999. 
Methodology: Instrumental Variable method 
and Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) 
The results lend 
support for the 
hypothesis that 
strategic 
interactions 
between  
sub–federal 
jurisdictions in 
Switzerland exist.  
Income tax rates 
in the cantons 
depend –ceteris 
paribus–on 
neighbors’ tax 
rates of the 
previous period or 
on other 
competing 
cantons’ tax rates. 
Goodspeed (2000): 
Estimates the 
impact of 
horizontal and 
vertical 
externalities on the 
choice of tax rates 
by local 
governments 
operating in a 
federation. 
Model: 
ctc
L
ctct
n
ct
L
ct DbGbHbtbbt ∈+++++= 4321101  
where: 
ct = country c in year t  
L
ctt1  = local income tax rate in country c in  
year t 
n
ctt1  = national income tax rate in country c in 
Local 
governments 
decrease their use 
of income taxes in 
reaction to a 
higher national 
income tax rate 
and a lower 
poverty rate. 
A one percentage 
point increase in 
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Author and 
Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
year t and reflects vertical externality 
H = measures the horizontal externality 
L
ctG  = total local revenue per capita in country  
c in year t 
Dc = are country–specific dummy variables 
ct∈  = random error term 
Methodology: Tobit estimation  
Data: 13 OECD countries for the period 
1975–1984. 
the national 
government 
income tax leads 
to a fall of about 
0.17 of a 
percentage point 
in the local 
government 
income tax rate. 
 
Heyndels and 
Vuchelen (1998): 
The paper presents 
empirical evidence 
on tax mimicking 
among Belgian 
municipalities by 
looking at local 
income tax and 
local property tax.. 
εαα ++= REFtZt .. 21  
where: 
 t = a [ ]1589×  vector of local tax rates for the 
municipal budgetary year 1991 
Z = a [ ]5589×  matrix of the internal 
determinants of the local tax rates, which 
are: 
ε  =  the error term 
 REFt  = a vector of average tax rates in 
neighboring municipalities. 
Methodology: 
3-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) technique 
Data: 
Tax rates on 589 municipalities 
 
The general 
results were in 
line with previous 
findings, that tax 
rates are indeed 
copied among 
neighboring 
municipalities. 
They also found 
evidence of 
interdependency 
of different tax 
rates and that 
mimicking among 
Belgian 
municipalities has 
a geographical 
dimension which 
extends beyond 
immediate 
neighbors. 
However, the 
intensity of 
influence 
diminishes with 
geographical 
distance. 
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Author and 
Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
Ladd (1992): 
The paper tests the 
hypothesis about 
whether local 
officials consider 
the tax burdens of 
neighboring 
counties when 
making their own 
decision about 
taxes on their own 
residents. 
Model: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ++++=
h k j
ijijkikhihi uTBwdSDcXbaTB  
Where: 
TBi = tax burden in the ith county 
Xh = county characteristics that affect tax 
burdens 
SDk =  an indicator for each state in which 
one or more of the sample counties are 
located 
∑
j
jtjTBw = a weighted average of tax 
burdens in neighboring counties where 
wj is the weight:  
 ui =  a random error 
d =  the coefficient that measures the degree 
of tax mimicking. 
Methodology: 
Instrumental Variables 
Data: 
Data on 248 large U.S. counties for 1978 and 
1985 
The study 
provides support 
for the view that 
local tax decisions 
in one jurisdiction 
are influenced by 
the tax burdens in 
neighboring 
jurisdictions. 
Regression 
equations confirm 
the presence of tax 
mimicking for 
total local tax 
burdens and for 
property tax 
burdens but does 
not find any 
evidence for sales 
tax burdens. 
Evidence of tax 
mimicking was 
more significant 
within 
metropolitan areas 
than within states: 
the average 
standard deviation 
of the total tax 
burden was only 
0.0021 in MSAs, 
which is 
significantly 
smaller than that 
of states which 
was 0.0037.    
Sole-Ollé (2003): 
The paper 
investigates the 
relation between 
tax mimicking and 
electoral 
accountability in 
Model: 
∑
∑ ∑
+++
+++=
−
−−
m
titi
m
tim
k l
l
ltil
k
tiktjti
w
zxtt
,,0,01,,4
,,31,,2,1,
εααα
ααα
 
The results 
confirmed 
mimicking 
behavior in the 
choice of property 
and vehicle tax 
rates, where an 
increase in each of 
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Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
Spain by looking at 
property taxes, 
motor vehicle tax 
and local business 
tax. 
where: 
tit ,  = the tax rate of either the property tax, 
motor vehicle tax or local business tax in the i 
municipality 
tjt ,  = the tax rate of each of these taxes in the 
set of neighbors or reference municipalities, j 
k
tix 1, − = the variables that measure the 
availability of exogenous revenues 
n
tiz 1, − = the variables that measure the demand 
for services in a municipality  
m
tiw 1, − = variables that proxy for political 
factors 
i,0α and t,0α = municipal fixed and time 
effects, respectively 
ti,ε = well-behaved error term. 
Data: 
Panel data for a set of Spanish municipalities 
(surrounding the city of Barcelona) during the 
1990s). 
 
these tax rates 
prompts a positive 
response in the tax 
rates of its 
neighbors. Results 
regarding the 
business tax were 
les robust.  Local 
elections were 
found to play a 
role in 
disciplining the 
Leviathan and that 
relative evaluation 
of fiscal policies 
by voters increase 
the effectiveness 
of the 
accountability 
process.   
Revelli (2001): 
The paper tested for 
mimicry in local tax 
setting in English 
non-metropolitan 
districts.  It looked 
at The United 
Kingdom’s two-tier 
system of local 
government 
Model: 
itiiitktitiitit vqdzRWrMrr +++′+++= − βθτρ 1   
where: 
index i = the shire district (i = 1,….,296) 
index k = the county (k = 1,….,39) 
The results 
confirmed the 
presence of large 
and significant 
horizontal 
interaction 
between UK 
districts even after 
allowing for 
district-specific 
and time effects: a 
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comprising county 
authorities and 
district authorities. 
index t = the financial year  
rit = the property tax rate set by district i in 
period t 
Rkt = the property tax rate set by county k in 
the same year. 
zit = a vector of explanatory variables specific 
of district i in period t. 
di = a fixed effect, i.e., an unobservable 
characteristic of the district that 
influences the local tax rate and is 
constant over time 
qt = a time effect  
τ andθ  = measure the horizontal interactions 
between districts and the vertical 
interactions between districts and 
counties respectively. 
Matrix M attributes neighbors to each district 
Matrix W assigns a county to each district  
Data: 
Used data collected by the Chartered Institute 
of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) 
for the years 1983-1990, i.e., before the 
reform of local government finance that 
introduced the Poll Tax/Council Tax. Data is 
for 296 shire districts and 39 counties. 
 
10 percent 
increase in the 
local property tax 
rate of a district’s 
neighbor led to an 
increase of 4-5% 
in its own 
property tax.  
There was no 
evidence of 
positive 
correlation 
between district 
and county 
property tax rates, 
supporting the 
thesis that the 
spatial 
autocorrelation in 
local taxes is not 
simply being 
driven by spatially 
auto-correlated 
shocks, but is 
rather compatible 
with tax 
mimicking at local 
level.    
Rork (2003):  
The paper models 
state competition 
tax by estimating 
the degree of 
interdependence 
Model:  
ittijtitit uTXT ++++= λξθβ  
where: 
Results indicate 
that taxes  with 
relatively mobile 
bases respond 
positively to rates 
set in neighboring 
states and these 
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among five of the 
major tax 
instruments used by 
state governments.  
itT  = tax measure in state i at time t 
itX  = state characteristics 
jtT  = neighbor’s tax rate 
iξ  and tλ  are state and year fixed effects, 
respectively 
itu  = mean zero, normally distributed random 
error 
 
To account for multiple neighborhood: 
jtT  is replaced by ∑ j jtijTw  
ttititit uXWTT ++++= λξβθ  
Data: State financial data for the years 1967-
1996.  Focuses on categories: personal 
income tax, corporate income tax, general 
sales tax, motor fuel tax and tobacco tax  
 
Methodology: Instrumental Variable 
Estimation.  They use two types of weights; 
contiguity weights and population weights. 
are: 
Cigarette 
taxation: an 
increase of 10 
cents in 
neighboring 
states’ cigarette 
taxes would 
induce a home 
increase between 
4 and 6 cents; 
Gasoline taxation: 
the coefficient 
ranged from 0.463 
for population 
weights and 0.600 
with the 
contiguity 
weights; 
Corporate income 
tax: the estimated 
coefficient was 
0.16 for both 
weights. 
 
Taxes with 
relatively 
immobile tax 
bases are found to 
respond 
negatively to 
neighboring 
states’ taxes: 
Personal income 
tax: the coefficient 
ranged from  
–0.048 to –0.097; 
General sales tax: 
the coefficients 
ranged from  
–0.237 to –0.164.  
Redoano (2003):  
Investigated 
Model: Corporate tax: 
 
Regression results 
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whether there is 
empirical evidence 
that EU Countries 
set their public 
expenditure and 
taxes 
interdependently.  
ititiitititit uDXAEE ++++++= − ηγβθα 1  
Where: 
itE  = state si'  fiscal choices in year t  
1−itE = dependent variable lagged of one year 
itX = a vector representing state si'  own 
characteristics 
iD = year dummy 
itη = individual linear time trend 
θγβα and,,,  are unknown parameters 
itu = random error term 
∑
=
=
n
j
jtijtit EwA
1
 
Where: 
,1
1
=∑ =nj ijtw and 0=ijtw if state j is not a 
neighbor. 
Data: 
Annual data on the EU States over the period 
1980-1995. 
 
suggest that tax 
competition 
occurs in Europe 
mainly between 
geographically 
close countries. 
Income taxes and 
public 
expenditures:  
Found similar 
results–confirm 
existence of 
yardstick 
competition with 
respect to 
countries with 
similar 
characteristics and 
“ leader”  
countries. GDP 
and GDP distance 
weights performed 
better. 
McGarvey and 
Walker  (2004): 
They provide new 
empirical estimates 
in the literature on 
state and local 
government 
Model:  
ttttnttt uhfyWtpXy +++++= ραβ  
ttt Du ε=  
Regarding the 
copy-cat effect, 
they found that a 
hundred dollar per 
capita increase in 
a state’s 
neighbors’ 
expenditures 
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expenditures by 
focusing on the 
effects of 
preference 
variables, the 
copycat effect and 
the fly-paper effect.  
Where:  
=ty  per capita expenditures 
X = observations of k variables. 
=ttp the tax price 
=tf  fixed effects 
=th year effect 
=nW Weight matrix 
Data: Annual data for states and local 
governments over the period 1977-1999.  
Methodology: An efficient GMM method. 
 
would lead to an 
increase in per 
capita state 
spending of 
$13.66 in the early 
period  
(1977-1988) and 
about $31.04 in 
the latter period 
(1989-1999).  
Geys (2005): 
He assesses the “ 
price/quantity”  of 
government policy 
in relation to that of 
neighboring 
jurisdictions, rather 
than focusing on 
spending or 
taxation levels 
alone.  
Model: 
εβρα ++−+=− XMeanWSFMeanSF  
where: 
)|( euuEMeanSF +=− is the government  
efficiency rating 
X = vector of control variables 
W = Weight Matrix 
ρα ,  andβ are parameters. 
Data: 
Used 301 Flemish municipalities in the year 
2000. 
Methodology: 
The analysis 
reveals a 
significant spatial 
pattern in Flemish 
local 
government’s 
efficiency ratings. 
 70 
 
Author and 
Objective 
Model, Data and Methodology Findings 
Both Maximum Likelihood estimation (ML) 
and Instrumental Variables estimation 
(IV) 
 
 
Source: Summary compiled by author from various papers.  
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CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Some Background on the Expenditure and Tax Structures of the SADC Member 
Countries 
To set the stage for the theoretical model, it is important to understand the main 
motivations in both public expenditure determination and the determinants of tax 
structure and particularly in the context of developing countries. 
 
Expenditures 
Public expenditures play a major role in the functioning of an economy and at all 
levels of income. This role does, however, change in the course of development and as 
the budgetary function adapts to changing needs of an economy.  Government 
expenditure decisions are an outcome of a political process and while the views of 
political leaders and policymakers are influential, they are subject to various pressures 
and constraints, as well as international concerns.  
As pointed out by Goode (1993), expenditure demands and responses to them are 
affected by the structure of the economy and by demographic, sociological, geographic, 
and technological factors. The direction of influence is, however, not always obvious. For 
instance, a demographic factor that could be expected to influence the demand for 
spending on education is the proportion of the population under 18 years; or expenditure 
on social security is often associated with the proportion of population that is over 65 
years. Geographic factors include such issues as expenditures for irrigation and 
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transportation while technological factors that influence government expenditures include 
the spread of motorcars and trucks, as well as changes in military technology.  
There is, therefore, no single formula that can be applied by developing countries 
in the determination of total government expenditures because of these complexities that 
result from such factors as fiscal conditions, political, economic and other factors. For 
most developing countries, their total expenditures usually depend on how much revenue 
they make as well as how much they can borrow or they can get in the form of aid or 
grants. However, government spending decisions in most developing countries and 
especially in Africa have of late been also heavily influenced by macroeconomic 
structural adjustment programs that have become synonymous with budget deficits and 
high external debts.  In their study, Fan and Rao (2003) found that structural adjustment 
programs had an adverse impact on government spending on infrastructure in most 
regions where they had been implemented.  
The factors that affect government expenditures outlined above do not include the 
role played by copycat behavior when it comes to determining expenditures.  As 
indicated in the earlier sections, this theory has only gained momentum recently, though 
in earlier literature, attention was called to an international demonstration effect that 
causes people in poor countries to emulate the consumption standards of rich countries.  
This effect compels poor countries to consume more and save less than they otherwise 
would.  When applied to government expenditures, the international demonstration effect 
may make political leaders of poor countries today to have different attitudes towards 
spending on education, health, and other economic services than existed in the 
industrialized countries when they were at comparable stages of development.   These 
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countries did not have more developed or much richer countries to emulate but mostly 
their neighbors who were at more or less the same development stage as they were. 
 
Tax Structure 
The principal reason that governments levy taxes is to raise revenue to provide 
resources for the provision of various public services, in turn presumably motivated by 
the wish to promote outcomes such as reduced poverty, maintenance of law and order 
and higher living standards.  The other reasons for levying taxes include stabilization of 
the economy and also in the case of externalities where specific taxes are used to address 
such externalities. Taxation is currently the only practical way of raising the revenue to 
finance government spending.  With tax mimicking, countries would look at their 
neighbors’ tax structures with the intent to copy if deemed to be favorable or attractive.  
Musgrave (1969) points out that economic factors bear on tax structure development in 
two ways. First, as the economy’s structure changes with economic development, so does 
the nature of the tax base. Second, the economic objectives of tax policy tend to vary with 
the stages of economic development, as well as the economic criteria by which a good tax 
structure is to be judged. For low income countries, their economic structures impose 
severe limitations on the structure of the tax system. As pointed out by Tanzi and Zee 
(2000), it is difficult for developing countries to set up an efficient and fair tax system, 
more especially if they want to be integrated in the international economy. For these 
countries, an ideal tax system would be one that does not entail a lot of government 
borrowing when raising essential revenue.  The tax system must not discourage economic 
activity and it must not diverge from the tax systems in other countries.  
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Challenges that developing countries face concerning the establishment of 
efficient tax systems include, among others, the following: (i) a hard to establish tax base 
given that most workers in these countries are employed in informal structures that pay in 
cash and do not maintain good accounting books–the hard to tax; (ii) manpower 
constraints, especially shortage of educated and well-trained personnel make it difficult to 
create an efficient tax system; and (iii) the formal structure of the economy in developing 
countries coupled with financial constraints make it difficult to generate reliable statistics, 
thus making it difficult for policy makers to make informed decisions regarding potential 
impact of major changes to the tax system.  
Hinrichs (1966) underscores the issue of tax structure by pointing out that there is 
no single tax system that can be deemed best for all countries or even for one country at 
all times.  The process of economic development as well as social mobilization 
necessarily means a change in economic tax bases during development and this 
necessitates parallel changes in the tax structure whose objective is mainly to narrow 
down the expenditure-revenue gap. However, setting up an efficient and fair tax system is 
an onerous task, particularly for developing countries that want to be integrated in the 
international economy.  The ideal tax system in these countries should raise essential 
revenue without excessive borrowing by the government.  Hinrichs (1966) made the 
following empirical generalizations, that tax structures have diversity within broad 
patterns that tend to shift during the process of economic development and social 
mobilization and such structural diversity is more pronounced at higher levels of income 
where either direct or indirect taxes are stressed depending on the cultural-political 
preference for either type of taxes. At lower levels of income, preference patterns are less 
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important. With the constraints given above, to an efficient tax system in developing 
countries, even if the governments were able to discern the preferences of taxpayers, it 
would be difficult to assign taxes to them as such choices may not be available or costly 
to administer and enforce.  
At an early stage of development, most countries tend to emphasize indirect 
taxation in view of the fact that the taxes are easy to collect as compared to direct levies, 
and they are also easy to enforce.   These countries tends to move towards direct taxation 
as their economies develop, as shown in Table 6 where most SADC countries now use 
practically both direct and indirect taxes, though they are still lacking in the likes of 
social security taxes.   
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Table 6: SADC Tax Structures as at December 2004  
 
Country Individual  Corporate Property Turnover Social 
Security 
Taxes on Goods and Services Taxes on International 
Transactions  
Other 
Taxes 
  Payroll     Sales Excise VAT M duties X duties  
Angola* √  √   √  √  √ √ √ 
Botswana √  √ √    √ √ √ √  
DRC √  √ √ √   √  √ √  
Lesotho √  √ √    √ √ √ √  
Malawi √ √ √     √  √  √ 
Mauritius √  √ √    √ √ √   
Mozambique √  √ √    √ √ √ √ √ 
Namibia √  √ √    √ √ √  √ 
Seychelles   √ √  √ √      
South Africa √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ √  √ 
Swaziland √  √ √    √  √ √ √ 
Tanzania √ √ √ √    √ √ √  √ 
Zambia √  √ √  √  √ √ √   
Zimbabwe √  √ √  √  √ √ √  √ 
 
Source: IMF Country Reports-Various 
Notes: * no municipal taxes 
 77
Theoretical Models 
Our study tests for mimicking in both government expenditures and tax revenues hence 
we look at two theoretical models that apply to each specifically. We will then test these models 
empirically using data for both the SADC and SSA regions. 
 
Theoretical Model I-Expenditures 
In this section, we will look at the theoretical model that will guide us in our 
empirical estimation on the expenditure side. The model discussed here looks at policy 
interaction as it relates to fiscal expenditures and it is borrowed from Case, Hines et al. 
(1989) and Case, Rosen et al. (1993). The authors point out that there are several ways in 
which expenditures of one state can affect the fiscal policies of other states. The 
theoretical framework in their study builds on the foundation that governments are 
concerned with the welfare of their citizens and hence choose expenditure levels that will 
equate the sum of the individual marginal benefits from public services to the marginal 
costs of providing those services. In addition, these governments also take into 
consideration expenditure levels of neighboring governments when determining their 
own expenditure levels. Other studies, like Revelli (2003), have modeled public 
expenditure determination in a two-tier system of government which accounts for both 
vertical and horizontal fiscal interactions, i.e., they look at interactions among 
governments at the same level, like local government versus local government and 
interactions at different levels of government, like state government versus local 
government.  
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Given that this study is conducted at a country level and looks at one level of 
government, i.e., central or federal government, it will only consider the horizontal fiscal 
interaction for both expenditures and tax revenues. The model discussed here illustrates 
how expenditure levels of one country’s neighbors impinge on that country’s optimal 
level of expenditure–the tax revenue side is modeled theoretically in the next sub-section. 
In modeling this connection, all consumers in a country are assumed to be identical; the 
government is assumed to provide only one type of public good; and lump-sum taxes are 
considered. The representative consumer’s utility in state i is expressed as a regularly 
smooth and convex utility index:23 
);,( iiiiii GTYVV ψ−=         (4.1) 
where Yi is per capita income in country i, iT is each consumer’s lump-sum tax 
burden in country i, Gi gives the level of public services provided by country i’s 
government, and iΨ is a vector of exogenous conditions affecting the utilities of country 
i’s residents which include political and other economic constraints. The price of private 
goods is the numeraire. Using per-consumer units to measure public services implies the 
following budget balance24 requirements: 
ii GT ≥          (4.2) 
If the government acts in the interests of its citizens, it chooses Gi and Ti to 
maximize Equation (4.1) subject to Equation (4.2). Equation (4.2) will hold with equality 
if preferences exhibit non-satiation.  
 
                                                 
23 See Samuelson, L.A. (1954).  
24 Equation (4.2) applies only when the budget is balanced or there is a surplus, which is what most 
jurisdictions strive for but is hardly ever achieved practically, especially in developing countries. 
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The Lagrangian is given by: 
)();,( iiiiiii TGGTYVL −+−= λψ      
 (4.3) 
 and the first-order conditions imply that:  
)(/(.)/(.) iiiii TYVGV −∂∂=∂∂       
 (4.4) 
From Equation (4.4), we can define igp as the consumer’s marginal willingness 
to pay for public goods, i.e.
)(/(.)
/(.)
iii
ii
i
g TYV
GVp −∂∂
∂∂= . Normalizing the price of the public 
good to one, i.e., 1=igp , gives Equation (4.4) which implies that the marginal utility of an 
additional dollar of expenditure on public goods equals the marginal utility of an 
additional dollar of after-tax private income.  
The model illustrated above does not incorporate the direct response of a 
country’s expenditure level to changes in the expenditures of its neighbors. The model 
shows that the expenditures of a country are determined entirely by variables that relate 
to that country.    However, since the purpose of this study is to demonstrate the presence 
of fiscal interdependence between countries, we need to incorporate the neighbors’ 
variable that captures that interdependence. 
Let us suppose that consumers compare the utilities they derive from the goods 
provided by their governments to utility levels they would obtain if they resided in 
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neighboring countries. This comparison could be direct or indirect via the politicians and 
if individuals are not happy, the politicians may eventually feel the heat and leave or 
change their policies in favor of what the voters prefer. This would imply that there is 
performance comparison across jurisdictions or yardstick competition. Further, let us 
suppose that legislators worry about the consequences of unpleasant or hostile political 
voice if they offer their citizens a fiscal package that is inferior to the one they would 
have obtained had they resided in the neighboring country. The following is a possible 
objective function for a government decision-maker faced with such a situation. 
);,,( ijiiiii GTYGVV ψ−= ,       (4.5) 
where jG represents the average level of government expenditures in other 
countries and iψ gives the remaining exogenous characteristics that influence utilities in 
country i. Equation (4.4) still characterizes the efficient choice of expenditure by country 
i but with utilities as given in Equation (4.5) and jG is an argument of the functions on 
both sides of Equation 4.4. We obtain the influence of other countries’ expenditures on 
country i’s expenditures by totally differentiating (4.4) colleting terms and imposing from 
Equation (4.2) that ii dGdT =  and this yields the following function (see Appendix C for 
the detailed differentiation): 
φ=
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where iii TYC −=  is private consumption. From Equation (4.6) the denominator 
of the right-hand side must be positive because of the second-order condition 
characterizing the optimal choice of iG . Therefore, the impact of a change in jG on the 
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level of iG must have the same sign as the difference of the two second partial 
derivatives in the numerator of the right hand side of Equation (4.6). The sign of the 
difference of the two second partial derivatives in the numerator will depend on the 
extent to which jG is complementary with iG and iC ; If jG is more complementary with 
iG  than it is with iC , then iG will increase with jG and the numerator will be positive. It 
is not possible to predict the patterns of complementarity beforehand, hence the sign of 
φ can only be determined empirically. 
Even though the sign ofφ , is indeterminate, it is reasonable to expect the 
expenditures of neighboring countries to move in the same direction. In the above 
theoretical model we assume that labor is immobile or that voters can not freely move 
from one country to one that offers them higher utility at free will.  The assumption of 
perfect labor mobility would only be feasible in situations where there are no legal 
barriers between jurisdictions like border/passport controls and permits for work and 
residency that make mobility difficult. This assumption would thus be considered only 
applicable in counties, districts, states, as well as in countries in a union or region where 
there is free mobility of labor to some degree. However, it does not apply to the Sub-
Sahara Africa and SADC regions. Regarding labor mobility inter-regionally, the 
European Union has been advocating for the free movement of labor within the Union, 
but mobility is still restricted.  The European Commission has in the past taken steps to 
foster labor mobility between the member states, the aim of which is to remove any 
remaining impediments to cross-border labor mobility.   For the SADC region, there is 
currently no free mobility of labor.  One of the broad strategies of the SADC region (as 
well as the other regional economic blocs of SSA) as contained in its Treaty is to develop 
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policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of capital 
and labor, goods and services, and of the peoples of the region generally, among member 
states.  
When it comes to how rational voters are in developing countries when compared 
to the developed world, we expect them to exercise some form of rational behavior as 
well.  While it can be argued that in developing countries lack of access to voting 
information is a major stumbling bloc, the politicians usually make it their interest to get 
such information to the voters during their campaigning period.  Further, voters 
themselves are usually aware of their social and infrastructural needs and they can use 
their judgment to determine if such services are being delivered timely or not and where 
they have an opportunity to use their voice by voting out the incumbent who is not 
delivering, they can do so.  Edlin et al. (2005) point out that a rational voter will decide 
which candidate or option to vote for based on the voter’s judgment of the expected social 
consequences of the election outcome as distinct from the direct consequences to that voter.  
However, it is important to point out that the theoretical model that we use above 
is predicated on the voter or individual, which is more applicable to developed countries 
and hence, it may not be the best model for developing countries.  Further, our study does 
not set up a model that tests explicitly the median voter over a tax competition or 
harmonization model. Future studies could focus on developing a theoretical model that 
is more applicable to developing countries.  
 
Theoretical Model II–Tax Revenues 
In this section we present the theory that applies to the mimicking behavior of 
jurisdictions when determining their tax revenues. The theoretical model discussed below 
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draws from the tax competition literature and it is borrowed from Brueckner and 
Saavedra (2001) and  Brueckner (2003).  Considering that this study is looking at 
strategic behavior as opposed to tax competition, it is important to distinguish between 
the two concepts.  The basic tax competition model considers a country with many 
identical regions each playing host to competitive firms that produce a single output. The 
firms employ a fixed stock of mobile capital and an immobile factor fixed in supply to 
produce the output. The fixed factor could be interpreted as land or labor, and may give 
rise to pure profits. It is assumed that each region uses a tax imposed on capital that is 
employed within its borders to finance the public good that it supplies. Tax policy affects 
the distribution of the world capital stock. An important insight is that a rise in the capital 
tax rate of one region benefits other regions by increasing their capital supplies and, 
hence, their revenues, which is a positive externality. However, the government in each 
region neglects these externalities since it is only concerned with the welfare of its own 
residents, leading to taxes being set too low. This results in under-provision of public 
goods, that is, an increase in all tax rates at the same time by a small amount would 
increase public goods supplies and hence welfare in all regions.  
With strategic behavior, other jurisdictions tax rates must be taken into account 
when a given jurisdiction makes its tax decisions. Strategic behavior also leads to under 
provision of public goods. For our model, let us assume that we have 2 or more 
jurisdictions which produce a private good using mobile capital and immobile labor. For 
simplicity, capital is assumed to be fixed regionally but mobile between jurisdictions. Let 
iK  denote the capital invested in the jurisdiction Nii ,....2,1, = , and iL denote labor 
supply in jurisdiction i. The production function is given by ),( ii LKF and its intensive 
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form is written as )( ikf , denoting output produced per worker where ik is the capital per 
unit of labor in jurisdiction i.   
Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) point out that fixed factor labor is often viewed as 
supplied by local workers and assuming that each community in a metropolitan area 
constitutes a separate labor market could be unrealistic.  However, in the case of this 
study where we are dealing with countries that are supposed to constitute immobile labor, 
the assumption that each jurisdiction supplies its own labor is largely valid except in the 
case where neighboring countries were supplying labor to South African mines, albeit 
under special arrangements.  For simplicity, we assume the jurisdictions to have identical 
population sizes and to impose a tax on the capital invested locally, with it denoting the 
tax per unit in jurisdiction i. Given that capital is mobile across jurisdictions, to equalize 
the net-of-tax returns, its distribution must satisfy the following: 
 ρ=−′==−′=−′ )(......)()( 2211 nn tkftkftkf        (4.7) 
or ρ=−′ )( ii tkf        (4.7’) 
where ρ is the uniform net-of-tax return. Further, it is assumed that the capital 
stock is fixed regionally25 and this gives the additional condition: 
knk
n
i
i =∑
=1
         (4.8) 
where k is the economy-wide level of capital per unit of labor.  Equations (4.7) 
and (4.7’) determine both niki ,....,2,1, = and ρ as functions of taxes it .  The capital per 
worker in jurisdiction i and the uniform net return are presented as follows: 
),( jii ttHk =            (4.9) 
                                                 
25 Capital is assumed to be mobile among jurisdictions within the region. 
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)(tG=ρ          (4.10) 
Where jt denotes the tax per unit in jurisdiction j or neighboring jurisdictions, t 
represents the entire vector of taxes. Differentiation of Equations (4.7) and (4.7’) shows 
that 0/ <∂∂ ii tk or 0<itH , indicating that increasing taxes in jurisdiction i would shrink 
its tax base as capital flees to other jurisdictions with lower taxes, to equalize net returns. 
Further, 0/ <∂∂ tρ , an indication that capital’s net return declines as taxes increase.   
The revenue from taxes is used to provide a public good iq .  The public good has 
private characteristics and it is produced at unit cost, with its level given by ii kt , which is 
equivalent to tax revenue per worker. Individual consumption of the private good is given 
as ic and it is equal to the wage, )( ikw  which depends positively on ik , and on income 
from ownership of capital, which equals kρ . Combining all the above information, the 
common utility function for residents of jurisdiction i, ),~;,( iiii YXqcU , can be written as 
 },~];,[,)()],([{],~;,)([ iijiijiiiiii YXttHtktGttHwUYXktkkwU +=+ ρ    
 ),~;,( iiji YXttV≡        (4.11) 
Where iX
~ represents jurisdiction characteristics, other than income, which help 
determine preferences and iY represents the political variables.  The objective function 
thus ultimately depends on jurisdiction i’s tax rates and tax rates elsewhere.  Therefore, in 
choosing its tax rates, jurisdiction i takes into account the capital flight caused by an 
increase in its tax rate as well as the impact of the tax increase on capital’s net return. 
Given that the impact of the higher it depends on tax rates elsewhere, the optimal value 
will also depend on these rates.      
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Jurisdiction i maximizes (4.11) with respect to it by setting  
0/ =≡∂∂
iti
VtV         (4.12) 
Given the above derivative, the solution to this maximization problem will depend 
both on tax choices elsewhere, jt , as well as on iX , the characteristics of jurisdiction i and 
iY , the political variables. The solution is written as,  
),;( iiji YXtRt =        (4.13) 
Equation (4.13) is a demand function for decision variable it and function R 
denotes a reaction function. This reaction function presents jurisdiction i’s best response 
to choices made by other jurisdictions on their taxes )( jt  and the position of the reaction 
function depends on jurisdiction i’s characteristics and not those of its neighbors. If, for 
instance, the slope of the reaction function for country i is negative, then it implies that 
jurisdiction i would lower its tax rate in response to an increase in the tax rate in 
jurisdiction j when the marginal utility of the public good is small.  In theory, nothing is 
said regarding the sign of the slope of the reaction function however, differentiating 
(4.13) indicates the following: 
iiii ttittji
VVtt // −=∂∂         (4.14) 
Where the expressions are the second partial derivatives of V of which, 
itt ii
V represents a vector of derivatives and depending on the properties of preferences, it 
can take either sign, while 
iitt
V must be negative so as to satisfy the second-order 
condition. The slope of the reaction function
it
R  can thus be positive or negative; it can 
also be zero.  However, a reaction function slope of zero would indicate a case where 
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interaction is absent. Consequently, a test of the null hypothesis that the reaction function 
has a slope of zero is effectively a test for the existence of interaction.   The slope of the 
reaction function gives by how much a jurisdiction would react to a 1 percent or unit 
change in the respective tax rates of neighboring jurisdictions.  
While tax policies in developing countries differ in terms of structure from those 
of the developed world we would still expect them to behave in a similar way when it 
comes to tax competition as they try to get as much revenue as they can from taxes and 
especially corporate taxes.  Developing countries collect much less tax revenue as a 
fraction of GDP, compared to developed economies, owing to a number of problems 
which include, among others, greater tax enforcement problems and a huge underground 
or informal sector.  These countries do rely a lot on corporate tax revenue, obtaining as 
much as 19.3 percent of revenue from corporate taxes as compared to 9.7 percent for 
developed countries (Gordon and Li 2005).  This indicates that developing countries are 
just as likely to compete for business as would the developed countries.      
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CHAPTER 5: THE EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
 
Econometric Model: Expenditure Side 
In this section we empirically test the theoretical model for government 
expenditure determination that we presented in the previous section.  Emanating from the 
theoretical model which implies that country i’s per capita expenditures in year t, itE , 
depend on the country’s own characteristics ( itX ) and its neighbors’ expenditures, we 
assume at the initial stage that each country has only one neighbor whose per capita 
expenditure is denoted jtE . From Equation (4.6) in the theoretical model, we estimate the 
impact of neighboring countries expenditures on country i’s expenditures and in linear 
specification we write:  
itjtitit uEXE ++= ρβ       (5.1) 
where β and ρ are parameters and itu is a random error. In Equation (5.1) we 
assume that the neighbor effects are transmitted concurrently, i.e., without any lags; a 
reasonable supposition given that the data are annual. Normally, it would be expected 
that a jurisdiction would copy its neighbor’s policies that are already in place, thus 
resulting in a lag between the two tax or expenditure variables. However, Case, Hines et 
al. (1989) who were one of the first researchers to apply spatial analysis to expenditures, 
analyzed a model in which they included the lagged variable for expenditures 1, −tjE , as an 
exogenous variable and found that the model did not perform as well as it did without it; 
the value of the log likelihood was lower than with jtE .  
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A country’s public expenditure is characterized by individual effects26 or 
unobserved characteristics that influence its fiscal decisions and do not change over time. 
Institutional differences are likely across countries and to control for these, Equation (5.1) 
is enhanced with an individual effect. The model also allows for time effects, i.e., 
including a series of year specific intercepts, which are intended to control for variables 
that might have a common effect on the countries in a given year like business cycle 
conditions.27  With the country and time effects, the model takes the following form: 
ittijtitit uhfEXE ++++= ρβ          (5.2) 
where if and th  are the country fixed and time effects, respectively.  In the above 
two equations, we are looking at a scenario which takes into consideration only one 
neighbor.  However, it is often the case that a country has more than one neighbor whose 
expenditures have an impact on its own expenditure. 
 
Multiple Neighbors  
As explained in Chapter 3 (Literature Review), the term neighbor as used in this 
context does not necessarily mean sharing a border “geographic neighbor”, it can be 
generalized to any network structure.  Defining neighbors has always proved to be a 
problem and as pointed out by Sole Olle (2003), Anselin (2002) and others; a common 
procedure for specifying these interactions uses geographic proximity criteria, but that, 
there is no reason not to use other distance metrics such as socio-economic similarity. A 
detailed discussion of how neighbors are selected in this study follows in the next       
                                                 
26 Examples of such fixed effects include climate, political make-up, etc. 
27 Time effects are also crucial in that they prevent attribution of behavioral significance to any cross-
country correlations in spending that are in actual fact due to common nation influences.  
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sub-section. The fact that expenditures of neighboring countries have an impact on the 
expenditures of country i does not imply that all neighbors have equal influence. Country 
j’s impact on country i’s spending depends on the complementarity of the countries’ 
spending in generating utility for residents of country i, where complementarity is based 
on the extent to which the countries’ populations are similar. Case et al. (1989) assume 
that the impact of other countries’ expenditures on country i depend on a weighted 
average of all other countries’ expenditures and the weights depend on the “ degree of 
neighborliness.”  With multiple neighbors, itE  in Equation (5.2) is replaced with 
∑
=
n
j
jtij Ew
1
        (5.3) 
where 1=ijw  if country j is neighbors with country i and 0=ijw  if country j is 
not a neighbor of country i. Vector ijw  indicates the relative importance of each country 
to country i. The system of expenditure equations for all countries is written in the 
following matrix form: 
tttt uXWEE +++= βρα       (5.4) 
where tE is an (N x 1) vector of country expenditures in year t; tWE is the spatial 
lag term, tX  is an (N x k) matrix of explanatory variables that includes time and fixed 
effects; and W is an (N x N) weight matrix that assigns neighbors to every country.  The 
parameter ρ  reflects the strength of interaction among countries.  
The expenditure equations that we estimate finally are in the form: 
ititjtit uXWEE +++= βρα        (5.6) 
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Correlated Random Shocks 
The inclusion of time effects in the model is meant to control for systematic 
influences that are common to all countries in a given year or period.  However, 
neighbors could still be subject to correlated random shocks and the presence of such 
shocks produces a correlation between neighbors’ levels of spending that could result in 
the presence of causal influences that are actually not there. Hence to correct for this, 
potential correlation among the errors of neighbors is allowed in the following way: 
tNttt WIWuu ελελ 1)( −−=+=      (5.7) 
whereε  is an idiosyncratic error that is uncorrelated between countries: 
0( =jtitE εε ) for .ji ≠  In this study there is potential for dependence on neighbors 
through expenditure (E), as well as through errors (u), to mimic each other. If spatial 
correlation in the error terms is not corrected for, it would not affect the consistency of 
theβ  parameters, but it would reduce its efficiency. However, ignoring the spatial lag 
term when ρ  is non-zero would be more serious as it will yield inconsistent estimates of 
the β  parameters.  
With the errors in Equation (5.4) correlated with the right-hand-side variables, 
this equation cannot be estimated consistently using ordinary least squares.  To remove 
the dependent variable from the right hand side, we can invert it to the following reduced 
form: 
tNtNt uWIXWIE
11 )()( −− −+−= λβρ      (5.8) 
where NI  is the identity matrix of size N and it gives the solution of the Nash 
equilibrium of the game.  Given that the error term is ttt Wuu ελ += , Equation (5.8) now 
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incorporates the potential correlation between errors of neighbors and expenditure and is 
now written as a non-linear function of exogenous variables X. With this correlation, it 
means that estimating using ordinary least squares (OLS) will lead to inconsistent 
parameters. Most studies, as indicated in the summary of literature above have used 
either maximum likelihood (ML) such as Brueckner (2003) or instrumental variables (IV) 
as in Baicker (2001), Brueckner (2003), Besley and Case (1995), Ladd (1992), and Rork 
(2003) in their estimations. Other types of methodologies have also been used in spatial 
analysis such as ordered probit and 2SLS. However, in the presence of correlation 
between the jurisdictions characteristics Xs and the error term, using ML estimates for 
spatial analysis will be inconsistent and this needs to be corrected for.  
 
Empirical Estimation: Tax Revenue Side   
This section gives the empirical specification for tax revenues. The reaction 
function generated in Section 4.3 above relates each jurisdiction’s chosen tax rate to the 
choices of other jurisdictions and to its own characteristics. The empirical estimation thus 
follows from Equation (4.13) and it can be written as: 
  ititjtit uXTaxTax +++= βρα      (5.9) 
Where itTax represents tax revenues as shares of total revenue for country i at time 
t, jtTax  are tax revenue shares for neighboring countries, β and ρ are parameters, 
and itu is an error term. Variable itX  is a vector representing the socio-economic 
characteristics of community i, and these represent preferences as well as other factors 
that affect the determination of tax revenues. The key coefficient in Equation (5.9) is the 
 93
reaction of country i to the tax rates of other countries j, and this is reflected by ρ . 
Jurisdictions often keep their tax rates low in view of the idea that a tax increase would 
result in positive fiscal externalities for neighboring jurisdictions with lower tax rates as 
they experience inflow of capital and a widening of their tax base.  Other jurisdictions 
will not usually follow suit when there is an increase in tax rates in one jurisdiction.  
Hence, the coefficient ρ  is expected to be positive in the presence of tax mimicking. 
The rest of the estimation procedure follows the one outlined under expenditures 
above. Hence, for both tax revenues and spending levels, we test the hypothesis that the 
slope of the reaction function is zero, i.e., 0=ρ  which is a test for the existence of 
interaction or mimicking behavior. This hypothesis tests for spatial interaction among the 
dependent variables and since spatial dependencies could also be due to spatially 
associated omitted variables, we test for the hypothesis that there is no spatial interaction 
in the error terms, i.e., .0=λ  We estimate the following revenue equations: 
itititit uXWTaxTax +++= βρα        (5.10) 
With  
ελ += Wuuit          (5.10a) 
 
Spatial Specification  
This section gives an overview of how weight matrices that are used to determine 
spatial interaction are constructed and we also include the choice of matrices that are used 
for this study. Determining the weighting matrix can be quite an onerous task as coming 
up with the best measure or criterion can involve a lot of trial and error. Revelli (2002) 
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points out that in general, the definition of the weighting criterion should be driven by the 
following: (a) the theoretical model; (b) the size and number of jurisdictions (local) in the 
sample; and (c) parsimony-as opposed to arbitrariness.  As a result of the uncertainty 
regarding the proper specification of the spatial weight matrix, Ruiz (2006) points out 
that this could lead to a potential problem of drawing inappropriate conclusions as the 
specified weight matrix may not be the true weight matrix.  
For most spatial models in applied local public economics, the use of geographic 
criterion seems reasonable enough, and this draws from the conclusion that close-by 
jurisdictions are more likely to affect each other than those that are far away. It is on this 
notion that most studies assume a limited geographical dimension of information 
externalities and this only considers jurisdictions that share boundaries. Brueckner (2003) 
underscores this by pointing out that this effect applies in both “ spillover” and “ 
resource-flow” models.28  Most empirical works have thus used a straightforward 
contiguity criterion which defines neighborliness as border-sharing and all contiguous 
jurisdictions are given equal weight. For instance, Case (1992) used geographic 
proximity to test for interdependence in farmers’ attitudes toward the adoption of new 
technologies.  Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) pointed out that for large-scale jurisdictions 
like the U.S. states, this approach seems reasonable but that it is far less so in the context 
of many small municipalities as is the case with their study on Belgium. They extend the 
                                                 
28 The spillover model is where agents or jurisdictions are directly affected by the decision variables chosen 
elsewhere and a resource-flow model is where the availability of a resource at a location is affected by the 
decision variables at all other locations. 
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jurisdiction’s reference space beyond its immediate borders by introducing a second-
order lag.29  
When constructing a weight matrix, it is important to consider both the spatial 
extent of the influence and the power of the influence (Bucholtz 2004). Not every 
member of a neighborhood would exert the same influence even if they all share a border 
with that jurisdiction. In the case of countries that are spread over a vast region, various 
ways could be used to determine the weight matrix and these include the contiguity or 
border criteria, geographic distance, economic characteristics, social characteristics and 
demographic characteristics. One way to overcome this uncertainty is to construct the 
weights using several of these methods and taking into consideration variables or 
characteristics that are common to all jurisdictions in the sample. The estimation results 
could then be used to determine which measures are better by looking at the ones with 
higher and more significant coefficients. This is the method preferred by most studies as 
demonstrated by among others, Case, Hines et al. (1989) who used three criteria 
(geography, per capita income, and percentage of the population that is black) to 
construct the weighting matrices, and Redoano (2003) who used four criteria: 
geographical distance weighted, GDP weighted, GDP distance weighted and GDP per 
capita weighted.  In this study, we consider the geographic, economic and social 
definitions of the weight matrix.  
 
                                                 
29 They define two separate “reference spaces” for each Belgian municipality i. The first one consists of the 
municipalities’ immediate neighbors (First-Order Neighbors) and the second one are municipalities that 
have a common boundary (Second-Order Neighbors) with FON municipalities but excludes municipality i 
itself and the FON municipalities of i.  
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Geographic Definition of Weight Matrices  
The first weight matrix measures we consider are based on the geographical 
definition. We use the contiguity criterion to determine the weight matrix given the 
clustering of SADC countries and that most of them share a border with at least one 
neighbor and this also extends to the SSA countries of which most share a border with at 
least one other country.  However, in these two regions, we have countries that are 
islands and hence do not share a border with any country, and this criterion would 
exclude them from the analysis.  This problem is also encountered where some countries 
in the region are omitted from the sample due to lack of data, thus leaving some countries 
without neighbors.   However, we overcome this constraint of unconnected observations 
by considering the nearest neighbor in terms of distance or shortest distance to mainland 
in the case of islands.    
The first geographic measure we use is the contiguity measure where the 
individual elements of the weighting matrix, W, which is an n x n positive matrix, are 
computed based on whether countries share a common border or not. We set weights 
such that: 1=ijω if countries i and j share a common border and 0=ijω  for non 
contiguous countries. Further, by convention, a country cannot be its own neighbor hence 
the diagonal elements will be zero ( 0=iiw  and 0=jjw ).  In order to eliminate 
discontinuity points in the solutions, the weight matrix is usually row-standardized such 
that each element in the standardized matrix falls between 0 and 1 and each row sums to 
one, whereby ,/ kw ij
s
ij ω= where ∑= j ijk ω . Row standardizing suggests that a spatial lag 
operation, whereby a vector of observations is multiplied by W, corresponds to an 
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averaging of the neighboring values and it also makes interpretation easy.  However, 
given that ∑∑ ≠ i jij ij ww , the row standardized weight matrix is no longer symmetric.   
When using contiguity to determine the weight matrix, different weight structures 
may result from the same spatial layout (Anselin 2002). Contiguity can be determined 
using only common boundaries and this is referred to as the rook case or it can be 
determined using only common vertices,30 a case known as the bishop.  The third case is 
whereby both boundaries and vertices are used to determine neighbors and this is referred 
to as the queen case and this is what we apply in this study. The queen case normally 
yields more neighbors. 
Geographic proximity could also be viewed as a continuous variable hence, the 
second geographical weight matrix criterion that we use is based on the distance between 
capital cities of the countries that are in the sample. When using distance to capture 
spatial interactions, we expect countries that are close to one another to display some 
mimicking behavior as opposed to distant neighbors. The distance measure was 
computed using the latitudes and longitudes of the capital cities. We define ijd  as the 
distance between capitals of countries i and j and set ,/1 ijij d=ω and construct ijw  
from ijω . The distance weight matrix is then normalized using ∑=
j ijij
d
ij dd
w 11 . Case, 
Hines et al. (1989) and Case, Rosen et al. (1993) also suggest using 2/1 ijij d=ω  or 
4/1 ijij d=ω , however, they point out that in practice the various measures of distance tend 
to yield similar results.   
                                                 
30 This is where countries do not share a common border but just a point or what is referred to as a node in 
geographic information system (GIS). 
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Economic Definitions of Weight Matrices  
We build our second type of weight matrices by considering two countries 
neighbors if they have similar economic characteristics. We considered the GDP and 
GDP per capita variables for the weighting matrices and their construction is similar for 
both variables.   For GDP we use: 
∑ −−= j jiji
g
ij GDPGDPGDPGDP
w 1/1  
Where g is GDP and ji GDPGDP − is the difference in the GDP levels between 
countries i and j. In our study we use time invariant GDP, which is the average GDP for 
the period 1980-2001.  
Similarly, the GDP per capita weight matrix is calculated in the following way: 
 ∑ −−= j gdppcjgdppcigdppcjgdppci
gdppc
ij
GDPGDPGDPGDP
w 1/1  
where gdppc is GDP per capita.  When applying the economic and social weight 
matrices to our case, we encountered a problem of spatial coefficients that were out of the 
stipulated boundaries.  We corrected this problem by assigning zeros to cases where the 
absolute difference for each variable was very high and 1 to those with smaller absolute 
differences. The smaller the difference, the closer the countries are in terms of each 
economic measure. For GDP per capita our cut off point was US$200,31 however we 
ended up dropping the GDP measure from our estimations as it failed to produce 
                                                 
31 The absolute differences, gdppcj
gdppc
i GDPGDP −  range from a low of 1.64 to a high of 5,507, with the 
majority of the countries clustered in the lower tail. We chose 200 as our cut off point because this is where 
our weight matrix performed well without being too singular.  
 99
acceptable results, yielding spatial coefficients that were outside the acceptable range of -
1 to 1.  We attributed the problem to large variations in economic variables between the 
countries as some of the middle-income countries in the sample have very high GDP 
levels, like South Africa, while some low-income countries’ GDP levels are relatively 
very low.   
It is also possible to test if there is a leader among the jurisdictions under analysis 
by using a weight matrix that assigns a higher weight to countries with higher values of 
the variable that is used to determine such leadership. Generally in fiscal studies, GDP is 
used to determine which country or countries are leaders. In this study, the way in which 
we reconditioned our GDP per capita weight matrix could be used to interpret the results 
in terms of “ leader(s)” as we made a distinction between the countries with low and high 
GDP per capita by assigning them different values.  
 
Social Definitions of Weight Matrices  
For the social indicator measure we used the Human Development Index (HDI) 
measure to construct the weight matrix.  As with GDP and GDP per capita, we used the 
average32 over the period under review and it was calculated as follows: 
 ∑ −−= j jijiij HDIHDIHDIHDIw
1/1  
Where ji HDIHDI − is the difference in the indices between country i and country 
j.  We encountered the same problems with our HDI matrix as we did with the GDP per 
capita weight matrix and we had to redefine it to get it to perform well.  We attributed 
this problem to the big inequalities in the social and economic variables among these 
                                                 
32 The HDI Index is given for every five years. 
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developing countries where some are classified as low-low income and some are high-
middle income, hence their HDI and GDP per capita values vary a great deal between the 
poorer countries and the richer ones. The HDI index takes values between 0 and 1 where 
values close to one indicate that a country is relatively rich and values close to zero 
indicate a great deal of inequality or poverty. We redefined this weight matrix by first 
taking the absolute differences between all the countries and then coding those that were 
above 0.2 as zero and those below or equal to 0.2 were coded as 1.  A higher absolute 
difference in the indices implies that the two countries were not close in terms of HDI 
rank and the reverse applies for those with small absolute differences. We chose 0.2 
because that was our median point where the maximum difference was around 0.6. The 
reconditioned weight matrix performed well.  This reconditioning of the weight matrix 
takes us back to the issue of arbitrariness associated with the determination of weight 
matrices, where there is no prescribed or specific way of determining them. 
 
Methodologies 
For the empirical analysis part, we tried to apply methodologies that would give 
us a better estimation given the objective of this study. As pointed out above, ordinary 
least squares (OLS) will yield inconsistent estimates because the spatial lag term, tWE   is 
correlated with the error term tu . However, we can estimate our models using alternative 
methods. The maximum likelihood approach has been the most common method of 
estimation and specification testing while the instrumental variables (IV) have been used 
mainly for the estimation of the spatial lag. These two methods of estimation have been 
rarely used in the estimation of the general or full spatial model, which involves 
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estimation of a spatial lag model with a spatial autoregressive disturbance Saavedra 
(2000). When dealing with panel data that involves a large number of countries over a 
short period of time, or where N>T, maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) may yield 
estimates that are not consistent.  This is the case with our SSA data where the number of 
countries exceeds the number of years. Further, McGarvey and Walker (2004) point out 
that they could not estimate the n x n disturbance covariance matrix using a fully efficient 
estimator such as maximum likelihood or a best IV estimator since n is greater than T in 
their sample.  
Kelejian and Prucha (1999) pointed out that the (quasi) maximum likelihood 
estimator may not be computationally feasible in many cases that involve moderate- or 
large-sized samples and they suggested a generalized moments estimator that is 
computationally simple regardless of the sample size. Further, while the MLE assumes 
normally distributed errors, the GMM estimation does not rely on distributional 
assumptions and the estimators are easy to calculate.  While GMM estimation has the 
advantage of consistency in the presence of arbitrary heteroscedasticity, this comes at a 
cost of possibly poor finite sample performance.   
When comparing MLE-based and GMM-based tests against spatially 
autocorrelated errors in spatial models, Egger, Larch et al. (2005) found that contrary to 
previous research, GMM-based Wald-tests tend to perform extremely well irrespective of 
the underlying error distribution and outperformed the MLE-based LM-test in terms of 
both size and power in small to moderately-sized samples and error distributions. In the 
case of normally distributed errors, a Wald-test based on the variance of the spatially 
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autoregressive residuals (SAR) parameters, the GMM performed as well as the MLE-
based tests.    
This study uses two methodologies: the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
and the generalized spatial two stage least squares (GS2SLS). 
 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
We use the GMM estimator that can be applied to spatial models and was 
developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1999) and Kelejian and Prucha (2006). Their 
generalized moments estimator uses moment conditions to form a system of equations to 
be estimated, depending on the model. While this method requires some matrix 
multiplication and the calculation of the trace of WW ′ , it does not require the calculation 
of the determinant of W or the eigenvalues of W, which is a problem that affects the MLE 
procedure. 
 
GMM Specification  
Following Kelejian and Prucha (2006) we specify a general spatial model and its 
underlying assumptions. The model with n spatial units can be described as follows: 
nnnnnnn uYWXY ++= ρβ        (5.11) 
nnnnn uMu ελ +=         (5.12) 
The variables are as defined above under the econometric models above.  The 
matrices nW  and nM are the spatial weights matrices which can be the same, and nρ  and 
nλ are the typical autoregressive parameters.  The vectors nnn YWY = and nnn uMu = are 
the spatial lags of nY  and nu , respectively. With all quantities allowed to depend on the 
 103
sample size n, the model is fairly general and allows for spatial spillovers in the variables 
and in the error terms.  We make the assumptions that all the diagonal elements of nW and 
nM are zero, that the matrices nnn WI ρ− and nnn MI λ− are nonsingular for all ρ andλ , 
and we uniquely define the following: 
uWIXWIY nnnnnnnnn
11 )(()( −− −+−= ρβρ ,    (5.13) 
nnnnn MIu ελ 1)( −−=         (5.14) 
The spatial lag model can be formulated as a linear model with an endogenous 
variable (Wy) and exogenous variables (X)  and we have: 
uZy += γ          (5.15) 
where ],[ XWyZ =  and ],[ βργ = . The endogeneity problem for the spatially lagged 
dependent variable is solved by using instrumental variables and these are obtained using 
a matrix Q (N x q) of additional variables: 
WyQQQQWy ′′= −1)(         (5.16) 
such that ],[ˆ XWyZ = , and this results in the spatial two stage least squares estimator 
(S2SLS): 
yZZZSLSS ′′= − ˆ]ˆˆ[ˆ 12γ         (5.17) 
Inference on the SLSS 2γ  is based on the asymptotic variance matrix: 
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2 ])([ˆ]ˆ[
−− ′′′= ZQQQQZAsyVar SLSS σγ      (5.18) 
with      NZyZy SLSSSLSS /)ˆ()ˆ(ˆ 22
2 γγσ −′−=      (5.19) 
On the other hand, the moment conditions related toλ are  
2]1[ σεε =′
n
E          (5.20) 
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)(1]1[ 2 MMtr
nn
E ′=′ σεε        (5.21) 
0]1[ =′εε
n
E          (5.22) 
From Equation (4), assuming u~ is a predictor of u, using the notation Muu = and 
MMuu = , and after substituting Equation (5) into Equation (6), we get the following 
moment conditions forλ : 
n
MMtruuuu
n
Euuuu
n
E )()()(1()(1
′
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −′−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −′− λλλλ v    (5.23) 
0()(1 =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −′− uuuu
n
E λλ        (5.24) 
OLS is used to estimate and obtain a consistent estimate of the residuals which are 
then plugged into the above moments to obtain a consistent estimate ofλ . 
 
Generalized Spatial Two Stage Least Squares (GS2SLS) Estimation  
We also used an instrumental variable estimator that builds on the generalized 
spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS) model by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) which is 
an estimation procedure for models that contain spatially lagged dependent variables as 
well as spatially autocorrelated error terms. However, their estimation is based on a 
cross-sectional setting (where T = 1) and we apply it to panel data (where T >1) as in 
McGarvey and Walker (2004) and Hernandez-Murillo (2003). This is basically a three-
step procedure which estimates the autoregressive spatial model with autoregressive 
errors (Equations 5.11 and 5.12) by two-stage least squares (2SLS) using a set of 
instruments, Ht, which is a nT x p matrix. The instrument matrices are composed of a 
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subset of the linearly independent columns of 
( ,....),,,,....,,, 22 ttttttttttttt XWMXWMXMXWXWX . 
In the second step the parameterλ is estimated using residuals obtained in the first 
step and the GMM procedure. In the third and final step, the regression model in 
(Equation 5.11) is then re-estimated using 2SLS but after the model has been transformed 
via a GLS type of transformation to account for the spatial correlation.  
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CHAPTER 6: DATA SET AND CHOICE OF VARIABLES 
 
In this study, we estimate the models specified in Equations (5.6) and (5.9) using 
yearly panel data on government expenditures, tax revenues , economic, geographic, 
political and demographic conditions. The use of panel data is advantageous over the 
conventional cross-sectional or time series data sets for various reasons. Panel data tends 
to give a large number of data points which increases the degrees of freedom and reduces 
the collinearity among explanatory variables.  This improves the efficiency of 
econometric estimates. The other advantage of panel data is that it allows for the 
availability of multiple observations for a given variable or individual at a given time, 
allowing one to identify an otherwise unidentified model, thus overcoming the problem 
of unidentification of a model that results from measurement errors (Hsiao 2003).  
The data used to test both tax and expenditure mimicking covers overall thirty 
Sub-Saharan African countries at the central government level for the period 1980-2001.   
The data on tax revenues and expenditures were obtained from the International 
Monetary Fund Yearbook of Government Finance Statistics, IMF Staff Country Reports 
and central bank and government reports for individual countries.  For some countries 
data on defense were obtained from (SIPRI).  Data on the economic and demographic 
control variables: aid per capita, GDP per capita, openness (GDP, imports and exports), 
land area, literacy rate, proportion of population aged 0–14 years and proportion of 
population above 65 years were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and the World Economic Outlook (WEO) Databases.  The political right and 
civil liberty data were obtained from the Freedomhouse. Data on structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) were obtained from the IMF and World Bank country reports while the 
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regional economic blocs information came from Africa Recovery, United Nations.  The 
electoral system data were obtained from Global Coalition for Africa Reports. 
 
Dependent Variables 
In this study we looked at five categories of government tax revenues and five 
categories of government spending as our dependent variables.  These are presented in 
detail below. 
 
Government Expenditures 
Under the public expenditure specifications, we consider selected categories of 
spending, and these are government expenditures in general public services, defense, 
education, health and transport and communication. The expenditure categories are 
presented as shares of the total expenditures. This is done mainly to avoid large 
fluctuations in data over the years in some countries as a result of, for example, declaring 
a new unit of currency during periods of very high inflation or hyperinflation.  The 
categories chosen here include expenditures on social services such as education and 
health which most developing countries tend to give higher priority given that they are 
the cornerstones of human development. It is our view that these would most likely be 
more copied than others. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the summary statistics for 
these variables as well as the control variables.  
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Government Tax Revenues 
The taxes analyzed are consumption taxes, individual income taxes, corporate 
income taxes, excise taxes and international trade taxes. Consumption taxes comprise 
general sales tax, turnover tax or value added tax (VAT) and are presented here as VAT.  
The general sales tax comprises of the manufacturers sales tax and the retail sales tax. By 
2003, eight SADC countries had introduced a VAT,33 which extends through the retail 
stage, while in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa, 33 countries had adopted VAT by May 
2005, IMF (2005). Property taxes34 are miniscule in most countries and are levied by 
local authorities, hence, they will not be considered here. Table A2 presents the summary 
statistics of these variables and those for the SADC countries are presented in Table A3.  
 
Descriptive Variables of Countries 
For each of the equations that we are estimating under expenditures and tax 
revenues, we propose a set of explanatory variables that could affect how the above fiscal 
choices are determined.  These variables are divided into the following characteristics: 
economic variables (aid per capita, per capita income, trade openness and IMF/World 
Bank structural adjustment programs [SAPs]); socio-demographic characteristics 
(percentage of population over 65 years, percentage of population under 14 years, land 
area, literacy rate and poverty or human development index (HDI); and political variables 
(political rights and civil liberties, dummies representing each country’s colonizing 
                                                 
33 VAT has replaced GST and turnover taxes in most SADC countries. The SADC countries with VAT as 
at 2003 were Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. 
34 The overall property tax revenue includes items like property transfer tax, estate duty, donations tax or 
marketable securities tax and these taxes are levied by central government authorities. 
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regime, dummies representing regional economic bloc membership and dummy for 
SADC membership).  These independent variables are explained in detail below.   
 
Economic Variables 
Aid per capita: Most of the countries under review at one point relied heavily on 
international aid and grants as a source of revenue and most still depend on aid as their 
economies continue to perform poorly for a number of reasons which include, famine, 
wars, lack of natural resources, over reliant on minerals and failure to diversify their 
economies when minerals get depleted.   
Per capita income: This is included because it measures the general well-being of 
the residents of a country (and it also controls for potential income effects in 
consumption) and generally accounts for local economic conditions. 
IMF/World Bank SAPs/ESAPs: This dummy variable represents the IMF and 
World Bank structural adjustment programs (SAPs) or enhanced structural adjustment 
programs (ESAPs) that were imposed by these Bretton Woods institutions on countries 
that were borrowing from them.  SAPs have been imposed by these institutions on 
countries seeking financial assistance, to ensure that these countries repay their debts and 
restructure their economies.  Such restructuring has required that the borrowers reduce 
spending on areas like health, education and development, while prioritizing debt 
repayment.  These constraints have had an impact on countries’ decisions to spend in 
these progressive sectors and hence the inclusion of SAPs in our estimation. They could 
also impact on tax revenue decisions as governments adjust their tax rates and/or bases to 
increase revenues so as to be able to service their debt. We include this variable as a 
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dummy where it takes the value of 1 for the period that the country was under the 
structural adjustment policy and zero when it was not. 
Openness: We included the openness measure as a proxy for trade intensity in 
each of our observations. To measure trade openness, we used the ratio of exports plus 
imports to GDP and the data for all the variables used in calculating the ratio was 
obtained from the World Development Indicators. 
 
Socio-demographic Characteristics:  
The percentage of the population that is over the age of 65 is included because of 
its high impact on government expenditures, particularly health expenditures in 
developing countries where most elderly people do not have health insurance. However, 
unlike in developed countries where the aged have a strong political voice, this may not 
be the case in developing countries because of limited access to relevant information. 
Percentage of population under 14:  Most expenditure on education is directed 
towards the young.  It is also the case that countries with different age structures may 
have different demands for publicly provided goods.  Some studies like Case, Rosen et al. 
(1993) and Revelli (2003) have included racial structures like proportion of population 
that is black or proportion of the minority, but we did not include that variable given that 
the population structures of the countries in SSA are totally different from those of 
developing countries.  
Land area: This variable captures the size of the countries and they differ 
considerably in terms of size and this also accounts for some expenditures.  Using land 
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area to account for size of countries also helps to identify the choice of tax structures by 
different countries.    
Latitudes/Longitudes:  We use the latitudes and longitudes of the cities of the 
countries in the sample to calculate the distance in miles between these cities.  The 
physical distance between the cities was used to compute one of our geographic weight 
matrices.  
Literacy Rate: This is included to account for the countries’ expenditures and 
economic conditions in general. It could also capture how vocal voters are in terms of 
their ability to access and analyze election information based on their ability to read. 
Poverty/HDI Index: With a relatively large population of developing countries 
still living in poverty, most expenditure could be geared towards improving living 
standards of voters. However, this variable is used to determine one of the weight 
matrices. 
 
Political Variables: 
Democracy/Electoral system:  Although there are many variations of electoral 
systems, such systems fall into three main groups: plurality-majority (where voters vote 
for candidates); proportional representation (where voters vote for a party); and semi-
proportional representation which is a combination of the other two. These were assigned 
values of 3 for plurality-majority; 2 for proportional representation; and 1 for semi-
proportional representation. All the three groups are found in the SSA region. 
Political rights and civil liberties:  This is meant to capture such factors as 
freedom of speech or expression, assembly, association, religion, free and fair elections, 
 112
and hence the extent to which citizens will be able to use elections to air their voice. 
Further, experience has shown that civil strives and political instabilities have had a 
serious impact on countries’ abilities to develop their individual economies as well as 
take full advantage of regional integration arrangements. The political rights and civil 
liberties are rated separately on a seven-category scale with 1 representing the most free 
and 7 the least free. 
Dummy on colonies: Almost all of the countries in SSA were at one point 
colonized by European countries. Countries that colonized SSA include Belgium, Britain, 
France, Germany, and Portugal and most colonies adopted their colonizers’ language as 
the official language. This dummy variable therefore captures the possibility that 
countries with the same colonizer would tend to adopt similar policies.   
Dummy on economic bloc membership:  This captures the various economic blocs 
that are in Sub-Saharan Africa.  However, in view of the fact that most countries are 
members of at least one economic group and to avoid the dummy variable trap problem, 
we only included the three major economic blocs represented in our sample and left out 
the rest.  The economic blocs included are SADC, COMESA and ECOWAS. Table A4 in 
the Appendix gives the detailed economic bloc membership of the countries included in 
the sample.  
Time trend: we included the trend variable in our analysis to help capture 
variables that are highly correlated with time and affect the dependent variable but are not 
directly observable. However, when running our regression, this variable caused the 
weight matrix not to perform well or to be close to singular.  We had to drop this 
variable, but this did not affect the results much. Dropping this variable had no impact on 
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the fixed effects part of the model which would have automatically dropped it anyway as 
fixed effects computation renders all fixed variables zero and drops them. 
The descriptive statistics of all the variables given in Tables A1 to A3 of the 
Appendix have been separated between SSA expenditures, SSA revenues and SADC 
expenditures and revenues because of the different number of countries and observations 
used in each sample. Data limitations led to our including 24 countries under SSA 
expenditures, 30 countries under SSA revenues and 11 countries for SADC.  
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CHAPTER 7: RESULTS 
 
The empirical results presented here provide evidence on the presence of copycat 
behavior pertaining to expenditure and taxation policies and can indicate whether such 
behavior points towards any harmonization of these policies in these regions. Further, the 
study allows the spatial interaction analysis to extend to the simultaneous determination 
of government expenditures and tax revenues by determining if, when these two policies 
are determined simultaneously by governments of these countries, such behavior is also 
mimicked among neighbors. We perform this by using the “ price/quantity” ratio of 
government policy as a basis for assessing relative performance by illustrating that this 
ratio of government tax revenues to public goods provision in country i is dependent 
upon the same ratio in neighboring countries.  By so doing, we assume that jurisdictions 
simultaneously consider the level of taxation for public goods and how much public 
goods they receive and compare this with those of neighboring jurisdictions.   
In our estimations, we applied both the GMM and the GS2SLS methodologies to 
the general spatial model for each of the categories of government tax revenues and 
spending that we looked at and the results are presented in the Appendix.  We used the 
general spatial model, which includes both the spatial lagged term and the spatially 
correlated error structure.  This model is in the form: 
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where y is a n x 1 vector of dependent variables and in our model it represents the 
various categories government tax revenues and expenditures, ρ is the coefficient of the 
 115
spatially lagged dependent variable which captures the spatial relationship in the 
variables, β is a k x 1 vector of parameters that are associated with exogenous variables, 
X is an n x k matrix of exogenous variables, ε  is an n x 1 vector of disturbances,λ is the 
coefficient of the spatial autoregressive structure for the error term ε , and μ is a n x 1 
vector of disturbances.  W1 and W2 are weight matrices that can be equal and in our 
estimations we treat the weight matrices as equal, except for the case where we use both 
the distance and contiguity matrices in the same model.  According to LeSage (1999), 
this kind of configuration of the spatial weight matrices would indicate a belief that 
contiguity alone does not suffice to capture the spatial effects at work, but that the 
distance from the central city might also represent an important factor in what we are 
modeling. Further, we also test for spatial interaction using different weight matrices 
based on economic and social variables.  
The interpretation of the results is presented below. However, we first present the 
general or overall analysis and then summarize the interpretation for the spatial 
coefficients in Section 7.4. However, given the large output of our results, we will focus 
our interpretation on the contiguity and GDP per capita weight matrices.  The results for 
the other two weight matrices, distance and HDI, are also presented in the results tables. 
 
Government Tax Revenues 
In the first part, we focus on government revenues and estimate the reaction 
function of one country’s taxation choices to those of other countries. We did estimations 
for the SSA region which included thirty countries as well as for the SADC region which 
covered 11 countries (see Table A5 in the Appendix for the list of countries). For our 
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estimations we used the generalized moments (GMM) estimating technique of Kelejian 
and Prucha (1999), with and without fixed effects and applied it to the general spatial 
model which gives the spatial coefficients for both the variables and the error terms.  As 
indicated above, the general spatial model tests for spatial interaction in the dependent 
variable as well as in the disturbances.  In our estimations, the spatial interaction in the 
model is given by the parameter ρ , which gives the impact of a unit increase in the 
weighted averages of neighboring countries’ tax revenues or expenditures on a country’s 
own tax revenues or expenditures. In our estimations, if countries that are included in the 
sample do not make tax revenue or expenditure decisions in isolation, but consider taking 
into consideration their neighbors’ fiscal policy choices, then we should expect to see 
some evidence of correlation in the variables of interest.  We also apply the generalized 
spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS) technique to test for spatial interaction and 
compare the results between the two techniques to see if they yield similar results  
Our results are divided into the two regions; we tested for spatial interaction in the 
whole of SSA and then we focused on the SADC sub-region.  The reason we looked at 
the two regions was because we wanted to determine if mimicking can occur over a wide 
region comprising many developing countries but of diverse economic conditions as in 
SSA that are spread over a wide geographic area and are also quite heterogeneous in 
terms of area or size, language (official), political administration, among other things, and 
we also checked for the same under a smaller region, SADC, where all the countries have 
stronger ties because of the regional integration process.   
 
 117
Sub-Saharan Africa 
We begin by analyzing the results for the SSA sample using the GMM 
methodology.  The GMM regression results for this region for the five government tax 
revenue categories are given in Tables A6 to A10. The five categories of tax revenues we 
examined are individual income taxes, corporate income taxes, VAT, excise taxes and 
international trade taxes. On the results tables, the second and third columns use 
geographic proximity in terms of border sharing to define neighborliness; the fourth and 
fifth columns use both distance and contiguity; the fifth and sixth columns use the human 
development index (HDI) weight matrix while the last two columns use the GDP per 
capita weight matrix.  As indicated above, we will limit our interpretation to the 
contiguity and GDP per capita weight matrices. In all of these specifications, there is 
evidence that neighborliness does matter when making decisions pertaining to tax 
revenues. The results for the GS2SLS estimations are presented in Table A26 in the 
Appendix and these only use the contiguity weight matrix. The results are also 
summarized in Tables A34 to A37 where we present only the spatial interaction 
coefficients, i.e., the spatial correlation in the model (ρ) and the spatial correlation in the 
errors (λ). The next sub-sections discuss the overall results as well as the marginal effects 
of the spatial coefficients.  
For the GMM methodology under the contiguity weight matrix,  the spatial 
autoregressive parameter or the copy-cat parameter (McGarvey and Walker 2004)), ρ , 
for individual income tax revenues for SSA is positive at 0.31 without controlling for 
fixed effects and improves to 0.51 with fixed effects and both are statistically significant 
at 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. These results attest to the presence of 
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spatial interaction in the determination of individual income taxes in the region. Further, 
this implies that a 1 unit increase in the neighboring countries’ ratio of individual income 
tax to total revenues would induce a 0.5 unit increase in this ratio in the home country.  
The spatial coefficient under the GDP per capita weight matrix is -0.49. The coefficient 
that allows for spatial autocorrelation in the disturbances,λ , is negative under the 
contiguity but positive under the GDP per capita weight matrix measure when we control 
for fixed effects.   
The negative and highly significant degree of correlation between neighbors’ 
errors and the relatively large, positive and very precise measure of correlation in the 
spatial terms could suggest that spatial interaction comes from the correlation in the 
countries’ tax revenues.  Hence, the ultimate effect of an individual income tax increase 
by country i’s neighbors is to increase country i’s individual income tax revenues by 0.5 
(when using the contiguity measure). The GS2SLS method yields similar results. Other 
studies have found negative coefficients on the personal income tax of neighboring 
jurisdictions, for instance, Rork (2003) found estimates ranging between -0.048 to -0.097 
for neighboring states.  He attributed this negative interaction to possible lack of mobility 
in the tax base. A change in a neighboring state’s personal income tax rates is unlikely to 
cause big relocations to that state with most individuals preferring to remain in their 
home state of residence.  While this would be a plausible explanation for developing 
countries, our positive spatial coefficient could be attributed to the need to harmonize 
taxes by these countries. 
For corporate income tax revenues, the spatial autocorrelation coefficient is 
positive under the contiguity but under the GDP per capita weight matrix it is not 
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significant.  The spatial coefficient under the contiguity measure is 0.57 without fixed 
effects and it is statistically significant at 1 percent. Conversely when using the GDP per 
capita measure, the coefficient is not significant.  The significant size of the coefficient 
could signify the presence of corporate tax mimicking that is leading to harmonization.  
This is possible given that the SSA countries have of late been moving towards 
harmonizing regional corporate taxes to attract businesses to the region. The results also 
indicate strong mimicking behavior among countries that are geographically closer as 
indicated by the relatively larger spatial interaction coefficient under the contiguity 
measure and the non-significant one under the distance measure.   
Estimations for the value added tax (see Table A8) reveal positive spatial 
correlation under both the contiguity and GDP per capita measures of the weight matrix 
when we do not control for fixed effects.  The spatial coefficients under the contiguity 
matrix are 0.12 and -0.69, estimated without and with fixed effects respectively and both 
statistically significant. The corresponding coefficients under the GDP per capita matrix 
are 0.13 and 0.19.  These results indicate the presence of spatial interactions with regard 
to VAT in the region, where most countries have now adopted VAT to replace the 
general sales tax and other related taxes. Mimicking behavior here could be in terms of 
countries adopting VAT as neighbors adopt it, as well as setting their rates close to or 
similar to those of their neighbors, leading to harmonization of the VAT.  The high and 
negative spatial coefficient for VAT revenues could imply that countries are moving 
towards harmonizing their VAT rates by lowering them, hence the negative coefficient, 
and this is reflected in the revenue ratio we use here as our dependent variable.  Future 
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analysis could control for the general movement in VAT and other taxes by including an 
average world-wide tax rate. 
The results for the excise tax revenues presented in Table A9 indicate a relatively 
strong presence of spatial interaction in SSA when using the geographic measure and 
only when we do not control for fixed effects.  The spatial lag coefficients when not 
controlling for fixed effects is -0.77 under the contiguity measure and statistically 
significant at 1 percent. Similarly under the GDP per capita weight matrix, the spatial 
coefficient is -0.58. 
For international trade taxes (Table A10), the spatial correlation coefficient in the 
dependent variable is negative for the contiguity measure but positive under the economic 
characteristic measure.  The negative coefficient for spatial correlation could be attributed 
to the fact that these countries have got diverse imports and exports, especially in exports 
where most developing countries export natural resources and agricultural products that 
are usually unique to each country and hence it may be difficult to harmonize taxes or 
tariffs in such cases. Contiguous countries do not necessarily export the same minerals or 
even agricultural products mainly due to different climates and vegetation.  
 
Southern African Development Community 
We carried out similar estimations for the SADC region using both the GMM and 
GS2SLS methods. Tables A16-A20 present the summary of our GMM estimation results 
for the SADC region using the contiguity, distance, HDI and GDP per capita weight 
matrices. Our dependent variables are the same tax revenue categories (as shares of total 
revenue) as in the SSA sample above. For individual tax revenues, the contiguity weight 
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matrix performs better when we did not control for fixed effects with a spatial lag 
coefficient of -0.57 and it is highly significant.  However, the GDP per capita measure 
gives a spatial coefficient of 0.60 that is also highly significant, implying the presence of 
mimicking behavior among countries with similar incomes. Overall, the results suggest 
that there is some mimicking behavior in neighboring countries when determining 
individual income taxes and also that there are some unobserved factors that contribute to 
mimicking as reflected in the high spatial error coefficients.   
For corporate income tax revenues, only the GDP per capita weight matrix shows 
the presence of spatial interaction in the variables.  The spatial lag correlation coefficient 
is 0.36 under this weight matrix and this implies that the slope of the tax revenue reaction 
function is positive, signaling the presence of copycat behavior as SADC countries work 
towards achieving their objective of harmonizing taxes.  
With regard to VAT, the spatial autocorrelation coefficient is -0.46 and significant 
under the contiguity measure and without fixed effects, -0.05 with fixed effects and under 
GDP per capita it is 0.41 with fixed effects.  The evidence of VAT mimicking is not that 
strong among SADC countries when we control for fixed effects and this could be 
explained by the fact that most of these countries introduced VAT in the later part of our 
review period and even then, it is not all of them that had adopted VAT during this 
period.  
Excise taxes show the presence of spatial interaction in the variables only under 
the GDP per capita weight matrix with a coefficient of 0.31 that is statistically significant, 
but the contiguity matrix was not significant.  International trade taxes yield negative 
coefficients in the spatial interaction among the dependent variables under the contiguity 
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weight matrix, but positive under the GDP per capita weight matrix and these results are 
similar to the ones we obtained for SSA countries. The spatial error coefficient is positive 
under contiguity but negative under the GDP per capita weight matrix, signaling that 
spatial interactions are present and explained by some unobserved variables in the error 
terms, such as some shocks affecting these countries such as drought, wars, changes in 
world prices of their mineral and agricultural goods, among others.  
 
Government Expenditures 
On the expenditure side, we included as dependent variables five categories of 
government expenditure, viz; general government services, defense, education, health 
and transport and communication, each as a ratio of total expenditures. Our samples 
comprised of 24 countries from SSA and 11 countries from SADC.   
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Tables A11-A15 present the GMM results of the expenditure categories for the 
SSA region and we analyze the results for the contiguity and GDP per capita weight 
matrices.  Under general public expenditures, the geographical weight matrix measure 
exhibits the presence of both spatial lag dependence and spatial error correlation. The 
spatial lag coefficient under the contiguity weight matrix is 0.40 when we do not control 
for fixed effects and -0.28 when we include fixed effects and both are statistically 
significant. The GDP per capita weight matrix spatial lag coefficients is 0.32 without 
controlling for fixed effects and 0.20 with fixed effects. The coefficient of spatial 
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correlation in the error term is positive (λ =0.09) and significant under the contiguity 
weight matrix but negative under the GDP per capita weight matrix (λ =-0.3).    
Expenditures in defense also display the presence of spatial interaction. The 
spatial lag coefficient is -0.64 and significant at 10 percent under the contiguity weight 
matrix and it is 0.26 and significant at 1 percent under the GDP per capita weight matrix.   
Political tensions in the region would result in increased expenditures in defense and the 
SSA region has been having civil wars and inter-country wars in one area or the other 
throughout the review period. Further, as shown in our summary statistics tables in the 
Appendix, the share of defense expenditure to total revenue is relatively high in the 
region.  
With regard to education expenditures, there is evidence of spatial lag interaction, 
with neighboring countries’ expenditures having a positive effect on the expenditures of 
country i. The spatial lag coefficient is significantly high at 0.98 under the contiguity but 
relatively smaller at 0.32 under the GDP per capita weight matrix. This  reflects the need 
for these countries to educate their population and they do so by mimicking their 
neighbors and investing more in education.   
Health is one of the sectors where government expenditure is high in most 
developing countries where in most cases health services are offered for free or at highly 
subsidized fees.  In our estimations, we find a relatively high and positive spatial lag 
coefficient of 0.65 when we do not control for fixed effects and -0.34 when we take fixed 
effects into account, under the contiguity matrix.  This coefficient is not significant under 
the GDP per capita weight matrix. The transportation and communications expenditures 
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exhibit correlation in the dependent variables between the countries and the coefficient is 
0.677 for the contiguity weight measure and not significant for the GDP per capita one.   
 
Southern African Development Community  
On the expenditures side, the spatial correlation coefficient for general public 
services is 0.29 and significant under the contiguity weight matrix and 0.6 under the GDP 
per capita weight matrix. The spatial error coefficient is negative and significant under all 
the weight matrices.  Under government expenditures in defense, the spatial lag 
correlation is not significant under the contiguity weight matrices and it is -0.48 under the 
GDP per capita weight matrix.     
Expenditures in education in neighboring countries show a negative sign under 
the contiguity weight matrix in both estimation methods and this is not the expected sign 
as normally, developing countries tend to increase their expenditures in education as most 
still need to invest in their citizens’ education to reduce reliance on foreign manpower or 
expatriates. The spatial lag coefficient under the contiguity matrix is relatively high at      
-0.40 while under the GDP per capita weight matrix measure it is positive at 0.31.  
Expenditures in health display the presence of spatial interaction in the dependent 
variableonly under the GDP per capita matrix and without fixed effects.  Redoano (2003) 
found that public expenditures on health for European Union countries did not seem to be 
affected by neighbors but mainly by their previous year expenditures.  Expenditures in 
transport and communication display negative and large spatial lag coefficients for the 
geographic weight matrix (-0.93 with fixed effects)  and GDP per capita weight matrix   
(-0.62 with fixed effects).  The negative spatial lag in transport and communication 
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expenditures could be attributed to the fact that most of these projects are capital projects 
that tend to have large start-up costs and whose lives span over several years, if not 
decades. The high interaction displayed by the spatial error could be that developing 
countries could actually copy their neighbors in such expenditures as most of them still 
lack good infrastructures and failure to keep up with their neighbors could affect 
investment in their countries.   
 
Explanatory Variables 
In this study we included quite a number of control variables as explained in 
Section 6.3, to explain the tax revenues and expenditures dependent variables. Aid per 
capita (AID_PC), which was rescaled downwards by 100 in our estimations, is expected 
to be positive under both revenues and expenditures as it boosts governments’ revenues 
and in turn their spending levels. In our estimations, this variable performed well though 
it was negative in some cases. Developing countries tend to rely a lot on foreign aid 
(grants) to the extent that in their earlier years of independence, for most of these 
countries, at least half of their revenue budgets were based on foreign aid. The amount of 
foreign aid, however, has been going down as these countries become more reliant on 
different types of taxes and exports for their revenues, and also as some graduate from 
low income to middle income status.  
GDP per capita (GDP_PC), which was expected to be positive, performed well 
under corporate income tax revenues, VAT (with fixed effects), and education and it was 
mostly negative or mixed under the other variables.  The largely negative coefficient for 
GDP_PC could be attributed to the fact that most of the countries under review had 
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experienced a decline in GDP_PC as their economic conditions worsened in them 
because of a number of factors.  These factors include, among others, civil wars, droughts 
and mismanaged economies by corrupt leaders and political dictators. The land area 
(LAND_AREA) variable was included to capture the size of each country and also as a 
proxy for bigger governments, that is, if we assume that bigger countries will have bigger 
governments. This was rescaled by a factor of 10,000 and it was expected to be positive 
but we got some negative coefficients mostly under spending categories.  
The literacy rate (LITERACY) variable turned out to be negative mostly under 
tax revenues for the SSA sample while the SADC sample did yield some positive 
coefficients under some of the revenue categories and this could be explained by the 
relatively high literacy rates in the SADC sample compared with the SSA samples. The 
minimum literacy rate for SSA in both samples is 10.8 percent and that is for Burkina 
Faso whose literacy rates are astonishingly low but improving, (see Tables A1 and A2) 
while the minimum for the SADC sample is 44.5 percent.  
Demographic variables in terms of different age (and more often race) structures 
are often included in these models to capture the different demands that jurisdictions have 
for publicly provided goods. In our study, we included the percentage of population aged 
between 0-14 years (POP_0-14) and we expected its coefficient to be positive especially 
in terms of education and health. For both samples under education, this coefficient is 
positive and highly significant when we do not control for fixed effects. With regard to 
the health expenditures, we only get a positive and significant relationship when we use 
the HDI weight matrix. The other demographic variable that we included is the 
proportion of population that is above 65 years (POP_65+) and this was expected to be 
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positive because the higher it is, the greater the spending on health and other related 
areas. This variable behaves well in both SADC and SSA samples, even though the 
proportion of the elderly in developing countries tends to be lower than in developed 
countries because of lower life expectancy rates, most of which have been declining 
owing to, among others, the HIV/AIDS pandemic.    
The openness (OPENNESS) explanatory variable was almost always negative but 
behaved relatively well with international trade taxes as expected. Based on our measure 
of openness (ratio of imports plus exports to GDP), one would expect a higher ratio to 
mean higher revenues from international trade taxes. The negative coefficients could be 
attributed to the decline in tariff revenue as most countries adopt the WTO low tariff 
agreements and also as among themselves regionally, they adopt low tariffs within the 
region. This loss in government revenue from trade through tariffs reform is however, 
considered to be counteracted by the gain in welfare because reducing tariffs in considered 
to bring welfare gains. 
We also included a dummy variable for the IMF and World Bank Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) or Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programs (ESAPs) to 
capture the impact of these programs on the policies of countries that implemented them.  
As explained in Section 6.3, these are economic policies that have to be adopted by 
countries in order to qualify for new World Bank and IMF loans and they are supposed to 
help these countries make debt repayments on the older loans from commercial banks, 
foreign governments and the World Bank. Though the SAPs are designed for individual 
countries, they have common guiding principles and features such as, among others, 
promoting export-led growth, privatizing government owned enterprises otherwise 
known as parastatals and liberalization. These conditions impact on fiscal policy (and 
 128
other macro-economic decisions) as countries are also required to balance their budgets 
by cutting down on government spending while raising revenues. Participating countries 
are also required to remove price controls and state subsidies and this, coupled with the 
requirement to reduce spending, impacts directly on spending programs related to sectors 
such as health, education and social care because services provided by these sectors tend 
to be highly subsidized in developing countries. The SAPs dummy (IMF/WB_SAPs) was 
negative and significant under general public services and defense categories and it was 
also quite significant but positive for the transport and communication category.  
Remarkably, it was positive but non significant for the education and health sectors in the 
SSA sample but for the SADC sample, it was negative and significant under education.    
For our political variables, we included political right (POL_RIGHT) and 
electoral system (ELECT_SYSTEM) where the former measures the degree to which 
elections are fair and free and also captures freedom of speech while the latter captures 
the variations of electoral systems that exist in our samples. We obtained a general 
positive and significant POL_RIGHT for all our samples and in terms of expenditures, it 
could signal the willingness of governments to provide services to please their electorates 
so that they can keep them in power in subsequent elections, notwithstanding cases of 
dictators. The ELECT_SYSTEM is positive for revenues and negative for expenditures.  
Almost all of the countries included in our samples were at one point colonized by one 
western country or another. We thus included a colonizer dummy and we divided these 
colonizers into BRITISH, FRENCH and GERMAN.35  These give mixed results across 
the samples and the categories.  We also included regional economic dummies and 
                                                 
35 Under countries colonized by Germany, we also included those that were colonies of Belgium, Portugal 
and those that were never colonized.  
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included the three major ones COMESA, SADC, and ECOWAS and these were included 
only under the SSA samples. The problem we encountered here was that of dual or 
multiple memberships to these blocs by most SSA countries and we had to leave out the 
smaller ones and focus on the big blocs that cover the whole region. These dummies were 
positive in all categories under revenues except for international trade taxes and mixed 
for expenditures. For the SADC sample, we included a dummy for SADC membership to 
capture when each country joined SADC and it is negative for corporate and international 
trade tax revenues and virtually non-significant for the other categories of revenues and 
spending. 
 
Summary: Interpreting the Spatial Coefficients 
In this sub-section we present a summary interpretation of the spatial coefficients 
in terms of the marginal effects. In Tables A34 and A35 we present a summary of these 
coefficients under all the four weight matrices that we used. However, in view of the 
large number of our results, we will not examine every estimation in detail but  we will 
focus on the coefficients of the contiguity weight matrix as it is the standard or traditional 
weight matrix used in most spatial studies.  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
For the individual income tax revenues for the SSA region, the correlation in 
countries’ revenues suggests that an increase in the ratio of individual income tax 
revenues to total revenues by one unit in the neighboring countries will result in an 
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increase in the home country’s ratio by 0.52 units. The other three weight matrices yield 
similar results.  With corporate income tax revenues, the spatial coefficient of 0.57 
indicates that a 1 unit increase in the neighboring countries’ corporate revenues will lead 
to a 0.57 unit increase in the corporate revenues of the home country. Comparably, a 
similar study conducted by Rork (2003) for U.S. states found that a 10 percent increase in 
the average corporate income tax rate of one’s neighbors resulted in an increase of 1.6 
percent at the home state while Redoano (2003) obtained a corporate tax spatial 
coefficient of 0.89 for European countries. 
The VAT revenues yield a spatial coefficient of -0.69 which implies that a 1 unit 
increase in the ratio of VAT revenues by neighboring countries would yield an increase 
of 0.69 units in the home country’s ratio of VAT revenues to total revenues. Excise taxes 
yield a similar reaction, with the home country increasing its excise tax revenue to total 
revenues ratio by 0.03 units in response to a 1 point increase in the neighboring countries’ 
ratio. Developing countries derive a larger portion of their revenue from consumption 
taxes36 and given the general lack of mobility in consumption taxes in these countries, the 
coefficient could go either way.  The positive coefficient observed here could indicate the 
quest for these countries to raise as much revenues as they can by raising their rates when 
their neighbors do, or it could indicate the move towards tax harmonization, as per the 
objectives of these regional integrations.  The international trade taxes give a negative 
spatial coefficient which denotes that a 1 unit increase in the ratio of international taxes 
for neighboring countries would induce a 0.5 unit decrease in the home country’s ratio. 
Most countries have been implementing trade liberalization so as to enhance their 
                                                 
36 A study by Gordon, Roger and Wei Li (2005) found that consumption taxes comprise 51.2 percent of the 
poorer countries revenues. 
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economic growth and this entails cutting tariffs and other trade taxes which results in loss 
of tax revenue. Many developing countries get a sizeable portion of their income from 
international trade taxes but have been reducing their tariffs in order to comply with 
WTO and regional trade agreements (Ebrill, Stotsky et al. 1999). This could explain the 
negative spatial coefficient in tariffs and hence lower revenue from trade taxes.  
With regard to expenditures, general public services had a negative spatial 
coefficient which implies that a 1 unit increase in the neighboring countries’ share of 
general public expenditures would lead to the home country reducing its share by 0.28 
units. It should be noted though that while the contiguity matrix with fixed effects gave a 
negative spatial coefficient, this was not the case when we did not control for fixed 
effects and also with the other three matrices, viz., distance, GDP per capita and HDI, 
which all yielded positive but much smaller coefficients. The spatial interaction 
coefficient for the defense category was positive, indicating that such expenditures in the 
home country are influenced by neighboring countries decisions with the home country 
reducing its defense expenditures share by 0.65 units in response to a 1 unit increase in 
the neighboring countries. The spatial coefficient for education was also positive, 
confirming the presence of mimicking behavior with the home country adjusting its share 
of education expenditures by 0.98 units in response to a 1 unit increase in the shares of 
neighboring countries.  
For the health expenditure category, we obtained a negative spatial coefficient 
which implies an reduction in the home country’s ratio by 0.34 units in response to a 1 
unit increase in the neighboring countries’ health expenditure ratios, holding everything 
else constant. We also found that a 1 unit increase in the transport and communications 
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expenditure ratio on a country’s neighbors leads to a 0.67 unit increase in the country’s 
own ratio. We present the rest of the copycat coefficients in a summary table below. 
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Table 7: Summary Results and Interpretation (Using Contiguity Weight Matrix and Controlling for Fixed Effects) 
 
Dependent 
Variable  
Copycat Result (in the 
Variables) 
Copycat Result (in the 
Error Terms) 
 SSA SADC SSA SADC 
Comments and interpretation of the spatial 
coefficients. 
Individual 
Taxes 
0.516*** 0.194
 
-0.306*** -0.183*** 
 
The spatial coefficients for the SSA region is 
positive, implying that 1 unit increase in the 
neighboring countries ratio of individual taxes to total 
tax revenues would result in a 0.51 unit increase in 
the home country’s ratio. The spatial coefficient for 
SADC was not statistically significant.  
Corporate 
Taxes 
0.024 0.173
 
-0.027 -0.169*** 
 
The spatial coefficients are not significant in both 
regions when we control for fixed effects except for 
the spatial error coefficient in SADC, which implies 
the presence of omitted variables that could be 
spatially autocorrelated. However, the SSA spatial 
coefficient is 0.57 and significant when we do not 
control for fixed effects, signaling a move towards 
harmonizing taxes.   
VAT -0.686*** -0.051
 
0.393***
 
-0.027 
 
The VAT spatial coefficient is negative for the SSA 
region and this could imply that countries in the 
region are reducing their taxes, moving towards the 
harmonization of such.  
Excise Taxes 0.025***
 
0.207
 
-0.588***
 
-0.153*** 
 
Countries in the SSA region will increase their share 
of excise taxes marginally in response to increases in 
neighboring countries’ shares.  
Int’l Trade 
Taxes 
-0.503***
 
-0.774***
 
0.210***
 
0.390*** 
 
Countries in both regions will reduce their share of 
international taxes in response to an increase in 
neighboring countries. This could reflect the 
reduction in tariffs that is taking place all over the 
world so as to improve trade relations. For instance in 
COMESA, in 2000 most countries had reached the 80 
percent tariff reduction agreed upon. The negative 
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Dependent 
Variable  
Copycat Result (in the 
Variables) 
Copycat Result (in the 
Error Terms) 
coefficient could also reflect the changes (decline) in 
world prices of natural resources and agricultural 
goods that these countries are exporting. 
General Public 
Services 
-0.283**
 
0.101
 
0.089***
 
-0.062 
 
A 1 unit increase in the share of general public 
services expenditures in neighboring countries would 
result in a 0.3 unit decrease in the home country’s 
share in SSA. 
Defense -0.648***
 
-0.214
 
0.364***
 
0.284*** 
 
Countries will respond to an increase in their 
neighbors’ share of defense expenditures by reducing 
their own shares in the SSA region while in the 
SADC region the coefficient was not statistically 
significant but the spatial error coefficient was 
significant indicating the presence of shocks in 
neighboring countries that are felt in the home 
country.   
Education 0.979***
 
-0.404
 
-0.560**
 
0.285*** 
 
A 1 unit increase in the share of education 
expenditure in the neighboring countries will trigger a 
0.9 unit increase in similar expenditures in the home 
country for the SSA region. This reflects the need to 
invest in education for these countries as most of 
them still lack educated manpower. 
Health -0.338**
 
0.294
 
0.212**
 
-0.229 
 
Countries in the SSA region will reduce their 
expenditures in health in response to increases by 
their neighbors. This could reflect a reduction in 
health expenditures in the region as a whole as 
reflected in the structural adjustment policies of the 
IMF that affect most of these countries. The positive 
spatial error coefficient could reflect the increased 
spending in health to combat the AIDS pandemic 
which has impacted most SADC countries greatly. 
Trans. & 0.667*** -0.930*** -0.333*** 0.550*** An increase in the share of transport and 
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Dependent 
Variable  
Copycat Result (in the 
Variables) 
Copycat Result (in the 
Error Terms) 
Communication     communications expenditures would trigger a 
reduction in the share of the home country in SADC 
but an increase in SSA. This could reflect the need 
for increased expenditures in such infrastructures as 
roads and communications in this region. The 
significant spatial error terms could reflect shocks 
such as oil prices that impact heavily on 
transportation. 
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Correlation between the Error Terms 
Our spatial estimation results revealed the presence of spatial correlation in the 
error terms as indicated by the spatial error coefficient, lambda, which is non-zero.  The 
non-zero and significant spatial error coefficients indicate the presence of omitted 
variables that are correlated with the dependent variable and are in themselves spatially 
autocorrelated. These variables could be in the form of shocks such as regional wars, 
droughts and changes in world prices of these countries’ major exports as well as 
imports. To test for the extent of these shocks between countries, we computed the 
correlation coefficient matrix for the residuals ( )(
ji tt
Correl εε of selected dependent 
variables whose spatial error coefficients were relatively high.  We chose the education 
expenditures ( )28.0−=λ , health expenditures ( 23.0−=λ ) and transport and 
communication expenditures ( )55.0=λ for our analysis.  These results are for the SADC 
region using the contiguity weight matrix. We believe that there could be some strong 
unexplained factors which contribute to the high spatial error coefficients such as shocks 
that affect neighboring countries or omitted variables that are in themselves spatially 
correlated. 
Table 8 below gives the correlation between the residuals results for education 
expenditures in SADC.  The coefficients that are relatively high are those that are 
between neighbors.  For instance, between Botswana and Namibia the correlation 
coefficient is 0.2 and so is that between Botswana and Zimbabwe.  Similarly for South 
Africa and Swaziland the correlation between the error terms is 0.3 and these are border 
neighbors. This could imply the occurrence of a similar among these countries that is not 
reflected in our model.  
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The spatial error coefficient for health expenditures is negative and calculating the 
correlation between the error terms for this variable gives both positive and negative 
coefficients (Table 9) implying the presence of a shock or shocks that impact these 
countries differently. This could be the AIDS pandemic which has led to some countries 
increasing their health expenditures extensively while some countries have been made to 
reduce their spending in adherence to the structural adjustment programs.     
Table 10 presents results for the coefficients between the error terms for 
international trade tax revenues. These are positive and relatively high for countries that 
are neighbors.  For instance, between Botswana and Zimbabwe the coefficient is 0.51 and 
between Botswana and South Africa it is 0.41 and these are big trading partners. For 
instance, Botswana imports at least 60 percent of its goods and services from South 
Africa. Between South Africa and Swaziland, the coefficient is 0.63 and these are trading 
partners.   
Overall we conclude that indeed there are some variables and shocks not captured 
in the model but contribute to spatial interaction among these countries.  
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Table 8: Correlation between the Error Terms: Education for SADC 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) 1     
(2) 0.047 1    
(3) 0.050 0.003 1   
(4) 0.030 0.073 0.003 1   
(5) 0.031 0.012 0.062 0.053 1   
(6) 0.202 0.055 0.052 0.035 0.034 1   
(7) 0.159 0.009 0.330 0.010 0.195 0.165 1   
(8) 0.050 0.003 0.107 0.003 0.062 0.052 0.330 1  
(9) 0.026 0.058 0.009 0.264 0.238 0.030 0.029 0.009 1 
(10) 0.150 0.336 0.009 0.229 0.037 0.173 0.031 0.009 0.183 1
(11) 0.237 0.009 0.069 0.007 0.040 0.065 0.217 0.069 0.009 0.031 1
 
(1) Botswana  (5) Mauritius   (9) Tanzania 
(2) DRC  (6) Namibia   (10) Zambia  
(3) Lesotho  (7) South Africa   (11) Zimbabwe 
(4) Malawi  (8) Swaziland 
 
 
Table 9: Correlation between the Error Terms: Health for SADC 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) 1           
(2) 0.024 1          
(3) 0.019 0.001 1         
(4) 0.012 0.037 0.001 1        
(5) 0.009 -0.003 0.039 0.028 1       
(6) -0.115 0.029 0.027 0.015 0.014 1      
(7) -0.075 -0.003 -0.265 -0.004 -0.154 -0.108 1     
(8) 0.019 0.001 0.069 0.001 0.039 0.027 -0.265 1    
(9) 0.008 0.027 -0.004 -0.173 -0.190 0.009 0.015 -0.004 1   
(10) -0.094 -0.271 -0.003 -0.144 0.014 -0.113 0.012 -0.003 -0.106 1  
(11) -0.159 -0.003 0.037 -0.001 0.021 0.032 -0.142 0.037 -0.003 0.012 1 
 
(1) Botswana   (5) Mauritius  (9) Tanzania 
(2) DRC    (6) Namibia  (10) Zambia  
(3) Lesotho   (7) South Africa  (11) Zimbabwe 
(4) Malawi   (8) Swaziland 
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Table 10: Correlation between the Error Terms: International Trade for SADC 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) 1     
(2) 0.211 1    
(3) 0.244 0.055 1   
(4) 0.164 0.303 0.057 1   
(5) 0.187 0.116 0.254 0.234 1   
(6) 0.476 0.238 0.241 0.186 0.193 1   
(7) 0.408 0.095 0.628 0.097 0.415 0.400 1   
(8) 0.244 0.055 0.389 0.057 0.254 0.241 0.628 1  
(9) 0.157 0.257 0.089 0.553 0.474 0.176 0.150 0.089 1 
(10) 0.358 0.628 0.097 0.502 0.199 0.401 0.165 0.097 0.431 1
(11) 0.513 0.097 0.298 0.082 0.201 0.290 0.490 0.298 0.097 0.167 1
 
(1) Botswana  (5) Mauritius   (9) Tanzania 
(2) DRC   (6) Namibia   (10) Zambia  
(3) Lesotho  (7) South Africa   (11) Zimbabwe 
(4) Malawi  (8) Swaziland 
 
 
 
GMM Vs GS2SLS Methodologies 
Using the GS2SLS methodology for comparison (see Tables A36 and A37) and 
applying it to the contiguity weight matrix, we obtained results that either replicated those 
obtained under the GMM methodology or were very close.  
Overall, we expect countries to copy their neighbors’ tax and expenditure policies 
but we do not expect the degree of mimicking to be the same for all the different 
categories.  Theoretically, we would expect to observe higher coefficients or stronger 
mimicking in mobile taxes like corporate income tax than individual income tax 
especially in developing countries where labor is immobile and by extension, the 
individual income tax.  However, our results indicate that mimicking is more pronounced 
in individual income taxes than in corporate taxes.  One reason behind this could be that, 
in their quest to lure investors to their countries, developing countries have a tendency to 
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introduce many tax concessions, tax holidays and tax exemptions which eventually lead 
to very little taxation of capital and thus impact negatively on the ultimate corporate tax 
revenue. It could also be possible that as a way to encourage capital inflow, developing 
countries will try to keep their tax rates as low as possible in comparison with their 
neighbors’ tax rates.  
The presence of mimicking behavior with regard to VAT is stronger in SSA than 
in SADC where the spatial coefficient is negative.  VAT is fairly new in most developing 
countries but it is fast becoming popular as its collection has proved to be more 
successful than the income taxes. Further, it has come to replace revenue lost from tariffs 
as tariff levels decline due to trade liberalization. As such, we would expect the VAT 
spatial coefficient to be more robust, but this could happen in later years as a longer time 
series covering the adoption of VAT by a larger sample becomes available for analysis.   
On the expenditures side, we expected to observe more mimicking behavior in the 
education and health sectors in both regions, however this was not the case with the 
SADC region where the education spatial coefficient is negative.  
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimations (MLE) 
We also used the maximum likelihood estimation for our estimations and the 
results reveal that the MLE spatial coefficients are smaller than the GMM estimator, but 
the signs of the coefficients are the same.  The results are presented in Tables A41-A44. 
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Spatial Analysis for Government Efficiency  
In this sub-section, we enhance our study by extending our spatial analysis to 
encompass the government efficiency in the provision of public goods, i.e., determine if 
voters use their neighbor’s ratings when assessing their government’s efficiency rating.  
We apply Geys (2005) notion that voters’ use the “ price/quantity” of public provisions to 
assess relative performance by illustrating the interdependence between the ratio of tax 
revenues to public goods provisions of country i to that of neighboring jurisdictions. In 
our study, we use the ratio of government revenues to government expenditures as a 
proxy for the “price/quantity”  of public goods provision and test for spatial patterns in 
the SSA and SADC regions.  For the SSA sample we have 30 countries and 660 
observations (as in our tax revenues sample) and for SADC we have 11 countries and 242 
observations.  
Using the same control variables as in our estimations above, we test for both 
spatial lag ( ρ ) and spatial error (λ ) coefficients using the general spatial model. The 
results for the SSA sample in Table A28 show that in the three estimations using different 
weight matrices, the spatial lag parameter is statistically significantly different from zero 
and it is negative for the geographical weight matrices and positive but small for the HDI 
matrix. The parameter for the contiguity matrix is -0.4 and for the distance measure it is -
0.2.  Negative spatial autocorrelation is said to occur when units or countries that are 
close together have different aspatial attributes than objects that are farther apart or are 
identified as spatial outliers as opposed to spatial clusters (Anselin 2002).  These results 
indicate that, holding other factors constant, a 1 unit higher efficiency rating in 
neighboring countries is associated with a decrease in one’s own efficiency rating by 0.2 
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units (or we could say efficiency is only copied among distant neighbors with similar 
aspatial attributes, as per the negative coefficient).  The spatial error parameter is positive 
and significant under all the three matrices and it is virtually the same under the 
contiguity and HDI matrices at 0.19 and 0.17, respectively.  
The SADC sample yields similar results, with the spatial lag coefficients in the 
dependent variable negative and statistically different from zero under all the weight 
matrices. The spatial error coefficient is positive and significant, with the distance weight 
matrix giving us a 4.0=λ when we don’t specifically account for fixed effects while the 
HDI weight matrix gives us λ  = 0.25. While the spatial error coefficient accounts for 
unobserved spatial heterogeneity, it also reflects the effect of the omitted spatial lagged 
dependent variable, ρ and comparing the magnitude of the two coefficients provides a 
rough idea of how much the effect of the spatial error parameter is due to unobserved 
spatial heterogeneity and not due to the omitted spatially weighted dependent variable 
(Coughlin, Garrett et al. 2006). If the two coefficients are close, then the bulk of the 
spatial error effect would be due to the omitted spatially weighted dependent variable. In 
our case, these two coefficients are not really close, considering that they have opposite 
signs hence we could attribute the spatial error effect to unobserved spatial heterogeneity.  
Overall, our results indicate the presence of spatial interaction among these 
countries when they make joint or simultaneous decisions regarding the tax revenues and 
spending. 
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Further Analyses of the Results 
In addition to our analyses above, we tried to establish the trend of the spatial 
coefficients over time to determine if we could discern any outstanding behavior in the 
coefficients of each category over time. We did this by dividing the data into four 5-year 
periods (the last term though comprised 7 years) and doing estimations for each period 
using the contiguity weight matrix.   
Our results which are presented in Tables A39 and A40 reveal that for individual 
tax revenues, the spatial coefficient starts off being negative and then turns positive for 
both the SSA and SADC regions. The reverse applies for the corporate tax revenues 
spatial coefficient which moves from positive to negative, implying stronger mimicking 
in earlier years than recently. The VAT spatial coefficient starts off being negative for 
both samples but it turns positive during the second phase (1986-1990) for SSA while for 
SADC it becomes positive only in the last phase.   The coefficients for excise taxes and 
international trade taxes display a somewhat similar behavior between the two regions.  
On the expenditures side, with the exception of the defense category whose 
coefficients are all negative, the rest of the expenditure categories for SADC display a 
similar trend, with the spatial coefficients negative during the earlier years and then 
becoming positive. For the SSA region while the spatial coefficients for most variables 
are positive, they all trend somewhat downwards.    
 
Some Simulations and Graphical Analyses of our Results 
We conducted further simulations whereby we calculated the predicted values for 
each region for some of the dependent variables and compared that to two countries 
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chosen based on their economic performance.  For each region we chose one country 
whose economy is doing particularly well as based on its GDP per capita and one whose 
economy is relatively smaller.  For the SADC region, we chose Botswana and Malawi 
and our predicted values are depicted on Figures 1 to 6.  For the corporate tax revenues, 
both countries displayed a similar trend with the regional average and this was the case 
with all the dependent variables that we selected.  However, in this case, Botswana’s 
graph was almost identical to or sort of converged with that of SADC while Malawi’s 
was much higher and parallel to these two series. We observed similar behavior with 
VAT with Botswana’s graph converging with that of the region’s average while Malawi’s 
graph is much higher but moving it the same direction with the others.  The main 
distinction between the two tax revenues is that the corporate tax revenues graphs are 
upward sloping while the VAT ones are downward sloping. 
With excise tax revenues, we observe Botswana’s curve converging towards that 
of Malawi which is parallel to the SADC curve. Botswana maintains a closer track of the 
SADC curve under international trade taxes while Malawi’s is still parallel and further 
below that of SADC. We also looked at the general publics services and defense 
expenditure categories and in both cases we observe Botswana maintaining a closer trend 
with the regional average while Malawi’s curves are either far above or below with a 
sizeable gap, albeit all three moving in the same direction.  
With the SSA region (see Figures 7-11), we analyzed all the tax variables and 
chose Lesotho and Nigeria for comparison. For the individual taxes, we observe a 
generally downward trend for all the three series with Nigeria much closer to the regional 
average while Lesotho is much lower but converges towards the three during the last 
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years under review.  We observe a similar trend under corporate taxes, with the major 
notable difference being the downward trending of the SSA series as opposed to the 
SADC series which move upwards. For the remaining three tax revenues, viz., VAT, 
excise taxes and international trade taxes, Nigeria’s curve is much closer to that of SSA 
while Lesotho’s maintains quite a reasonable gap. All in all though, we discern a slow 
convergence in the three curves, especially in the case of Lesotho. 
Overall, we can conclude that countries whose economies are more advanced in 
the region, display closer or even full convergence with the regional averages while the 
smaller economies maintain a sizeable gap which in most cases is below the regional 
average.  However, these poorer countries seem to be slowly closing on, on this gap 
especially during the last two years of the period under review.  These countries 
therefore, do not appear to start off being closer or the same in terms of revenue and tax 
structure but appear to be moving towards similar structures as they develop. An 
extension of our time series could reveal some interesting trends. 
 
Spatial Dependency Tests   
Spatial autocorrelation tests measure the degree of dependence among 
observations in a given geographic space. There are a number of tests than are used for 
this purpose and in this study we tested for the presence of spatial correlation using two 
of the approaches; the Moran I test and the Lagrange Multiplier statistics. Both tests use 
regression residuals to test for spatial autocorrelation. The Moran I statistic is considered 
to be global in the sense that it estimates the overall degree of spatial autocorrelation for a 
dataset. The Moran I statistic is formally given as: 
146 
)(
)(
eeS
WeeNI ′
′=          (7.1) 
Where e is a vector of OLS regression residuals, W is a spatial weight matrix, N is 
the number of observations, and S is a standardization factor which is equal to all the 
summation of all the elements in the weight matrix. For a normalized weight matrix, the 
expression (7.1) becomes: 
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The null hypothesis for the Moran I test is the absence of spatial dependence and 
the spatial weight matrix is included to represent the pattern of potential spatial 
interaction that causes dependence.  
We also conducted spatial diagnostic tests using the Lagrange Multiplier statistic 
Anselin (1988) which is also derived from OLS residuals and weight matrix traces and is 
in the form: 
222 ~]/).[/1( χσWeeTLM ′=       (7.2) 
where }){( WWWtrT ′+= .  The LM statistic is based on estimation under the 
null hypothesis only and it has an asymptotic )1(2χ  distribution.  It corresponds to the 
square of the Moran I statistic.  
Results for the two diagnostic statistics are presented in Tables A32 and A33 of 
the Appendix for all the four weight matrices that we used. The overall results display the 
presence of spatial autocorrelation as we reject the null hypothesis of no spatial 
interaction under one matrix or more for all the dependent variables, short of defense and 
education for the SADC sample, where the tests are not significant.   
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Studies in public finance and related fields that incorporate spatial effects have 
gained popularity in economic literature. Previous studies have found the presence of 
spatial interaction among jurisdictions when making policy decisions, in other words, 
governments at all levels make their decisions by taking into account what their 
neighbors are doing. The aim of our study was three-fold: first, we tried to determine the 
presence of such policy mimicking in governments expenditures; then we did the same 
for government revenues; and finally, we tested for spatial interaction in government 
efficiency to determine if it is also influenced by neighboring countries. Most 
importantly, we applied the fiscal copycat theory to developing countries, and to the best 
our knowledge, all existing studies pertaining to this theory have been confined to 
developed countries only. 
We have thus contributed to the empirical literature of fiscal policy mimicking by 
applying this technique to developing countries and used the results to try and determine 
the presence of fiscal harmonization. We also extended our analysis by going beyond the 
exclusive analysis of revenues or expenditures in isolation, and analyzed their spatial 
interaction in the context of government efficiency. We did this at a national level as 
opposed to previous studies that have focused on local government level efficiency. In 
our dissertation, we employed panel data on central government tax revenue and 
spending in Sub-Saharan Africa and the regional economic bloc of Southern African 
Coordinating Community, which basically is a sub-set of the SSA sample.  
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We used spatial econometric techniques to test for fiscal policy mimicking in our 
sample countries. We test whether fiscal interactions exist in government tax revenues 
because countries try to attract businesses so they could expand their tax bases or as it is 
the case with most regional blocs, whether they do so as a way of harmonizing their 
regional policies.  On the expenditure side, we test whether governments try to please 
their voters so they could vote them back in power (since we do not expect any 
significant “ voting with one’s feet” to occur at a country level).  
Even though our estimations gave us mixed results in as far as the signs of the 
coefficients, overall we found the presence of fiscal policy mimicking in these 
developing countries.  We also observe that our estimates are in some cases smaller in 
magnitude compared to those obtained in previous studies. When we compare our 
estimates to the only other study that tested for spatial interaction across countries at a 
central government level (Redoano 2003), we find that some of our estimates are not that 
far off from their results.  Small spatial coefficients are not unexpected as we are looking 
at countries that cover a vast area and differ in more ways than one, as compared to most 
previous studies that have focused on local jurisdictions that tend to have a lot in 
common or at a state level which are more homogeneous than a set of developing 
countries.  
From our study we find evidence, and some of it relatively strong, that spatial 
interaction is present in our samples as we reject the null hypotheses that 
0=ρ and 0=λ . For example, our results reveal that if neighboring countries increase 
their share of individual income tax revenues to total revenues by 1, then country i would 
increase its own ratio by 0.3 and this applies to both the SSA and SADC samples. We 
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found strong evidence of spatial interaction in VAT ( ρ =0.3) and excise tax revenues 
( ρ =0.4) for the SSA sample. Expenditures in education and health also display strong 
mimicking behavior for the SSA sample and somewhat in SADC.  Overall, the contiguity 
weight matrix performed quite well compared to the distance and HDI weight matrices. 
We encountered problems with our HDI and GDP per capita weight matrices and we had 
to redefine them to get them to perform well.  We attributed this problem to the big 
inequalities in the social and economic variables among these developing countries where 
some are classified as low-low income and some are high-middle income.  This would 
not be a problem for studies that focus on jurisdictions that have similar socio-economic 
characteristics.    
We also tested for government efficiency by relating total taxes to the level of 
spending as a measure for the “ price/quantity” of government and determining spatial 
patterns among the governments of these developing countries. While we did find some 
evidence that when governments simultaneously determine the revenue and spending 
levels they do consider their neighbors’ policies, our results also showed mostly positive 
and relatively high correlation in the error terms, which could suggest that we need to 
improve the estimation of this simultaneity by introducing other control variables. 
We conclude that mimicking is not a developed country only phenomenon!  We 
have found evidence of fiscal policy mimicking behavior in the SSA and SADC regions, 
some of which point to policy harmonization. This is a crucial finding for the African 
countries as they have been involved in sub-regional economic and political groupings or 
blocs, most of which share the same objectives which include, among others, 
harmonizing their macroeconomic policies.  For instance, SADC states in its Regional 
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Strategy Paper that one of the macro-economic liberalization policies it tends to 
implement is the harmonization of tax policies. We did find mimicking in individual tax 
revenues, which are usually not the primary focus of regional integration objectives as 
tariffs are, thus pointing us to some evidence of voluntary mimicking behavior. For 
instance, in its Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in tax cooperation, SADC 
envisages to harmonize both indirect taxes and VAT as well as to avoid tax competition 
in the region.  However, it should be noted that this MoU was drawn in 2003, which is 
outside our review period and while these objectives had been initiated some time back, 
their implementation takes time and this could mean that some voluntary mimicking in 
these tax revenue categories that started before the formal agreement took place.  
Donor funds and the spending constraints attached to these funds, which are 
similar for most countries, have played a great role in determining how developing 
countries allocate their budgets and with all of the countries in the sample having relied 
on donor funds at some point in time, these funds have contributed to some mandated 
mimicking behavior.  The same can be said for conditions imposed by International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) through the SAPs and the ESAPs as well as the regional 
cooperation agreements which also played a role in mandated copycat behavior.  While 
we have included aid to capture donor funds and dummies to capture the impact of  SAPs 
and ESAPs, future studies could enhance this analysis by controlling for these constraints 
in a more detailed way.  Therefore, while our spatial coefficients reflect the presence of 
mimicking behavior, it is possible that due to all the above-mentioned factors, this may 
not be copycat behavior per se and we need to control more for these and other world 
trends such as the downward movement of VAT rates as countries harmonize these.   
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We also find evidence of spatial interaction in the error terms in both regions 
which reflects the presence of omitted variables that are spatially correlated.  These could 
be shocks in the neighboring countries that are felt in the home country.  For developing 
countries and particularly for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, such shocks include, among 
others, prolonged droughts, regional wars, the AIDS pandemic impact on health 
expenditures, oil prices, prices of other major imports and prices of the major exports of 
these countries. These factors need to be controlled for in the model.  
From our analysis we conclude that as a result of the above factors, there is some 
evidence that mandated policy convergence is taking effect in Africa and that in addition, 
some voluntary mimicking is also present in some taxes and expenditures. 
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CHAPTER 9: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
As indicated above, we find evidence which points towards the presence of fiscal 
policy mimicking behavior in these developing countries. This is crucial for those regions 
which are trying to harmonize their policies like our case study SADC as well as the 
other SSA regional economic blocs. When implementing the different macro-economic 
policies, countries or regions put in place structures aimed at making such policies work.  
Our study reveals that with mimicking behavior present, this could enhance the 
implementation of these policies and thus make it easy for these regions to implement 
their policies without fully committing resources towards the building up of such 
structures.  
Future research could take the analysis of spatial interaction in developing 
countries one government level down by focusing on local governments. The main 
challenge here would be data availability since most developing countries lack sufficient 
time series data at the local government level and this would tend to limit the sample size. 
Further, most local governments in these countries are not entitled to raise their own 
taxes.  The study could focus on two or more adjacent countries or even just look at one 
country like South Africa, though here one could encounter the problem of the 
introduction of homelands (and abolition thereafter) as well as the reclassification of 
provinces that took place after independence.  However, these could be easily controlled 
for.  Future work could also focus on testing for fiscal policy mimicking in all the 
regional economic blocs that are in SSA individually as we did for SADC. Again, data 
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availability would still be a major challenge as evidenced by our inability to include all 
countries that are in SADC in our analysis as some lacked considerable data.   
Empirically, we have found that though the determining of weight matrices is 
considered ad hoc, careful consideration has to be put in place when dealing with 
developing countries, especially when we want to use measures that reflect their 
economic diversity to construct such matrices.  Future studies could try to overcome this 
problem by using spatial clusters which group regions by similar economic or social 
ranges.   This could also be done by introducing flexibility into the spatial weight matrix 
whereby it is built with bands that are based on distance with jurisdictions falling within 
each band given the equal weights.  
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND RESULTS 
Table A1. Summary Statistics for SSA Expenditures 
 
Variable 
 
Data Source 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
 
 
General Public 
Services37 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 
528 0.1920 0.0999 0.0005 0.5907 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defense 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 
Facts On International Relations and 
Security Trends (FIRST) 
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 
from http://projects.sipri.se38 
528 0.1045 0.0799 0.0003 0.4593 
 
 
 
 
Education 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 
528 0.1499 0.0577 0.0000 0.3458 
Health 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 
528 0.0658 0.0385 0.0000 0.3279 
 
 
 
 
Transportation 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 
528 0.0668 0.0476 0.0000 0.2630 
 
 
Aid_ pc 
World Bank Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
528 45.0648 46.3453 0.0004 395.4898 
 
 
GDP_ pc 
World Development Indicators  
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
528 732.26 872.10 44.64 3,933.55 
 
Land_area39 
World Development Indicators 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
528 526,228 534,112 2,030 2,267,050 
 World Development Indicators 528 56.855 20.337 10.796 89.342 
                                                 
37 The expenditure categories are given as shares of total expenditures. 
38 Accessed August 2005. 
39 Land area has been rescaled by 10 000.  
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Variable 
 
Data Source 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Literacy  World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
 
Pop_0-14 
World Development Indicators 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
528 44.2979 4.2083 25.4217 50.1054 
 
Pop_65+ 
World Development Indicators 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
528 3.0684 0.7230 1.9020 6.2249 
IMF/WB_SAPs IMF and World Bank Country Reports 528 1.3580 0.4799 1.0000 2.0000 
Pol_right Freedom House 519 4.8131 1.7863 1.0000 7.0000 
Civil_Lib Freedom House 519 4.7803 1.3901 2.0000 7.0000 
Ttrend  528 11.5000 6.3503 1.0000 22.0000 
 
Latitude 
Latitude and Longitude of World Cities  
from www.mapsofworld.com40  
528 -6.6021 13.6262 -29.1800 12.3400 
 
Longitude 
Latitude and Longitude of World Cities  
from www.mapsofworld.com40 
528 23.5038 17.0817 -10.4700 57.3000 
British  http://en.wikipedia.org41 528 0.5417 0.4987 0 1 
French http://en.wikipedia.org41 528 0.2500 0.4334 0 1 
German42 http://en.wikipedia.org41 528 0.2083 0.4065 0 1 
COMESA Africa Recovery, United Nations 528 0.5833 0.4935 0 1 
ECOWAS Africa Recovery, United Nations 528 0.2083 0.4065 0 1 
SADC Africa Recovery, United Nations 528 0.4583 0.4987 0 1 
Elect_system Global Coalition for Africa 528 1.2917 0.0234 1 3 
Openness World Development Indicators 528 0.695 0.017 0.121 2.087 
 
                                                 
40 Accessed September 2005 
41 Accessed Septmeber 2005. 
42 Includes Belgian and Portuguese colonies as well as independent countries that were never colonized. 
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Table A2.  Summary Statistics for SSA Tax Revenues  
Variable 
 
Data Source Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Individual 
Income Tax43 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins  for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 660 0.102 0.077 0.001 0.443 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 660 0.126 0.090 0.007 0.659 
GST/VAT 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 660 0.141 0.103 0.004 0.560 
Excises 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 660 0.106 0.099 0.000 0.519 
International 
Trade 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 660 0.298 0.176 0.017 0.813 
 
 
Aid_ pc 
World Bank Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 660 48.979 45.778 0.000 395.490 
 
 
GDP_ pc 
World Bank Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 660 780.81 1,020.86 44.63 4,796.26 
 
 
Land_area44 
World Bank Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 660 468,386 20,534 2,030 2,267,050 
 
 
Literacy  
World Bank Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 660 52.916 19.830 10.796 89.342 
 
 
Pop_0-14 
World Bank Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 660 44.110 4.101 25.422 51.523 
                                                 
43 The tax revenue categories are given as shares of total revenues 
44 Land area has been rescaled by 1000.  
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Variable 
 
Data Source Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
 
 
Pop_65+ 
World Bank Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 660 3.178 0.867 1.902 6.353 
 
 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
IMF and World Bank Country Reports 
660 1.3848 0.4869 1 2 
 
 
Pol_right 
Freedom House 
660 4.917 1.716 1 7 
 
 
Civil_Lib 
Freedom House 
660 4.815 1.325 2 7 
 
 
Latitude 
Latitude and Longitude of World 
Cities  
from www.mapsofworld.com40 660 -4.120 13.655 -29.180 13.280 
 
 
Longitude 
Latitude and Longitude of World 
Cities  
from www.mapsofworld.com40 660 19.610 19.386 -16.400 57.300 
Ttrend  660 11.500 6.349 1 22 
British  http://en.wikipedia.org41 660 0.467 0.499 0 1 
French http://en.wikipedia.org41 660 0.333 0.472 0 1 
German45 http://en.wikipedia.org41 660 0.200 0.400 0 1 
COMESA Africa Recovery, United Nations 660 0.433 0.496 0 1 
ECOWAS Africa Recovery, United Nations 660 0.300 0.459 0 1 
SADC Africa Recovery, United Nations 660 0.367 0.482 0 1 
Elect_system Global Coalition for Africa 660 1.3 0.0205 1 3 
Openness World Development Indicators 660 0.682 0.014 0.121 2.087 
 
 
                                                 
45 Includes Belgian and Portuguese colonies as well as independent countries that were never colonized. 
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Table A3. Summary Statistics for SADC 
Variable  
 
Data Source Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Individual 
Income Tax 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 242 0.1444 0.0950 0.0284 0.4427 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 242 0.1564 0.0944 0.0233 0.6589 
GST/VAT 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 242 0.1681 0.1128 0.0059 0.5597 
Excises 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 242 0.1262 0.1461 0.0010 0.7138 
International 
Trade 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 242 0.2671 0.1789 0.0171 0.8000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Public 
Services 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 
242 0.1950 0.1060 0.0005 0.4749 
 
 
 
 
Defense 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 242 0.0883 0.0682 0.0003 0.3989 
                                                 
46 Accessed June 2005. 
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Variable  
 
Data Source Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Facts On International Relations 
and Security Trends (FIRST) 
SIPRI Military Expenditure 
Database from 
http://projects.sipri.se46 
 
 
 
 
Education 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 242 0.1647 0.0608 0.0000 0.3458 
 
 
 
 
Health 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 242 0.0792 0.0374 0.0000 0.3279 
 
 
 
 
Transportation 
(dependent 
variable) 
IMF-Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 
IMF Staff Country Reports 
Central Bank Annual Reports and 
Bulletins for Individual Countries 
Government Reports for Various 
Countries 242 0.0744 0.0463 0.0000 0.2630 
 
 
Aid_ pc 
World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 242 44.68 33.6278 0.0004 229.0282 
 
 
GDP_ pc 
World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 242 1,167.84 1,073.41 84.27 3,933.54 
 
 
Land_area 
World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 242 639,002 649,062 2,030 2,267,050 
 
 
Literacy  
World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 242 71.61 10.00 44.54 89.34 
 
 
Pop_0-14 
World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 242 43.04 5.55 25.42 49.58 
 
 
Pop_65+ 
World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 242 3.20 0.97 1.98 6.23 
 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
IMF and World Bank Country 
Reports 242 1.32 0.47 1 2 
Pol_right Freedom House 242 4.25 1.84 1 7 
Ttrend  242 11.50 6.36 1 22 
British http://en.wikipedia.org
41 242 0.7273 0.4463 0 1 
French http://en.wikipedia.org  242 0.0909 0.2881 0 1 
sadc_membership  242 0.7686 0.4226 0 1 
Elect_system| Global Coalition for Africa 242 1.1818 0.3865 1 2 
openness  World Development Indicators 242 0.890 0.401 0.253 1.954 
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Table A4. Africa’s Multiple Regional Economic Groups 
 
CEEAC CEMAC CEPLG COMESA EAC ECOWAS IGAD IOC MRU SACU SADC UEMOA 
Burundi Cameroon Burundi Burundi Tanzania Gabon Djibouti Comoros Liberia Botswana Botswana Burkina Faso
Cameroon Gabon Congo, DR Comoros Kenya Cote d’Ivoire Ethiopia Madagascar Sierra Leone Lesotho Congo, Dr Cote d’Ivoire
Gabon Chad  Congo, DR Uganda Ghana Kenya Mauritius  Namibia Lesotho Guinea Bissa
TCH   Djibouti  Gambia Uganda Swaziland  Swaziland Mauritius Mali 
Congo, DR   Ethiopia  Guinea Bissau    South Africa Malawi Togo 
   Kenya  Liberia     Namibia  
   Madagascar  Mali     Swaziland  
   Mauritius  Nigeria     Seychelles  
   Malawi  Sierra Leone     Tanzania  
   Namibia  Togo     South Africa  
   Swaziland       Zambia  
   Seychelles       Zimbabwe  
   Tanzania         
   Uganda         
   Zambia         
   Zimbabwe         
Source: Africa Recovery, September 2002 
Notes: CEEAC: Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale 
 CEMAC: Communauté Economique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale 
 CEPLG: Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs 
 COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
 EAC : East African Cooperation 
 ECOWAS : Economic Community of West African States 
 IGAD : Intergovernmental Authority for Development 
 IOC : Indian Ocean Commission 
 MRU : Man River Union 
 SACU : Southern African Customs Union 
 SADC : Southern African Development Community 
 UEMOA : Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine 
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Table A5. Countries Included in Each Sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SSA–Revenues (30) SSA-Expenditures (24) SADC (11) 
Botswana Botswana Botswana 
Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Congo Dem. Rep 
Burundi Burundi Lesotho 
Cameroon Cameroon Malawi 
Chad Congo Dem. Rep Mauritius 
Comoros Djibouti Namibia 
Congo Dem. Rep Ethiopia South Africa 
Cote d'Ivoire Gambia Swaziland 
Djibouti Ghana Tanzania 
Ethiopia Kenya Zambia 
Gabon Lesotho Zimbabwe 
Gambia Liberia  
Ghana Madagascar 
Guinea Bissau Malawi  
Lesotho Mali  
Liberia Mauritius  
Madagascar Namibia  
Malawi Nigeria  
Mali South Africa 
Mauritius Swaziland  
Namibia Tanzania  
Nigeria Uganda  
Sierra Leone Zambia  
South Africa Zimbabwe  
Swaziland  
Tanzania  
Togo   
Uganda   
Zambia   
Zimbabwe  
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Table A6.  Individual Tax Revenue-SSA    
Variable         WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
 GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE 
constant 
0.465*** 
(5.344)  
0.357*** 
(4.547)  
0.300*** 
(3.186) 
 -0.074*** 
(-7.452) 
 
aid_pc 
0.006 
(0.938) 
0.010* 
(1.857) 
0.010 
(1.3740 
0.012* 
(1.906) 
0.013* 
(1.887) 
0.013** 
(2.108) 
0.008 
(1.201) 
0.012** 
(2.046) 
gdp_pc 
0.002 
(0.467) 
-0.026*** 
(-3.883) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.034*** 
(-4.507) 
-0.002 
(-0.543) 
-0.026*** 
(-3.689) 
0.026*** 
(3.668) 
-0.057*** 
(-6.964) 
land_area 
0.042*** 
(6.278)  
0.044*** 
(6.597)  
0.043*** 
(6.641)  
0.027*** 
(4.350)  
literacy 
0.019 
(0.999) 
-0.015 
(-0.693) 
0.031 
(1.635) 
-0.026 
(-0.953) 
0.015 
(0.874) 
-0.023 
(-0.641) 
0.067*** 
(3.868) 
-0.064** 
(-2.312) 
pop_0-14 
-0.865*** 
(-5.905) 
-0.108 
(-0.869) 
-0.804*** 
(-5.326) 
-0.131 
(-0.953) 
-0.616*** 
(-4.597) 
-0.218* 
(-1.665) 
0.276*** 
(3.735) 
-0.097 
(-0.717) 
pop_65+ 
-0.229*** 
(-3.846) 
0.251*** 
(3.644) 
-0.183*** 
(-3.026) 
0.231*** 
(3.367) 
-0.126** 
(-2.242) 
0.258*** 
(3.885) 
0.051 
(1.263) 
0.176** 
(2.566) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.008 
(1.332) 
0.003 
(0.858) 
0.007 
(1.209) 
0.006 
(1.484) 
0.005 
(0.937) 
0.004 
(1.083) 
0.004 
(0.743) 
0.006 
(1.371) 
pol_right 
0.003* 
(1.645) 
-0.001 
(-0.451) 
0.003* 
(1.782) 
-0.002 
(-1.096) 
0.004** 
(2.143) 
-0.001 
(-0.633) 
0.003 
(1.561) 
-0.001 
(-0.477) 
british 
0.043*** 
(4.636)  
0.044*** 
(4.736)  
0.053*** 
(5.827)  
0.042*** 
(4.738)  
french 
-0.002 
(-0.187)  
-0.003 
(-0.391)  
-0.008 
(-1.002)  
0.007 
(0.840)  
COMESA 
0.024* 
(1.933)  
0.029** 
(2.389)  
0.012 
(1.031) 
 -0.036*** 
(-2.772) 
 
ECOWAS 
0.008 
(0.604)  
0.005 
(0.384)  
-0.018 
(-1.463) 
 -0.047*** 
(-3.508) 
 
Elect_system 
0.042*** 
(7.069)  
0.042*** 
(7.138)  
0.048*** 
(8.288) 
 0.044*** 
(8.377) 
 
Openness 
-0.033*** 
(-3.511) 
-0.015 
(-1.471) 
-0.023** 
(-2.443) 
-0.017 
(-1.467) 
-0.020** 
(-2.188) 
-0.024** 
(-2.202) 
-0.008 
(-0.989) 
-0.022** 
(-1.997) 
ρ  0.307*** (5.302) 0.516*** (7.544) 0.158*** (2.634) 0.319*** (4.262) 0.527*** (6.174) -0.710*** (-4.116) -0.485*** (-9.038) 0.091 (1.237) 
λ  -0.159*** (-2.994) -0.306*** (-3.351) -0.019 (-0.197) -0.059 (-0.479) -0.276*** (-21.10) 0.385*** (7.000) 0.405*** (149.1) 0.459*** (22.91) 
R2 0.280 0.777 0.247 0.777 0.304 0.778 0.254 0.765 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table A7. Corporate Tax Revenue–SSA    
Variable         WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
 GMM GMM FE GMM GMM GMM FE GMM FE GMM GMM FE 
constant 
0.005 
(0.047)  
-0.044 
(-0.506)  
0.880*** 
(6.588) 
 0.016 
(1.616) 
 
aid_pc 
-0.033*** 
(-4.639) 
-0.047*** 
(-4.818) 
-0.037*** 
(-4.852) 
-0.047*** 
(-4.795) 
0.063*** 
(7.686) 
-0.039*** 
(-4.267) 
-0.032*** 
(-4.329) 
-0.042*** 
(-4.523) 
gdp_pc 
0.043*** 
(9.187) 
0.046*** 
(3.805) 
0.045*** 
(9.487) 
0.045*** 
(3.780) 
-0.023*** 
(-4.610) 
0.057*** 
(4.418) 
0.040*** 
(4.971) 
0.072*** 
(6.508) 
land_area 
0.012* 
()  
0.018*** 
(2.633)  
0.021** 
(2.518)  
0.024*** 
(3.700)  
literacy 
-0.091*** 
(-4.521) 
-0.370*** 
(-5.711) 
-0.086*** 
(-4.154) 
-0.382*** 
(-5.877) 
-0.097*** 
(-4.376) 
-0.167*** 
(-3.033) 
-0.078*** 
(-4.001) 
-0.270*** 
(-4.609) 
pop_0-14 
0.122 
(0.758) 
0.240 
(1.109) 
0.236 
(1.451) 
0.237 
(1.090) 
-1.251*** 
(-7.580) 
0.044 
(0.220) 
0.096 
(1.436) 
-0.124 
(-0.577) 
pop_65+ 
-0.068 
(-1.043) 
0.074 
(0.660) 
-0.068 
(-1.011) 
0.069 
(0.610) 
-0.177** 
(-2.542) 
0.100 
(1.030) 
-0.029 
(-0.609) 
0.446*** 
(4.102) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.007 
(1.103) 
0.020*** 
(2.933) 
0.005 
(0.787) 
0.020*** 
(2.885) 
0.014** 
(2.119) 
0.019*** 
(2.880) 
-0.003 
(-0.406) 
0.009 
(1.329) 
pol_right 
-0.003 
(-1.638) 
0.004* 
(1.670) 
-0.002 
(-0.760) 
0.004 
(1.605) 
-0.011*** 
(-5.382) 
0.001 
(0.583) 
0.000 
(-0.195) 
0.002 
(1.052) 
british 
0.012 
(1.139)  
0.017 
(1.594)  
0.100*** 
(8.578)  
0.049*** 
(4.674)  
french 
-0.030*** 
(-3.535)  
-0.031*** 
(-3.419)  
-0.002 
(-0.213)  
-0.023** 
(-2.509)  
COMESA 
0.056*** 
(4.745)  
0.046*** 
(3.692)  
0.093*** 
(6.362) 
 0.082*** 
(5.889) 
 
ECOWAS 
0.038*** 
(2.858)  
0.025* 
(1.875)  
-0.004 
(-0.225) 
 0.038** 
(2.541) 
 
Elect_system 
0.006 
(0.880)  
0.013** 
(2.086)  
0.031*** 
(3.669) 
 0.022*** 
(3.725) 
 
Openness 
0.012 
(1.251) 
-0.024 
(-1.265) 
0.017* 
(1.817) 
-0.025 
(-1.304) 
-0.065*** 
(-5.785) 
-0.025 
(-1.527) 
0.025*** 
(2.658) 
-0.015 
(-0.845) 
ρ  0.567*** (7.884) 0.170 (1.345) 0.414*** (5.154) 0.147 (1.129) 0.845*** (7.465) 0.979*** (6.174) 0.006 (0.155) 0.000 (-0.002) 
λ  -0.234** (-2.412) -0.027 (-0.747) 0.031 (1.564) 0.042 (1.256) -0.429*** (-6.518) -0.442*** (-4.279) 0.432*** (10.74) 0.412*** (10.57) 
R2 0.415 0.514 0.353 0.514 0.373 0.475 0.281 0.471 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table A8. Value Added Tax–SSA 
Variable         WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
 GMM GMM FE GMM GMM GMM FE GMM FE GMM  GMM_FE 
constant 
0.836*** 
(8.223)  
0.678*** 
(8.129)  
0.206*** 
(3.864) 
 -0.033** 
(-2.136) 
 
aid_pc 
0.068*** 
(7.890) 
0.019** 
(2.178) 
0.074*** 
(8.593) 
0.024** 
(2.500) 
0.008 
(0.922) 
0.024*** 
(3.057) 
0.062*** 
(6.902) 
0.021** 
(2.275) 
gdp_pc 
-0.027*** 
(-4.987) 
0.014 
(1.441) 
-0.026*** 
(-4.907) 
0.015 
(1.2340 
-0.001 
(-0.177) 
0.000 
(-0.008) 
0.021** 
(2.053) 
0.044*** 
(4.036) 
land_area 
0.031*** 
(3.708)  
0.028*** 
(3.378)  
-0.034*** 
(-4.560)  
0.038*** 
(4.460)  
literacy 
-0.044* 
(-1.862) 
0.036 
(0.662) 
-0.037 
(-1.570) 
0.024 
(0.517) 
0.105*** 
(3.838) 
-0.051* 
(-1.833) 
0.019 
(0.771) 
-0.036 
(-1.066) 
pop_0-14 
-1.501*** 
(-8.458) 
-0.229 
(-1.228) 
-1.255*** 
(-8.022) 
-0.338 
(-1.577) 
-0.389** 
(-2.155) 
-0.292* 
(-1.867) 
-0.302*** 
(-2.812) 
-0.236 
(-1.055) 
pop_65+ 
-0.287*** 
(-3.836) 
-0.117 
(-1.379) 
-0.208*** 
(-3.001) 
-0.157 
(-1.429) 
-0.378*** 
(-4.841) 
-0.133* 
(-1.736) 
0.049 
(0.828) 
-0.267** 
(-2.490) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.014* 
(1.913) 
-0.003 
(-0.555) 
0.011 
(1.453) 
-0.001 
(-0.133) 
-0.020** 
(-2.492) 
-0.001 
(-0.095) 
0.003 
(0.362) 
0.002 
(0.413) 
pol_right 
-0.011*** 
(-4.814) 
-0.006*** 
(-2.980) 
-0.010*** 
(-4.417) 
-0.009*** 
(-4.139) 
0.008*** 
(3.372) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.502) 
-0.012*** 
(-4.465) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.820) 
british 
0.104*** 
(8.241)  
0.100*** 
(7.817)  
-0.003 
(-0.274)  
0.114*** 
(8.836)  
french 
0.018 
(1.513)  
0.010 
(0.853)  
-0.024** 
(-2.194)  
0.013 
(1.095)  
COMESA 
0.125*** 
(8.635)  
0.116*** 
(7.999)  
0.079*** 
(5.490) 
 0.098*** 
(5.339) 
 
ECOWAS 
0.041** 
(2.471)  
0.028* 
(1.675)  
0.037** 
(2.526) 
 0.029 
(1.514) 
 
Elect_system 
0.022*** 
(2.619)  
0.019** 
(2.249)  
-0.006 
(-0.836) 
 0.044*** 
(5.846)  
Openness 
-0.045*** 
(-4.228) 
-0.004 
(-0.285) 
-0.047*** 
(-4.409) 
-0.005 
(-0.244) 
0.014 
(1.378) 
-0.006 
(-0.400) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.746) 
0.013 
(0.726) 
ρ  0.116** (1.979) -0.686*** (-9.414) -0.005 (-0.091) -0.367*** (-4.400) -0.846*** (-19.45) 0.323*** (9.121) 0.126** (2.070) 0.193*** (5.040) 
λ  -0.063 (-1.057) 0.393*** (7.075) 0.095 (1.595) 0.112 (1.2480 0.447*** (20.98) -0.953*** (-4.599) 0.499*** (16.521) 0.750*** (23.854) 
R2 0.346 0.661 0.337 0.664 0.459  0.062 0.661 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A9. Excise Tax–SSA 
Variable         WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
 GMM GMM FE GMM GMM GMM FE GMM FE GMM  GMM_FE 
constant 
0.347*** 
(3.544)  
0.382*** 
(3.038)  
0.206*** 
(3.864) 
 -0.108*** 
(-7.188) 
 
aid_pc 
0.006 
(0.599) 
-0.007 
(-0.884) 
-0.006 
(-0.602) 
-0.026*** 
(-2.714) 
0.008 
(0.922) 
-0.017* 
(-1.874) 
-0.001 
(-0.142) 
-0.020** 
(-2.402) 
gdp_pc 
0.015** 
(2.374) 
0.000 
(0.042) 
0.013** 
(2.050) 
-0.024** 
(-1.999) 
-0.001 
(-0.177) 
-0.010 
(-0.993) 
0.019* 
(1.930) 
-0.003 
(-0.252) 
land_area 
-0.031*** 
(-3.444)  
-0.047*** 
(-5.029)  
-0.034*** 
(-4.560)  
-0.038*** 
(-4.616)  
literacy 
0.011 
(0.391) 
0.002 
(0.076) 
0.048* 
(1.682) 
0.006 
(0.1380 
0.105*** 
(3.838) 
0.066 
(1.106) 
0.105*** 
(4.065) 
0.025 
(0.833) 
pop_0-14 
-0.410* 
(-1.934) 
0.406** 
(2.306) 
-0.370* 
(-1.733) 
0.482** 
(2.259) 
-0.38988 
(-2.155) 
0.466** 
(2.280) 
0.510*** 
(6.436) 
0.423** 
(2.131) 
pop_65+ 
-0.521*** 
(-5.469) 
0.064 
(0.653) 
-0.520*** 
(-5.298) 
0.217** 
(2.001) 
-0.378*** 
(-2.155) 
0.156 
(1.502) 
-0.195*** 
(-3.348) 
0.210** 
(2.241) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.022** 
(-2.467) 
0.005 
(0.796) 
-0.024*** 
(-2.658) 
0.001 
(0.122) 
-0.020** 
(-2.492) 
-0.006 
(-1.023) 
-0.034*** 
(-4.047) 
0.001 
(0.184) 
pol_right 
0.009*** 
(3.495) 
-0.001 
(-0.259) 
0.010*** 
(3.607) 
0.002 
(0.724) 
0.008*** 
(3.372) 
0.002 
(1.161) 
0.004 
(1.185) 
0.004* 
(1.940) 
british 
-0.028** 
(-2.093)  
-0.033** 
(-2.352)  
-0.003 
(-0.274)  
-0.006 
(-0.482)  
french 
-0.074*** 
(-5.280)  
-0.064*** 
(-4.474)  
-0.024** 
(-2.194)  
-0.023* 
(-1.869)  
COMESA 
0.084*** 
(5.271)  
0.081*** 
(4.846)  
0.079*** 
(5.490) 
 0.059*** 
(3.356) 
 
ECOWAS 
0.015 
(0.862)  
0.020 
(1.086)  
0.037** 
(2.526) 
 0.029 
(1.495) 
 
Elect_system 
-0.003 
(-0.402)  
-0.004 
(-0.435)  
-0.006 
(-0.836) 
 0.029*** 
(3.595) 
 
Openness 
0.039*** 
(3.376) 
-0.007 
(-0.436) 
0.042*** 
(3.358) 
0.001 
(0.052) 
0.014 
(1.378) 
0.022 
(1.328) 
0.040*** 
(3.345) 
0.003 
(0.151) 
ρ  -0.774*** (-5.990) 1.025*** (5.900) -0.324** (-2.474) 0.300* (1.675) -0.846*** (-19.45) -0.257*** (-9.664) -0.580*** (-9.885) 0.207*** (5.670) 
λ  0.234 (1.413) -0.588*** (-3.153) -0.021 (-0.692) -0.120** (-2.451) 0.447*** (20.98) 0.509*** (5.624) 0.396*** (55.412) -0.317*** (-11.06) 
R2 0.270 0.712 0.231 0.718 0.459 0.717 0.246 0.717 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A10. International Trade Taxes–SSA 
Variable         WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
 GMM GMM FE GMM GMM GMM FE GMM FE GMM  GMM_FE 
constant 
0.454*** 
(2.905)  
0.114 
(0.956)  
0.180 
(1.254) 
 0.023 
(0.661) 
 
aid_pc 
-0.023 
(-1.534) 
-0.004 
(-0.274) 
-0.016 
(-1.105) 
-0.002 
(-0.100) 
-0.016 
(-1.095) 
0.003 
(0.180) 
-0.006 
(-0.373) 
0.027* 
(1.751) 
gdp_pc 
-0.099*** 
(-10.777) 
-0.094*** 
(-4.769) 
-0.096*** 
(-10.47) 
-0.096*** 
(-4.616) 
-0.100*** 
(-10.85) 
-0.106*** 
(-5.230) 
-0.129*** 
(-7.697) 
-0.154*** 
(-8.060) 
land_area 
-0.065*** 
(-4.935)  
-0.078*** 
(-5.666)  
-0.075*** 
(-5.594)  
-0.064*** 
(-4.720)  
literacy 
0.006 
(0.155) 
-0.343*** 
(-4.252) 
0.058 
(1.399) 
-0.371*** 
(-4.936) 
0.039 
(0.917) 
-0.334*** 
(-4.430) 
0.062 
(1.528) 
-0.245*** 
(-3.730) 
pop_0-14 
0.026 
(0.081) 
0.022 
(0.062) 
0.720*** 
(3.152) 
0.288 
(0.773) 
0.698** 
(2.248) 
0.287 
(0.807) 
0.798*** 
(5.196) 
-0.030 
(-0.076) 
pop_65+ 
0.405*** 
(3.137) 
0.119 
(0.731) 
0.630*** 
(5.787) 
0.012 
(0.062) 
0.574*** 
(4.383) 
-0.031 
(-0.169) 
0.703*** 
(7.454) 
0.207 
(1.044) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.015 
(1.143) 
0.030*** 
(2.795) 
0.008 
(0.576) 
0.038*** 
(3.283) 
0.005 
(0.384) 
0.031*** 
(2.672) 
0.008 
(0.587) 
0.035*** 
(3.180) 
pol_right 
-0.019*** 
(-4.673) 
-0.013*** 
(-3.726) 
-0.017*** 
(-4.289) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.991) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.776) 
-0.015*** 
(-4.058) 
-0.014*** 
(-3.073) 
-0.014*** 
(-4.014) 
british 
-0.086*** 
(-4.275)  
-0.089*** 
(-4.432)  
-0.064*** 
(-3.122)  
-0.069*** 
(-3.196)  
french 
0.042** 
(2.218)  
0.023 
(1.235)  
0.028 
(1.507)  
0.021 
(1.094)  
COMESA 
-0.095*** 
(-3.913)  
-0.110*** 
(-4.511)  
-0.101*** 
(-4.120) 
 -0.063** 
(-2.164) 
 
ECOWAS 
-0.005 
(-0.175)  
-0.017 
(-0.598)  
-0.039 
(-1.492) 
 0.002 
(0.065) 
 
Elect_system 
-0.048*** 
(-3.919)  
-0.048*** 
(-3.778)  
-0.050*** 
(-4.019) 
 -0.047*** 
(-3.476) 
 
Openness 
0.084*** 
(4.096) 
-0.026 
(-0.879) 
0.084*** 
(3.947) 
-0.031 
(-1.004) 
0.090*** 
(4.521) 
-0.043 
(-1.363) 
0.114*** 
(5.904) 
-0.054* 
(-1.697) 
ρ  -0.337*** (-4.734) -0.503*** (-4.670) -0.263*** (-3.738) -0.158 (-1.391) -0.433*** (-4.626) 0.099 (0.798) -0.039 (-0.726) 0.229*** (5.838) 
λ  0.153*** (137.08) 0.210*** (11.161) 0.177*** (8.979) -0.125*** (-13.39) 0.133*** (6.394) -0.134*** (-8.953) 0.409*** (51.51) 0.677*** (22.46) 
R2 0.372 0.672 0.358 0.675 0.377 0.675  0.668 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table A11. General Public Services–SSA 
Variable         WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
 GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE 
constant 
0.659*** 
(3.650)  
0.007 
(0.095)  
0.801*** 
(3.051) 
 0.260*** 
(3.297) 
 
aid_pc 
0.031*** 
(2.780) 
-0.065*** 
(-4.862) 
0.037*** 
(3.295) 
-0.064*** 
(-4.547) 
0.032*** 
(3.051) 
-0.050*** 
(-3.571) 
0.046*** 
(3.959) 
-0.045*** 
(-3.431) 
gdp_pc 
-0.044*** 
(-4.534) 
-0.016 
(-1.105) 
-0.017** 
(-2.030) 
-0.025* 
(-1.693) 
-0.030*** 
(-3.323) 
-0.029* 
(-1.937) 
0.011 
(1.283) 
-0.029* 
(-1.904) 
land_area 
-0.018* 
(-1.680)  
-0.018* 
(-1.719)  
-0.015 
(-1.399)  
-0.016 
(-1.547)  
literacy 
0.016 
(0.484) 
-0.279*** 
(-4.026) 
0.063* 
(1.774) 
-0.260*** 
(-3.608) 
0.022 
(0.738) 
-0.119** 
(-2.062) 
0.069** 
(2.359) 
-0.081 
(-1.526) 
pop_0-14 
-0.538** 
(-2.190) 
-0.888** 
(-2.474) 
0.268* 
(1.873) 
-1.012*** 
(-2.868) 
-0.616*** 
(-2.617) 
-0.942*** 
(-2.961) 
-0.300** 
(-2.352) 
-0.674** 
(-2.166) 
pop_65+ 
-0.468*** 
(-3.958) 
-0.275** 
(-2.197) 
-0.219** 
(-2.405) 
-0.262** 
(-2.019) 
-0.532*** 
(-5.018) 
-0.225* 
(-1.792) 
-0.532*** 
(-6.122) 
-0.202* 
(-1.675) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.029*** 
(-3.158) 
-0.020** 
(-2.119) 
-0.023** 
(-2.382) 
-0.021** 
(-2.219) 
-0.013 
(-1.413) 
-0.019** 
(-2.089) 
-0.007 
(-0.870) 
-0.013 
(-1.492) 
pol_right 
0.003 
(1.038) 
-0.001 
(-0.192) 
0.008*** 
(2.644) 
-0.001 
(-0.295) 
0.005* 
(1.779) 
0.001 
(0.355) 
0.007** 
(2.492) 
-0.001 
(-0.325) 
british 
-0.016 
(-1.079)  
-0.011 
(-0.718)  
-0.022 
(-1.511)  
-0.023 
(-1.541)  
french 
0.011 
(0.733)  
0.032** 
(2.054)  
-0.004 
(-0.252)  
0.010 
(0.737)  
COMESA 
-0.023 
(-1.297)  
-0.021 
(-1.187)  
-0.008 
(-0.470)  
0.006 
(0.353)  
ECOWAS 
-0.058*** 
(-3.011)  
-0.032* 
(-1.731)  
-0.044** 
(-2.306) 
 -0.035* 
(-1.851) 
 
Elect_system 
-0.003 
(-0.326)  
-0.003 
(-0.309)  
-0.001 
(-0.153) 
 0.018 
(1.629) 
 
Openness 
0.072*** 
(5.661) 
0.053** 
(-0.192) 
0.067*** 
(5.176) 
0.055** 
(2.381) 
0.055*** 
(4.529) 
0.046** 
(2.038) 
0.070*** 
(5.470) 
0.024 
(1.077) 
ρ  0.400*** (4.177) -0.283** (-2.218) 0.320*** (3.427) -0.086 (-0.652) 0.942*** (7.873) 0.596*** (4.709) 0.317*** (9.527) 0.199*** (5.596) 
λ  -0.238*** (-185.43) 0.089*** (15.828) -0.242** (-2.095) -0.218 (-1.420) -0.854*** (-19.63) -0.786*** (-5.229) -0.216*** -7.274) -0.302*** (-5.060) 
R2 0.225 0.480 0.155 0.481  0.475 0.27 0.446 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A12.  Defense–SSA 
Variable         WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
 GMM GMM FE GMM GMM GMM FE GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
constant 
0.321*** 
(4.478)  
0.418*** 
(4.371)  
0.590*** 
(4.015) 
 0.000 
(0.017) 
 
aid_pc 
0.021** 
(2.579) 
0.005 
(0.490) 
0.012 
(1.424) 
0.015 
(1.381) 
-0.006 
(-0.857) 
0.001 
(0.059) 
-0.004 
(-0.478) 
0.005 
(0.588) 
gdp_pc 
-0.008 
(-1.195) 
0.006 
(0.522) 
-0.013* 
(-1.925) 
-0.013 
(-0.963) 
-0.017*** 
(-2.620) 
0.001 
(0.126) 
0.024** 
(2.417) 
0.007 
(0.647) 
land_area 
0.005 
(0.770)  
0.005 
(0.654)  
0.007 
(0.931)  
0.004 
(0.620)  
literacy 
-0.125*** 
(-5.931) 
-0.189*** 
(-3.186) 
-0.112*** 
(-5.086) 
-0.168*** 
(-2.898) 
-0.062*** 
(-2.661) 
0.157** 
(2.500) 
-0.092*** 
(-3.269) 
0.121** 
(2.172) 
pop_0-14 
-0.057 
(-0.371) 
0.415* 
(1.763) 
-0.069 
(-0.429) 
0.739*** 
(2.638) 
-0.212 
(-1.196) 
0.272 
(1.096) 
0.542*** 
(8.368) 
0.635*** 
(2.838) 
pop_65+ 
0.052 
(0.711) 
0.159* 
(1.867) 
-0.002 
(-0.026) 
0.233** 
(2.162) 
-0.136 
(-1.608) 
0.258*** 
(2.681) 
0.045 
(0.724) 
0.182** 
(1.996) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.038*** 
(-5.788) 
-0.022*** 
(-3.453) 
-0.042*** 
(-6.172) 
-0.024*** 
(-3.284) 
-0.029*** 
(-4.366) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.447) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.505) 
-0.016*** 
(-2.806) 
pol_right 
0.008*** 
(4.043) 
0.007*** 
(3.396) 
0.008*** 
(3.690) 
0.010*** 
(4.510) 
0.004* 
(1.957) 
0.005** 
(2.113) 
0.005** 
(2.048) 
0.005** 
(2.384) 
british 
-0.025** 
(-2.470)  
-0.029*** 
(-2.791)  
-0.037*** 
(-3.504)  
-0.053*** 
(-4.478)  
french 
-0.036*** 
(-3.941)  
-0.031*** 
(-3.297)  
-0.022** 
(-2.349)  
-0.045*** 
(-4.568)  
COMESA 
-0.008 
(-0.709)  
-0.020* 
(-1.708)  
-0.035*** 
(-3.051)  
-0.036*** 
(-2.944)  
ECOWAS 
-0.100*** 
(-7.950)  
-0.109*** 
(-8.411)  
-0.109*** 
(-8.207) 
 -0.073*** 
(-5.688) 
 
Elect_system 
-0.044*** 
(-6.415)  
-0.041*** 
(-5.757)  
-0.029*** 
(-4.088) 
 -0.036*** 
(-4.321) 
 
Openness 
-0.070*** 
(-8.516) 
0.040** 
(2.175) 
-0.066*** 
(-7.411) 
0.035* 
(1.703) 
-0.052*** 
(-6.158) 
0.058*** 
(3.401) 
-0.048*** 
(-5.248) 
0.050*** 
(3.061) 
ρ  -0.521*** (-8.958) -0.648*** (-6.238) -0.329*** (-4.938) -0.417*** (-3.191) 0.491*** (3.754) 1.076*** (6.063) 0.139*** (4.818) 0.257*** (7.751) 
λ  0.205*** (11.405) 0.364*** (29.54) -0.039 (-0.529) 0.020 (0.332) -0.472*** (-17.75) -0.669*** (-7.925) 0.892*** (6.075) -0.333*** (-9.263) 
R2 0.445 0.528 0.391 0.515 0.403 0.486 0.289  
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A13.  Education–SSA 
Variable         WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
 GMM GMM FE GMM GMM GMM FE GMM FE GMM  GMM_FE 
constant 
-0.230** 
(-2.176)  
-0.175** 
(-2.242)  
-0.021 
(-0.257) 
 0.000 
(-0.058) 
 
aid_pc 
-0.014** 
(-2.518) 
-0.005 
(-0.902) 
-0.014** 
(-2.413) 
-0.002 
(-0.233) 
-0.019*** 
(-3.158) 
-0.003 
(-0.3590 
-0.027*** 
(-4.195) 
-0.001 
(-0.094) 
gdp_pc 
0.018*** 
(3.813) 
0.005 
(0.681) 
0.019*** 
(3.777) 
0.008 
(0.985) 
0.022*** 
(4.142) 
0.005 
(0.704) 
-0.008 
(-1.045) 
0.012 
(1.515) 
land_area 
-0.039*** 
(-7.284)  
-0.034*** 
(-6.327)  
-0.034*** 
(-6.241)  
-0.034*** 
(-6.422)  
literacy 
0.005 
(0.335) 
-0.037 
(-1.554) 
0.023 
(1.3900 
-0.063* 
(-1.8250 
0.042** 
(2.404) 
-0.038 
(-0.865) 
0.009 
(0.461) 
-0.027 
(-1.069) 
pop_0-14 
0.357*** 
(2.921) 
-0.192 
(-1.0460 
0.433*** 
(3.4380 
-0.509** 
(-2.581) 
0.381*** 
(2.838) 
-0.660*** 
(-3.423) 
0.159** 
(2.515) 
-0.440*** 
(-2.807) 
pop_65+ 
0.102* 
(1.780) 
-0.053 
(-0.754) 
0.118* 
(1.955) 
-0.123* 
(-1.700) 
0.087 
(1.428) 
-0.148** 
(-2.141) 
0.069 
(1.553) 
-0.126** 
(-2.075) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.001 
(-0.140) 
0.002 
(0.445) 
0.003 
(0.637) 
0.003 
(0.613) 
0.000 
(0.077) 
0.001 
(0.262) 
-0.001 
(-0.142) 
0.004 
(1.046) 
pol_right 
-0.001 
(-0.500) 
0.001 
(0.612) 
-0.001 
(-0.756) 
-0.001 
(-0.815) 
-0.002 
(-1.204) 
-0.002 
(-1.135) 
0.000 
(0.155) 
0.000 
(-0.232) 
british 
0.012* 
(1.683)  
0.017** 
(2.078)  
0.014 
(1.621)  
0.035*** 
(4.171)  
french 
-0.008 
(-1.221)  
-0.002 
(-0.300)  
-0.008 
(-1.134)  
0.001 
(0.142)  
COMESA 
0.009 
(0.986)  
-0.003 
(-0.322)  
-0.015 
(-1.586)  
-0.007 
(-0.797)  
ECOWAS 
0.007 
(0.665)  
-0.009 
(-0.862)  
-0.022** 
(-2.239) 
 -0.007 
(-0.750) 
 
Elect_system 
0.009* 
(1.864)  
0.013** 
(2.446)  
0.006 
(1.120) 
 0.008 
(1.295) 
 
Openness 
0.003 
(0.397) 
-0.028** 
(-2.524) 
0.016** 
(2.430) 
-0.007 
(-0.593) 
0.017** 
(2.590) 
-0.009 
(-0.734) 
0.003 
(0.410) 
-0.004 
(-0.387) 
ρ  0.789*** (10.563) 0.979*** (8.945) 0.417*** (4.863) 0.241* (1.730) -0.250 (-0.836) -0.845* (-1.710) 0.095** (2.156) 0.313*** (7.241) 
λ  -0.372*** (-2.997) -0.560** (-2.109) -0.001 (-0.015) -0.040 (-0.421) 0.109 (0.916) 0.461* (1.935) 0.725*** (4.502) -0.421*** (-14.28) 
R2 0.448 0.542 0.327 0.553 0.328 0.553 0.062  
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A14.  Health–SSA  
Variable         WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
 GMM GMM FE GMM GMM GMM FE GMM FE GMM  GMM_FE 
constant 
-0.035 
(-0.464)  
0.017 
(0.840)  
0.082*** 
(3.413) 
 -0.150*** 
(-4.607) 
 
aid_pc 
0.012*** 
(2.781) 
0.008 
(1.529) 
0.003 
(0.721) 
0.010* 
(1.919) 
-0.001 
(-0.197) 
0.005 
(0.888) 
0.019*** 
(4.309) 
0.006 
(1.024) 
gdp_pc 
0.000 
(-0.026) 
0.003 
(0.415) 
-0.002 
(-0.523) 
-0.016** 
(-2.304) 
0.008** 
(2.165) 
-0.002 
(-0.436) 
0.011*** 
(3.640) 
-0.002 
(-0.313) 
land_area 
0.013*** 
(2.854)  
0.002 
(0.4780  
0.000 
(0.099)  
0.007* 
(1.759)  
literacy 
0.004 
(0.315) 
0.013 
(0.488) 
0.032*** 
(2.625) 
0.019 
(0.720) 
0.059*** 
(4.946) 
-0.025 
(-0.747) 
0.035*** 
(3.427) 
0.037 
(1.496) 
pop_0-14 
-0.088 
(-0.949) 
0.127 
(0.998) 
-0.008 
(-0.176) 
0.134 
(0.992) 
0.095 
(1.085) 
0.060 
(0.473) 
0.024 
(0.517) 
-0.099 
(-0.605) 
pop_65+ 
0.113*** 
(2.622) 
0.203*** 
(3.755) 
0.124*** 
(4.103) 
0.108* 
(1.7610 
0.125*** 
(3.016) 
0.270*** 
(5.699) 
0.135*** 
(3.855) 
0.312*** 
(5.902) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.002 
(0.697) 
0.002 
(0.6630 
0.003 
(0.8980 
0.002 
(0.518) 
0.003 
(0.823) 
0.001 
(0.369) 
-0.004 
(-1.324) 
-0.003 
(-0.724) 
pol_right 
0.001 
(1.291) 
0.004*** 
(3.944) 
0.000 
(0.431) 
0.004*** 
(3.279) 
0.001 
(1.029) 
0.006*** 
(5.195) 
0.004*** 
(3.733) 
0.006* 
(5.441) 
british 
0.024*** 
(4.167)  
0.012** 
(1.970)  
0.009 
(1.642)  
0.015*** 
(2.596)  
french 
0.008* 
(1.645)  
0.005 
(1.027)  
0.007 
(1.586)  
0.007 
(1.339)  
COMESA 
0.014** 
(2.133)  
-0.001 
(-0.134)  
0.000 
(-0.021)  
0.010 
(1.483)  
ECOWAS 
0.016** 
(2.100)  
-0.011 
(-1.576)  
-0.003 
(-0.397) 
 -0.009 
(-1.337) 
 
Elect_system 
0.000 
(0.093)  
-0.008* 
(-1.8990  
-0.003 
(-0.884) 
 0.009** 
(2.056) 
 
Openness 
0.001 
(0.125) 
0.009 
(0.969) 
0.005 
(1.0830 
-0.010 
(-0.976) 
0.013*** 
(2.989) 
0.013 
(1.575) 
0.016*** 
(3.130) 
0.019* 
(1.927) 
ρ  0.650*** (9.235) -0.338** (-2.468) -0.228*** (-2.885) -0.587*** (-4.625) -3.787*** (-8.659) -3.670*** (-5.465) 0.023 (0.432) 0.064 (0.751) 
λ  -0.353*** (-5.578) 0.212** (2.323) 0.342* (1.793) 0.364 (1.522) 0.534*** (4.710) 0.500*** (4.365) -0.326*** (-10.374) 0.775*** (5.907) 
R2 0.284 0.460 0.175 0.427 0.314 0.456 0.308  
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
171 
Table A15.  Transportation and Communication-SSA 
Variable         WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
 GMM GMM FE GMM GMM_FE GMM  GMM_FE GMM  GMM_FE 
constant 
0.005 
(0.065)  
-0.006 
(-0.100)  
0.004 
(0.131) 
 0.009** 
(2.305) 
 
aid_pc 
0.010** 
(2.285) 
-0.013** 
(-2.409) 
0.014*** 
(2.954) 
-0.012** 
(-2.005) 
0.015*** 
(3.204) 
-0.020*** 
(-3.010) 
0.009** 
(1.976) 
-0.020*** 
(-3.099) 
gdp_pc 
0.000 
(-0.123) 
-0.008 
(-1.404) 
0.000 
(-0.093) 
-0.009 
(-1.392) 
0.001 
(0.233) 
-0.006 
(-0.9310 
-0.008 
(-1.314) 
-0.008 
(-1.317) 
land_area 
-0.015*** 
(-3.615)  
-0.008** 
(-1.967)  
-0.006 
(-1.404)  
-0.001 
(-0.294)  
literacy 
-0.044*** 
(-3.435) 
-0.080*** 
(-2.742) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.359) 
-0.112*** 
(-3.142) 
-0.055*** 
(-3.831) 
-0.084 
(-1.6170 
-0.069*** 
(-4.739) 
-0.139*** 
(-3.528) 
pop_0-14 
-0.076 
(-0.795) 
0.232* 
(1.731) 
-0.037 
(-0.368) 
0.200 
(1.3530 
-0.150 
(-1.445) 
0.108 
(0.6390 
0.023 
(0.578) 
0.337* 
(1.943) 
pop_65+ 
0.083* 
(1.866) 
0.156*** 
(2.766) 
0.079* 
(1.674) 
0.151*** 
(2.660) 
0.022 
(0.443) 
0.136** 
(2.2250 
0.178*** 
(5.415) 
0.208*** 
(3.520) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.005 
(1.507) 
0.012*** 
(3.518) 
0.007* 
(1.770) 
0.014*** 
(3.587) 
0.018*** 
(3.719) 
0.019*** 
(4.262) 
0.009** 
(2.087) 
0.016*** 
(3.546) 
pol_right 
0.005*** 
(4.773) 
0.003*** 
(2.672) 
0.005*** 
(4.232) 
0.004*** 
(2.859) 
0.005*** 
(4.010) 
0.002* 
(1.718) 
0.004*** 
(3.451) 
0.004*** 
(2.830) 
british 
0.006 
(0.982)  
0.009 
(1.400)  
0.005 
(0.719)  
0.021*** 
(3.325)  
french 
-0.020 
(-4.061)  
-0.017*** 
(-3.066)  
-0.025*** 
(-4.516)  
-0.016*** 
(-2.916)  
COMESA 
0.000 
(-0.019)  
-0.006 
(-0.942)  
-0.008 
(-1.221)  
-0.025*** 
(-3.756)  
ECOWAS 
-0.006 
(-0.750)  
-0.010 
(-1.317)  
-0.007 
(-0.822) 
 -0.019*** 
(-2.602) 
 
Elect_system 
-0.006 
(-1.619)  
-0.002 
(-0.504)  
0.001 
(0.241) 
 -0.004 
(-0.869) 
 
Openness 
0.055*** 
(11.098) 
0.026*** 
(2.654) 
0.056*** 
(10.992) 
0.024** 
(2.374) 
0.054*** 
(10.128) 
0.029*** 
(2.780) 
0.045*** 
(8.431) 
0.027** 
(2.532) 
ρ  0.714*** (8.298) 0.667*** (5.227) 0.420*** (3.876) 0.513*** (3.269) 0.981*** (3.667) 0.855** (2.220) -0.012 (-0.295) 0.066 (1.040) 
λ  -0.358*** (-2.983) -0.333*** (-2.814) 0.005 (0.038) -0.015 (-0.101) 0.456 (0.590) 0.475 (0.601) 0.587*** (9.661) 0.631*** (6.130) 
R2 0.506 0.545 0.380 0.553 0.325 0.530 0.216  
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A16.  Individual Tax Revenue–SADC 
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
constant 
0.734*** 
(3.643)  
0.819*** 
(3.500)  
0.780*** 
(3.150)  
0.046 
(0.415)  
aid_pc 
-0.025 
(-1.433) 
0.019 
(1.403) 
-0.016 
(-0.870) 
0.018 
(1.231) 
-0.011 
(-0.582) 
0.024** 
(2.312) 
-0.010 
(-0.724) 
0.024** 
(2.171) 
gdp_pc 
-0.023** 
(-2.376) 
-0.068*** 
(-4.827) 
0.011 
(0.896) 
-0.065*** 
(-4.653) 
-0.013 
(-1.268) 
-0.081*** 
(-5.7530 
-0.019*** 
(-2.763) 
-0.085*** 
(-5.296) 
land_area 
-0.044*** 
(-3.009)  
-0.025* 
(-1.648)  
-0.048*** 
(-2.909)  
0.023 
(1.619)  
literacy 
0.324*** 
(4.886) 
-0.174** 
(-2.091) 
0.286*** 
(4.189) 
-0.182** 
(-2.011) 
0.157** 
(2.489) 
-0.155*** 
(-3.221) 
0.256*** 
(5.631) 
-0.214*** 
(-3.547) 
pop_0-14 
-1.501*** 
(-4.152) 
-1.347*** 
(-3.595) 
-1.391*** 
(-3.601) 
-1.086*** 
(-2.764) 
-1.256*** 
(-3.273) 
-1.312*** 
(-5.220) 
-0.184 
(-0.940) 
-1.235*** 
(-4.074) 
pop_65+ 
-0.158 
(-1.210) 
1.780 
(1.347) 
-0.259** 
(-1.846) 
1.831 
(1.381) 
-0.057 
(-0.412) 
-1.007 
(-1.006) 
0.217 
(1.632) 
1.564 
(1.634) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.008 
(-0.702) 
0.014 
(1.347) 
0.016 
(1.228) 
0.020* 
(1.845) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.565) 
0.037*** 
(3.768) 
0.013 
(1.474) 
pol_right 
0.007* 
(1.761) 
-0.001 
(-0.399) 
-0.002 
(-0.412) 
-0.002 
(-0.527) 
0.004 
(0.867) 
-0.008*** 
(-2.943) 
-0.002 
(-0.484) 
-0.003 
(-0.961) 
british 
0.014 
(0.7200  
0.022 
(0.990)  
-0.004 
(-0.198)  
0.094*** 
(3.929)  
french 
-0.218*** 
(-6.287)  
-0.218*** 
(-6.038)  
-0.247*** 
(-5.599)  
-0.020 
(-0.720)  
SADC 
Membership 
Dummy 
0.011 
(0.684)  
0.034* 
(1.885)  
0.000 
(0.023)  
0.008 
(0.648)  
Openness 
-0.060** 
(-2.546) 
-0.023 
(-0.868) 
-0.136*** 
(-7.098) 
-0.009 
(-0.324) 
-0.167*** 
(-6.278) 
-0.038* 
(-1.873) 
-0.065*** 
(-4.304) 
-0.007 
(-0.273) 
ρ  -0.566*** (-5.503) 0.194 (1.509) -0.167*** (-3.709) 0.107 (1.693) 0.245* (1.702) 0.161*** (10.65) -0.577*** (-9.735) 0.602*** (7.4890 
λ  0.099* (1.650) -0.183*** (-5.351) 0.008 (0.038) -0.065 (-0.426) -0.023* (-1.725) -0.734*** (-4.944) 0.149*** (6.089) -0.420*** (-4.728) 
R2 0.577 0.759 0.574 0.756 0.519 0.736 0.730 0.747 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A17.  Corporate Tax Revenue–SADC    
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
constant 
-0.362 
(-1.390)  
-0.156 
(-0.866)  
-0.352* 
(-1.743) 
 -0.123 
(-0.665)  
aid_pc 
-0.065*** 
(-3.843) 
-0.080*** 
(-4.444) 
-0.064*** 
(-3.609) 
-0.062*** 
(-3.248) 
-0.052*** 
(-2.756) 
-0.066*** 
(-3.625) 
-0.067*** 
(-3.652) 
-0.076*** 
(-4.390) 
gdp_pc 
0.078*** 
(8.175) 
0.043** 
(2.364) 
0.057*** 
(5.661) 
0.038** 
(2.127) 
0.080*** 
(8.585) 
0.029 
(1.493) 
0.079*** 
(6.854) 
0.069*** 
(3.000) 
land_area 
-0.078*** 
(-5.253)  
-0.088*** 
(-6.007)  
-0.087*** 
(-6.066)  
-0.102*** 
(-5.271)  
literacy 
-0.194*** 
(-3.205) 
-0.204* 
(-1.950) 
-0.254*** 
(-3.7850 
-0.188* 
(-1.696) 
-0.196*** 
(-3.103) 
-0.581*** 
(-3.973) 
-0.180*** 
(-2.829) 
-0.125 
(-1.206) 
pop_0-14 
1.629*** 
(4.106) 
0.981* 
(1.921) 
1.298*** 
(4.213) 
0.118 
(0.225) 
1.878*** 
(5.171) 
0.734 
(1.622) 
1.332*** 
(4.494) 
0.794 
(1.609) 
pop_65+ 
0.079 
(0.578) 
2.360 
(1.380) 
0.078 
(0.682) 
2.704 
(1.592) 
0.164 
(1.237) 
1.798 
(1.070) 
-0.073 
(-0.703) 
0.722 
(0.430) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.026** 
(2.148) 
0.007 
(0.528) 
0.009 
(0.669) 
0.012 
(0.880) 
0.016 
(1.339) 
0.007 
(0.570) 
0.022** 
(1.997) 
0.017 
(1.242) 
pol_right 
-0.004 
(-0.940) 
0.012** 
(2.583) 
0.001 
(0.153) 
0.011** 
(2.239) 
-0.003 
(-0.704) 
0.011** 
(2.399) 
-0.003 
(-0.787) 
0.009* 
(1.854)) 
british 
-0.067*** 
(-3.290)  
-0.081*** 
(-4.115)  
-0.068*** 
(-3.459)  
-0.101*** 
(-3.768)  
french 
-0.109*** 
(-3.011)  
-0.124*** 
(-3.920)  
-0.101*** 
(-2.929)  
-0.163*** 
(-4.452)  
SADC 
Membership 
Dummy 
-0.053*** 
(-3.429)  
-0.060*** 
(-3.457)  
-0.062*** 
(-3.784) 
 
-0.054*** 
(-3.285)  
Openness 
-0.055*** 
(-2.959) 
-0.029 
(-0.783) 
-0.042** 
(-2.218) 
-0.084** 
(-2.181) 
-0.067*** 
(-3.809) 
-0.037 
(-1.081) 
-0.071*** 
(-3.307) 
-0.059 
(-1.403) 
ρ  0.107 (1.106) 0.173 (1.378) 0.077*** (4.062) 0.144*** (3.590) -0.130 (-1.116) -0.580*** (-3.374) 0.085 (1.091) 0.358*** (2.794) 
λ  -0.095*** (-4.418) -0.169*** (-22.98) -0.069 (-0.378) -0.090 (-0.549) 0.122*** (2.793) 0.333*** (5.766) -0.090*** (-17.58) -0.194*** (-6.377) 
R2 0.570 0.583 0.588 0.544 0.574 0.560 0.567 0.555 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A18.  Value Added Tax–SADC 
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
constant 
1.777*** 
(7.302)  
0.229** 
(2.141)  
1.520*** 
(6.885) 
 1.511*** 
(5.725)  
aid_pc 
0.008 
(0.409) 
0.018 
(1.026) 
-0.007 
(-0.318) 
0.019 
(1.111) 
-0.003 
(-0.157) 
0.018 
(1.043) 
0.016 
(0.805) 
0.012 
(0.943) 
gdp_pc 
-0.021* 
(-1.946) 
0.003 
(0.192) 
-0.002 
(-0.235) 
0.005 
(0.314) 
-0.029*** 
(-2.664) 
0.003 
(0.173) 
-0.032** 
(-2.380) 
-0.008 
(-0.424) 
land_area 
-0.094*** 
(-5.610)  
-0.107*** 
(-6.037)  
-0.001 
(-0.031)  
-0.057** 
(-2.593)  
literacy 
-0.633*** 
(-8.714) 
-0.448*** 
(-4.341) 
-0.433*** 
(-5.405) 
-0.464*** 
(-4.669) 
-0.743*** 
(-9.249) 
-0.317*** 
(-3.020) 
-0.571*** 
(-7.793) 
-0.198*** 
(-2.750) 
pop_0-14 
-2.259*** 
(-5.463) 
-2.304*** 
(-5.310) 
0.156 
(0.771) 
-2.337*** 
(-5.385) 
-2.123*** 
(-5.142) 
-1.910*** 
(-4.243) 
-1.772*** 
(-4.273) 
-1.562*** 
(-4.143) 
pop_65+ 
-0.230 
(-1.529) 
-1.606 
(-1.006) 
0.690*** 
(6.538) 
-1.563 
(-0.985) 
-0.123 
(-0.812) 
-1.278 
(-0.868) 
0.116 
(0.832) 
-0.764 
(-0.683) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.025* 
(1.790) 
-0.005 
(-0.400) 
-0.019 
(-1.213) 
-0.008 
(-0.621) 
0.018 
(1.317) 
-0.004 
(-0.271) 
0.020 
(1.514) 
-0.001 
(-0.096) 
pol_right 
0.021*** 
(4.456) 
0.007 
(1.600) 
0.029*** 
(5.850) 
0.007 
(1.490) 
0.019*** 
(4.257) 
0.006 
(1.296) 
0.020*** 
(4.164) 
0.007* 
(1.765) 
british 
-0.092*** 
(-4.035)  
-0.046** 
(-2.028)  
-0.024 
(-0.876)  
-0.024 
(-0.943)  
french 
-0.209*** 
(-4.865)  
-0.136*** 
(-4.089)  
-0.135*** 
(-2.782)  
-0.193*** 
(-4.463)  
SADC Membership 
Dummy 
0.090*** 
(5.062)  
0.044** 
(2.068)  
0.088*** 
(4.976) 
 0.086*** 
(4.631)  
Openness 
-0.195*** 
(-8.690) 
-0.119*** 
(-3.590) 
-0.205*** 
(-8.668) 
-0.117*** 
(-3.580) 
-0.118*** 
(-3.889) 
-0.109*** 
(-3.475) 
-0.195*** 
(-7.935) 
-0.077** 
(-2.496) 
ρ  -0.456*** (-4.205) -0.051 (-0.398) 0.091*** (4.708) -0.005 (-0.115) -0.720*** (-5.088) 0.536*** (3.380) -0.003 (-0.039) 0.405*** (7.098) 
λ  0.067*** (13.69) -0.027 (-0.576) -0.218*** (-7.319) -0.104 (-1.113) 0.140*** (21.052) -0.335*** (-11.852) -0.047*** (-1697) -0.451*** (-10.57) 
R2 0.600 0.740  0.740 0.615 0.739 0.570 0.726 
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A19.  Excise Tax-SADC  
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
constant 
-1.123** 
(-2.439)  
-0.506** 
(-2.591)  
-1.202*** 
(-4.577) 
 -1.362*** 
(-3.801)  
aid_pc 
-0.106*** 
(-3.263) 
-0.032* 
(-1.659) 
-0.069** 
(-2.087) 
-0.035* 
(-1.849) 
-0.125*** 
(-4.212) 
-0.038* 
(-1.928) 
-0.106*** 
(-3.888) 
-0.025 
(-1.211) 
gdp_pc 
0.033* 
(1.901) 
-0.012 
(-0.638) 
0.014 
(0.777) 
-0.017 
(-0.924) 
0.017 
(1.117) 
-0.014 
(-0.756) 
0.010 
(0.712) 
-0.014 
(-0.697) 
land_area 
0.088*** 
(3.106)  
0.060 
(2.180)**  
-0.031 
(-1.195)  
-0.017 
(-0.596)  
literacy 
0.203 
(1.454) 
0.249** 
(2.247) 
0.134 
(1.121) 
0.244** 
(2.239) 
0.871*** 
(6.473) 
0.264** 
(2.340) 
0.311*** 
(3.423) 
0.154* 
(1.801) 
pop_0-14 
1.849** 
(2.489) 
1.710*** 
(3.374) 
0.738** 
(2.054) 
1.608*** 
(3.234) 
2.723*** 
(4.516) 
1.726*** 
(3.392) 
2.526*** 
(4.502) 
1.073** 
(2.428) 
pop_65+ 
0.046 
(0.188) 
5.748*** 
(3.253) 
-0.342** 
(-1.995) 
5.744*** 
(3.292) 
0.070 
(0.320) 
5.973*** 
(3.436) 
0.771*** 
(3.462) 
3.196** 
(2.143) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.046** 
(-2.238) 
-0.002 
(-0.141) 
-0.071*** 
(-2.988) 
-0.003 
(-0.195) 
-0.048*** 
(-2.645) 
-0.004 
(-0.289) 
-0.037** 
(-2.029) 
-0.009 
(-0.722) 
pol_right 
0.015** 
(2.095) 
-0.007 
(-1.499) 
0.018** 
(2.302) 
-0.007 
(-1.490) 
0.013** 
(1.982) 
-0.008 
(-1.527) 
0.009 
(1.435) 
-0.007* 
(-1.674) 
british 
0.113*** 
(3.088)  
0.094*** 
(2.604)  
0.058* 
(1.868)  
-0.034 
(-0.755)  
french 
0.273*** 
(4.032)  
0.201*** 
(3.864)  
0.249*** 
(4.579)  
-0.059 
(-0.703)  
SADC Membership 
Dummy 
0.055** 
(1.971)  
0.037 
(1.151)  
0.055** 
(2.155) 
 0.021 
(0.856)  
Openness 
0.236*** 
(6.946) 
-0.020 
(-0.556) 
0.219*** 
(5.994) 
-0.013 
(-0.363) 
0.077** 
(2.257) 
-0.015 
(-0.415) 
0.204*** 
(7.020) 
-0.003 
(-0.083) 
ρ  -0.363 (-1.459) 0.207 (1.366) -0.008 (-0.155) -0.001 (-0.023) -0.804*** (-9.395) -0.144 (-0.985) -0.638*** (-7.564) 0.307*** (3.309) 
λ  0.064 (0.268) -0.153*** (-3.651) -0.171** (-2.070) 0.012 (0.268) 0.288*** (15.032) 0.048 (1.412) 0.020 (1.083) -0.303*** (-9.907) 
R2 0.419 0.821 0.400 0.821 0.545 0.821 0.537 0.820 
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A20: International Trade Taxes–SADC 
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
constant 
-0.298 
(-1.080)  
-0.123 
(-1.075)  
-0.592 
(-1.549) 
 -0.649** 
(-2.253)  
aid_pc 
0.079*** 
(2.690) 
-0.007 
(-0.254) 
0.084** 
(2.601) 
0.036 
(1.407) 
0.086*** 
(2.768) 
-0.004 
(-0.146) 
0.062* 
(1.909) 
0.013 
(0.489) 
gdp_pc 
-0.092*** 
(-5.289) 
-0.070** 
(-2.549) 
-0.113*** 
(-7.084) 
0.085** 
(2.570) 
-0.117*** 
(-6.981) 
-0.070** 
(-2.511) 
-0.097*** 
(-4.511) 
-0.102*** 
(-3.314) 
land_area 
0.117*** 
(4.776)  
0.071*** 
(2.786)  
0.054** 
(2.076)  
0.019 
(0.647)  
literacy 
-0.044 
(-0.422) 
-0.079 
(-0.452) 
0.371** 
(3.347) 
0.079 
(0.532) 
0.209* 
(1.942) 
-0.032 
(-0.198) 
0.233** 
(2.213) 
-0.222* 
(-1.674) 
pop_0-14 
0.939 
(1.579) 
1.300** 
(2.027) 
0.127 
(0.515) 
3.005*** 
(4.701) 
1.131* 
(1.704) 
2.805*** 
(3.654) 
1.099** 
(2.322) 
1.081 
(1.519) 
pop_65+ 
1.114*** 
(5.113) 
2.866 
(1.264) 
0.719*** 
(5.037) 
-0.233 
(-0.101) 
1.096*** 
(4.633) 
0.953 
(0.370) 
0.916*** 
(6.050) 
3.177 
(1.410) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.008 
(0.448) 
0.051*** 
(2.835) 
0.032 
(1.466) 
0.067*** 
(3.628) 
-0.013 
(-0.621) 
0.056** 
(2.540) 
-0.024 
(-1.262) 
0.066*** 
(3.295) 
pol_right 
-0.024*** 
(-3.611) 
-0.020*** 
(-3.079) 
-0.032** 
(-4.442) 
-0.018*** 
(-2.746) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.178) 
-0.030*** 
(-4.061) 
-0.027*** 
(-3.755) 
-0.026*** 
(-3.708) 
british 
0.111*** 
(3.386)  
0.042 
(1.278)  
0.081** 
(2.267)  
0.005 
(0.131)  
french 
0.141** 
(2.450)  
0.037 
(0.801)  
0.123** 
(1.964)  
0.078 
(1.622)  
SADC Membership 
Dummy 
-0.144*** 
(-5.518)  
-0.124*** 
(-3.998)  
-0.177*** 
(-6.466) 
 -0.174*** 
(-6.255)  
Openness 
0.168*** 
(4.954) 
-0.008 
(-0.166) 
0.218*** 
(6.040) 
-0.007 
(-0.143) 
0.213*** 
(5.876) 
0.004 
(0.069) 
0.212*** 
(5.907) 
-0.004 
(-0.077) 
ρ  -0.655*** (-5.760) -0.774*** (-5.634) -0.041* (-1.945) -0.265*** (-7.008) -0.152 (-1.441) -0.216** (-2.095) 0.063 (0.751) 0.311*** (4.097) 
λ  0.238*** (5.341) 0.390*** (4.079) -0.315* (-1.653) 0.322*** (10.236) 0.055*** (3.276) -0.041 (-1.158) -0.114** (-2.025) -0.251*** (-3.303) 
R2 0.678 0.702 0.646 0.655 0.621 0.708 0.626 0.712 
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A21.  General Public Services–SADC 
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
constant 
0.073 
(0.211)  
-0.071 
(-0.624)  
-0.231 
(-1.274) 
 -0.398*** 
(-2.745)  
aid_pc 
-0.055** 
(-2.356) 
0.015 
(0.449) 
-0.039* 
(-1.695) 
0.008 
(0.203) 
-0.054** 
(-2.538) 
0.024 
(0.799) 
-0.061*** 
(-2.959) 
0.026 
(0.699) 
gdp_pc 
-0.027** 
(-2.122) 
-0.080* 
(-1.765) 
-0.047*** 
(-4.256) 
-0.054 
(-1.358) 
-0.038*** 
(-3.460) 
-0.081** 
(-2.000) 
0.021 
(1.389) 
-0.089* 
(-1.787) 
land_area 
0.115*** 
(5.677)  
0.091*** 
(4.860)  
0.075*** 
(4.489)  
0.053** 
(2.191)  
literacy 
-0.345*** 
(-2.808) 
-0.229 
(-1.051) 
-0.305*** 
(-3.651) 
-0.232 
(-0.963) 
-0.138* 
(-1.743) 
-0.155 
(-1.108) 
-0.032 
(-0.462) 
-0.224 
(-1.115) 
pop_0-14 
0.370 
(0.747) 
-0.953 
(-0.864) 
0.328 
(1.489) 
-0.408 
(-0.348) 
1.364*** 
(3.046) 
-1.314* 
(-1.802) 
0.812*** 
(3.215) 
-1.267 
(-1.292) 
pop_65+ 
-0.009 
(-0.050) 
1.557 
(0.436) 
0.081 
(0.731) 
1.932 
(0.526) 
0.354** 
(2.107) 
-0.995 
(-0.343) 
-0.317*** 
(-2.618) 
1.684 
(0.524) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.002 
(0.096) 
0.014 
(0.472) 
-0.053*** 
(-3.197) 
0.025 
(0.822) 
0.014 
(0.956) 
0.005 
(0.197) 
-0.017 
(-1.317) 
0.014 
(0.472) 
pol_right 
-0.002 
(-0.428) 
-0.003 
(-0.266) 
0.007 
(1.376) 
-0.001 
(-0.104) 
-0.001 
(-0.204) 
-0.008 
(-1.013) 
-0.001 
(-0.282) 
-0.004 
(-0.346) 
british 
0.098*** 
(3.457)  
0.108*** 
(4.479)  
0.092*** 
(4.050)  
0.016 
(0.495)  
french 
0.184*** 
(3.914)  
0.176*** 
(5.075)  
0.191*** 
(4.773)  
0.161*** 
(4.479)  
SADC Membership 
Dummy 
0.041** 
(2.002)  
0.009 
(0.402)  
0.021 
(1.075) 
 0.052*** 
(2.829)  
Openness 
0.138*** 
(5.505) 
-0.012 
(-0.163) 
0.160*** 
(6.401) 
-0.007 
(-0.095) 
0.049** 
(2.174) 
-0.038 
(-0.644) 
0.118*** 
(4.356) 
-0.011 
(-0.129) 
ρ  -0.208 (-1.262) 0.292* (1.752) 0.075*** (4.166) 0.205 (1.589) -1.012*** (-8.062) 1.158*** (3.660) 0.209*** (2.793) 0.602** (2.178) 
λ  -0.010 (-0.227) -0.182*** (-17.142) -0.215*** (-7.979) -0.264*** (-4.873) 0.325*** (3.778) -0.723** (-2.534) -0.257*** (-7.375) -0.336*** (-24.32) 
R2 0.386 0.370 0.460 0.395 0.531 0.344 0.477 0.413 
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A22: Defense–SADC 
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
constant 
-0.271 
(-1.274)  
-0.048* 
(-1.655)  
-0.327 
(-1.347) 
 0.329*** 
(4.253)  
aid_pc 
0.019 
(1.142) 
-0.074** 
(-2.075) 
-0.009 
(-0.679) 
-0.062** 
(-2.099) 
0.012 
(0.804) 
-0.051 
(-1.538) 
0.007 
(0.536) 
-0.020 
(-0.795) 
gdp_pc 
0.003 
(0.349) 
0.037 
(1.208) 
-0.024*** 
(-4.090) 
0.039 
(1.395) 
0.005 
(0.596) 
0.026 
(0.7940 
-0.015* 
(-1.842) 
0.013 
(0.606) 
land_area 
0.037*** 
(2.699)  
0.063*** 
(5.613)  
0.037*** 
(2.802)  
0.064*** 
(3.913)  
literacy 
0.073 
(1.372) 
-0.491** 
(-2.166) 
0.132*** 
(2.855) 
-0.170 
(-1.002) 
0.115** 
(2.185) 
-0.680** 
(-2.056) 
0.058 
(1.332) 
-0.549 
(-2.571) 
pop_0-14 
0.500 
(1.488) 
0.598 
(0.696) 
-0.141* 
(-1.691) 
0.022 
(0.028) 
0.402 
(1.281) 
0.488 
(0.599) 
-0.486*** 
(-3.660) 
-0.496 
(-0.695) 
pop_65+ 
0.079 
(0.642) 
1.793 
(0.608) 
-0.078 
(-1.374) 
2.778 
(1.063) 
0.030 
(0.258) 
2.051 
(0.6770 
-0.198*** 
(-2.678) 
1.236 
(0.545) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.018* 
(-1.780) 
0.017 
(0.733) 
0.004 
(0.484) 
0.012 
(0.572) 
-0.020** 
(-1.994) 
0.003 
(0.123) 
-0.026*** 
(-3.142) 
-0.006 
(-0.365) 
pol_right 
0.008** 
(2.360) 
0.011 
(1.224) 
0.003 
(0.930) 
0.010 
(1.408) 
0.006 
(1.595) 
0.010 
(1.192) 
0.000 
(-0.048) 
0.009 
(1.603) 
british 
0.047*** 
(2.621)  
0.072*** 
(4.784)  
0.046** 
(2.506)  
0.066*** 
(3.055)  
french 
0.056* 
(1.744)  
0.100*** 
(4.698)  
0.036 
(1.099)  
-0.020 
(-0.787)  
SADC Membership 
Dummy 
0.004 
(0.287)  
0.020 
(1.552)  
0.005 
(0.376) 
 -0.007 
(-0.629)  
Openness 
-0.041** 
(-2.500) 
-0.042 
(-0.599) 
0.008 
(0.573) 
-0.089 
(-1.516) 
-0.035** 
(-1.987) 
-0.046 
(-0.782) 
0.011 
(0.552) 
-0.004 
(-0.108) 
ρ  0.014 (0.088) -0.214 (-0.767) -0.230*** (-7.461) 0.163*** (2.654) 0.422*** (2.843) -0.826*** (-0.782) 0.479*** (7.318) -0.482*** (-6.820) 
λ  -0.045 (-0.290) 0.284*** (53.782) 0.510 (1.329) -0.079 (-0.623) -0.244*** (-6.978) 0.566*** (5.779) -0.387*** (-10.08) 0.647*** (107.1) 
R2 0.359 0.236 0.561 0.291 0.385 0.265 0.497 0.356 
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
179 
Table A23: Education–SADC 
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
constant 
0.479*** 
(3.175)  
0.113* 
(1.681)  
0.551*** 
(3.227) 
 0.434*** 
(3.181)  
aid_pc 
-0.007 
(-0.564) 
0.028 
(0.723) 
-0.006 
(-0.493) 
0.010 
(0.261) 
-0.004 
(-0.414) 
0.024 
(0.619) 
-0.014 
(-1.208) 
0.018 
(0.518) 
gdp_pc 
0.003 
(0.411) 
0.016 
(0.463) 
0.019*** 
(3.526) 
-0.011 
(-0.289) 
0.000 
(-0.027) 
0.010 
(0.259) 
0.008 
(1.561) 
0.005 
(0.126) 
land_area 
-0.048*** 
(-4.813)  
-0.030*** 
(-2.839)  
-0.039*** 
(-3.462)  
-0.032*** 
(-2.762)  
literacy 
0.150*** 
(3.014) 
-0.392 
(-1.516) 
0.201*** 
(4.842) 
-0.382 
(-1.624) 
0.087* 
(1.940) 
-0.364 
(-1.414) 
0.217*** 
(6.020) 
-0.306 
(-1.541) 
pop_0-14 
-0.508** 
(-2.146) 
-1.790* 
(-1.894) 
-0.017 
(-0.138) 
-2.159** 
(-2.180) 
-0.531** 
(-2.337) 
-2.029** 
(-1.966) 
-0.492** 
(-2.140) 
-1.862** 
(-2.0620 
pop_65+ 
-0.238*** 
(-2.7750 
-1.488 
(-0.451) 
-0.046 
(-0.762) 
-1.465 
(-0.402) 
-0.221*** 
(-2.729) 
-1.736 
(-0.507) 
-0.258** 
(-2.453) 
-1.639 
(-0.528) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.034*** 
(-4.477) 
-0.008 
(-0.269) 
-0.021*** 
(-2.626) 
-0.004 
(-0.122) 
-0.031*** 
(-3.883) 
-0.011 
(-0.397) 
-0.031*** 
(-3.904) 
-0.006 
(-0.242) 
pol_right 
-0.008*** 
(-2.952) 
0.006 
(0.581) 
-0.009*** 
(-3.261) 
0.007 
(0.708) 
-0.007*** 
(-2.883) 
0.006 
(0.5710 
-0.011*** 
(-3.888) 
0.005 
(0.566) 
british 
-0.010 
(-0.743)  
0.029* 
(1.833)  
-0.001 
(-0.043)  
-0.003 
(-0.176)  
french 
-0.130*** 
(-5.284)  
-0.092*** 
(-5.095)  
-0.116*** 
(-4.884)  
-0.113*** 
(-4.494)  
SADC Membership 
Dummy 
0.000 
(0.005)  
-0.001 
(-0.077)  
0.000 
(-0.040) 
 0.004 
(0.429)  
Openness 
0.011 
(0.928) 
-0.098 
(-1.380) 
0.002 
(0.168) 
-0.111 
(-1.506) 
0.008 
(0.613) 
-0.122* 
(-1.696) 
0.046*** 
(3.026) 
-0.120* 
(-1.724) 
ρ  -0.034 (-0.213) -0.404 (-1.412) -0.074*** (-2.896) -0.193* (-1.707) 0.265** (2.327) 0.276 (0.731) -0.480*** (-4.424) 0.305* (1.831) 
λ  -0.004 (-0.051) 0.285*** (8.646) 0.189 (1.327) 0.133** (1.989) -0.194*** (-19.45) -0.042** (-2.272) 0.083*** (13.06) -0.129*** (-3.528) 
R2 0.559 0.487 0.577 0.488 0.574 0.464 0.562 0.519 
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 292 242 242 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A24: Health–SADC 
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
constant 
0.133 
(1.086)  
0.037 
(0.630)  
0.036 
(0.910) 
 0.103 
(0.851)  
aid_pc 
0.007 
(0.722) 
-0.029 
(-0.617) 
0.013 
(1.275) 
-0.031 
(-0.693) 
0.000 
(0.044) 
-0.033 
(-0.714) 
0.008 
(0.845) 
-0.026 
(-0.486) 
gdp_pc 
-0.001 
(-0.170) 
-0.009 
(-0.195) 
0.003 
(0.562) 
-0.015 
(-0.354) 
-0.002 
(-0.565) 
-0.019 
(-0.4190 
-0.003 
(-0.568) 
-0.018 
(-0.374) 
land_area 
0.009 
(1.058)  
0.007 
(0.773)  
0.023*** 
(3.378)  
0.015 
(1.547)  
literacy 
-0.016 
(-0.453) 
0.242 
0.902) 
-0.046 
(-1.205) 
0.129 
(0.463) 
0.011 
(0.312) 
0.249 
(0.941) 
-0.013 
(-0.408) 
0.179 
(0.774) 
pop_0-14 
-0.241 
(-1.164) 
1.708 
(1.390) 
-0.044 
(-0.406) 
1.032 
(0.811) 
0.057 
(0.330) 
1.599 
(1.382) 
-0.194 
(-0.987) 
1.291 
(1.154) 
pop_65+ 
0.065 
(0.870) 
5.619 
(1.294) 
0.138** 
(2.583) 
4.609 
(1.075) 
0.116* 
(1.791) 
5.965 
(1.391) 
0.084 
(1.025) 
4.434 
(1.136) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.005 
(0.832) 
-0.002 
(-0.045) 
0.001 
(0.188) 
-0.001 
(-0.017) 
0.009* 
(1.746) 
-0.003 
(-0.073) 
0.010 
(1.338) 
-0.006 
(-0.194) 
pol_right 
0.003 
(1.439) 
-0.007 
(-0.610) 
0.004* 
(1.799) 
-0.007 
(-0.590) 
0.002 
(0.837) 
-0.007 
(-0.547) 
0.003 
(1.405) 
-0.007 
(-0.661) 
british 
0.013 
(1.144)  
0.021 
(1.585)  
0.034*** 
(3.7040  
0.021 
(1.487)  
french 
-0.007 
(-0.333)  
0.005 
(.299)  
0.046*** 
(2.756)  
0.003 
(0.155)  
SADC Membership 
Dummy 
0.012 
(1.377)  
0.002 
(0.176)  
-0.007 
(-0.803) 
 0.011 
(1.277)  
Openness 
-0.005 
(-0.426) 
-0.024 
(-0.276) 
-0.012 
(-1.125) 
-0.043 
(-0.499) 
0.001 
(0.144) 
-0.014 
(-0.159) 
-0.002 
(-0.150) 
-0.007 
(-0.074) 
ρ  -0.139 (-1.010) 0.294 (0.799) -0.017 (-0.383) -0.165 (-0.974) -1.733*** (-11.71) 0.014 (0.4310 -0.172* (-1.940) 0.223 (0.907) 
λ  0.062 (0.519) -0.229 (-0.488) 0.192 (1.273) 0.158* (1.798) 0.606*** (7.096) -0.007 (-1.312) 0.034*** (4.552) -0.170*** (-7.513) 
R2 0.097 0.017 0.106 0.029 0.465  0.119  
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A25: Transportation and Communication-SADC 
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
constant 
0.303*** 
(2.631)  
0.009 
(0.117)  
0.293** 
(2.507) 
 0.153** 
(2.023)  
aid_pc 
0.008 
(0.944) 
-0.012 
(-0.204) 
0.003 
(0.316) 
0.032 
(0.615) 
0.008 
(0.877) 
-0.041 
(-0.330) 
0.004 
(0.418) 
-0.005 
(-0.091) 
gdp_pc 
-0.003 
(-0.580) 
-0.068 
(-1.110) 
0.011 
(2.122)** 
0.102* 
(1.940) 
-0.001 
(-0.186) 
-0.025 
(-0.131) 
0.003 
(0.531) 
-0.002 
(-0.048) 
land_area 
-0.009 
(-1.207)  
-0.004 
(-0.534)  
-0.006 
(-0.697)  
0.000 
(0.037)  
literacy 
-0.185*** 
(-6.283) 
-0.029 
(-0.060) 
-0.117*** 
(-3.487) 
0.098 
(0.315) 
-0.202*** 
(-6.122) 
-0.662 
(-0.889) 
-0.146*** 
(-4.817) 
0.299 
(0.494) 
pop_0-14 
-0.389** 
(-2.062) 
0.852 
(0.601) 
0.090 
(0.698) 
1.652 
(1.332) 
-0.370* 
(-1.918) 
2.202 
(0.613) 
-0.209 
(-1.5890 
1.372 
(0.847) 
pop_65+ 
0.003 
(0.051) 
2.813 
(0.558) 
0.137 
(2.569)** 
-0.253 
(-0.053) 
0.020 
(0.294) 
-4.453 
(-0.361) 
0.045 
(0.947) 
1.177 
(0.219) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.010* 
(-1.733) 
0.046 
(1.159) 
-0.001 
(-0.227) 
0.068* 
(1.775) 
-0.010* 
(-1.750) 
0.056 
(0.528) 
-0.001 
(-0.216) 
0.007 
(0.177) 
pol_right 
0.008*** 
(3.770) 
-0.016 
(-1.112) 
0.007*** 
(3.363) 
-0.010 
(-0.709) 
0.008*** 
(3.863) 
-0.038 
(-0.979) 
0.006*** 
(2.937) 
-0.008 
(-0.617) 
british 
0.010 
(0.982)  
0.025 
(2.398)**  
0.014 
(1.399)  
0.031*** 
(2.713)  
french 
-0.072*** 
(-3.983)  
-0.040*** 
(-2.647)  
-0.067*** 
(-3.754)  
-0.037*** 
(-2.717)  
SADC Membership 
Dummy 
-0.012 
(-1.570)  
-0.006 
(-0.629)  
-0.010 
(-1.2010 
 -0.011 
(-1.432)  
Openness 
0.061*** 
(6.447) 
-0.003 
(-0.029) 
0.053*** 
(5.164) 
-0.015 
(-0.164) 
0.063*** 
(5.947) 
-0.047 
(-0.172) 
0.064*** 
(6.200) 
-0.132 
(-1.472) 
ρ  0.184 (1.573) -0.930*** (-2.987) -0.051** (-2.1950 -0.213*** (-5.677) 0.123 (1.167) -0.094 (-1.315) 0.257*** (3.479) -0.615*** (-6.205) 
λ  -0.004 (-0.196) 0.550*** (4.120) -0.108 (-0.736) 0.820*** (3.501) -0.005 (-0.072) 0.233*** (17.401) -0.148*** (-18.67) 0.491*** (106.8) 
R2 0.570 0.158 0.540 0.218 0.561  0.543  
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A26: SSA Tax Revenues–Generalized Spatial Two Stage Least Squares 
(GS2SLS) Estimations    
WCONTIGUITY 
Variable         
Individual 
Tax 
Corporate 
Tax  VAT 
Excise 
Taxes 
Int. Trade 
Taxes 
constant 
0.390*** 
(4.975) 
0.003 
(0.043) 
0.786*** 
(8.014) 
0.434*** 
(3.652) 
0.454** 
(2.485) 
aid_pc 
0.007 
(1.056) 
-0.033*** 
(-4.755) 
0.068*** 
(7.682) 
0.000 
(0.046) 
-0.022 
(-1.508) 
gdp_pc 
0.001 
(0.323) 
0.042*** 
(9.456) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.858) 
0.014** 
(2.326) 
-0.099*** 
(-10.865) 
land_area 
0.043*** 
(6.216) 
0.011 
(1.624) 
0.031*** 
(3.608) 
-0.040*** 
(-4.622) 
-0.070*** 
(-5.229) 
literacy 
0.022 
(1.142) 
-0.090*** 
(-4.652) 
-0.044* 
(-1.818) 
0.029 
(1.081) 
0.014 
(0.333) 
pop_0-14 
-0.851*** 
(-5.586) 
0.120 
(0.775) 
-1.500*** 
(-8.241) 
-0.411** 
(-2.063) 
0.149 
(0.464) 
pop_65+ 
-0.217*** 
(-3.524) 
-0.066 
(-1.047) 
-0.287*** 
(-3.737) 
-0.530*** 
(-5.861) 
0.440*** 
(3.405) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.008 
(1.261) 
0.007 
(1.159) 
0.014* 
(1.8710 
-0.023*** 
(-2.725) 
0.014 
(1.049) 
pol_right 
0.003* 
(1.651) 
-0.003* 
(-1.762) 
-0.011*** 
(-4.694) 
0.010*** 
(3.835) 
-0.018*** 
(-4.586) 
british 
0.043*** 
(4.538) 
0.011 
(1.141) 
0.104*** 
(8.039) 
-0.031** 
(-2.462) 
-0.088*** 
(-4.381) 
french 
-0.002 
(-0.252) 
-0.030*** 
(-3.646) 
0.018 
(1.482) 
-0.071*** 
(-5.374) 
0.032* 
(1.732) 
COMESA 
0.025** 
(1.999) 
0.057*** 
(4.976) 
0.125*** 
(8.418) 
0.083*** 
(5.428) 
-0.098*** 
(-4.003) 
ECOWAS 
0.007 
(0.513) 
0.039*** 
(3.021) 
0.041** 
(2.416) 
0.017 
(0.976) 
-0.014 
(-0.496) 
Elect_system 
0.042*** 
(6.925) 
0.005 
(0.823) 
0.022** 
*2.547) 
-0.004 
(-0.568) 
-0.050*** 
(-4.070) 
Openness 
-0.030*** 
(-3.089) 
0.012 
(1.266) 
-0.046*** 
(-4.122) 
0.039*** 
(3.539) 
0.093*** 
(4.494) 
ρ  0.262*** (4.334) 0.578 (8.339) 0.119** (1.970) -0.565*** -4.635) -0.264*** (-3.744) 
λ  -0.109 (-1.571) -0.252*** (-3.760) -0.066 (-0.767) 0.118 (1.305) 0.0951 (0.655) 
Observations 660 660 660 660 660 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A27: SSA Expenditures–GS2SLS  
WCONTIGUITY 
Variable         
Gen. Public  
Expenditures 
 
Defense Education Health 
Transport & 
Communication 
constant 
0.539*** 
(3.739) 
0.434*** 
(4.914) 
-0.085 
(-1.008) 
0.087 
(1.299) 
0.045 
(0.714) 
aid_pc 
0.031*** 
(2.839) 
0.023*** 
(2.914) 
-0.024*** 
(-3.476) 
0.001 
(0.232) 
0.018*** 
(3.302) 
gdp_pc 
-0.044*** 
(-4.567) 
-0.003 
(-0.471) 
0.014*** 
(2.588) 
-0.004 
(-1.033) 
-0.003 
(-0.589) 
land_area 
-0.018* 
(-1.677) 
0.001 
(0.185) 
-0.023*** 
(-4.080) 
0.005 
(1.0130 
0.002 
(0.426) 
literacy 
0.017 
(0.512) 
-0.105*** 
(-4.680) 
0.069*** 
(3.364) 
0.034** 
(2.062) 
-0.038** 
(-2.325) 
pop_0-14 
-0.546** 
(-2.245) 
-0.130 
(-0.880) 
0.456*** 
(3.429) 
-0.052 
(-0.497) 
-0.035 
(-0.335) 
pop_65+ 
-0.476*** 
(-4.068) 
0.045 
(0.646) 
0.070 
(1.108) 
0.056 
(1.112) 
0.031 
(0.630) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.029*** 
(-3.203) 
-0.028*** 
(-4.281) 
0.002 
(0.251) 
0.001 
(0.204) 
0.009* 
(1.770) 
pol_right 
0.003 
(1.085) 
0.006*** 
(3.119) 
-0.002 
(-1.417) 
0.000 
(0.274) 
0.004*** 
(3.017) 
british 
-0.016 
(-1.079) 
-0.026** 
(-2.506) 
0.021** 
(2.252) 
0.016** 
(1.982) 
0.015** 
(1.964) 
french 
0.012 
(0.790) 
-0.031*** 
(-3.039) 
-0.001 
(-0.111) 
0.001 
(0.109) 
-0.018** 
(-2.453) 
COMESA 
-0.024 
(-1.319) 
0.001 
(0.051) 
-0.007 
(-0.703) 
-0.003 
(-0.343) 
-0.012 
(-1.551) 
ECOWAS 
-0.058*** 
(-3.050) 
-0.082*** 
(-5.933) 
-0.021 
(-1.628) 
-0.020** 
(-1.984) 
-0.006 
(-0.566) 
elect_system 
-0.003 
(-0.296) 
-0.045*** 
(-5.899) 
0.014* 
(1.920) 
0.001 
(0.135) 
0.010* 
(1.856) 
Openness 
0.071*** 
(5.665) 
-0.068*** 
(-8.126) 
0.026*** 
(3.459) 
0.007 
(1.220) 
0.047*** 
(7.555) 
ρ  0.389*** (4.096) -0.749*** (-13.834) -0.301*** (-2.693) -0.694*** (-7.181) -0.465*** (-3.210) 
λ  -0.222*** (-2.525) 0.500*** (8.285) 0.499*** (9.075) 0.500*** (11.59) 0.499*** (11.58_ 
Observations 660 660 660 660 660 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A28: SADC Tax Revenues–GS2SLS  
WCONTIGUITY 
Variable         
Individual 
Tax 
Corporate 
Tax  VAT 
Excise 
Taxes 
Int. Trade 
Taxes 
constant 
0.701*** 
(3.035) 
-0.263 
(-1.009) 
1.522*** 
(5.881) 
-2.372*** 
(-4.933) 
-0.299 
(-0.765) 
aid_pc 
-0.035* 
(-1.864) 
-0.053*** 
(-2.892) 
-0.039** 
(-1.974) 
-0.120*** 
(-4.160) 
0.053* 
(1.741) 
gdp_pc 
-0.032*** 
(-3.014) 
0.075*** 
(6.664) 
-0.048*** 
(-4.085) 
-0.014 
(-0.812) 
-0.072*** 
(-3.812) 
land_area 
-0.026 
(-1.444) 
-0.079*** 
(-4.586) 
-0.068*** 
(-3.814) 
0.128*** 
(4.818) 
0.089*** 
(3.080) 
literacy 
0.289*** 
(3.871) 
-0.208*** 
(-3.262) 
-0.277*** 
(-3.840) 
0.512*** 
(3.970) 
0.201* 
(1.893) 
pop_0-14 
-1.393*** 
(-3.781) 
1.567*** 
(3.759) 
-2.412*** 
(-6.094) 
2.963*** 
(4.311) 
0.565 
(0.914) 
pop_65+ 
-0.175 
(-1.340) 
0.125 
(0.886) 
-0.613*** 
(-4.229) 
-0.136 
(-0.627) 
1.096*** 
(4.881) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.008 
(0.729) 
0.024** 
(1.966) 
0.013 
(0.983) 
-0.056*** 
(-3.125) 
0.028 
(1.436) 
pol_right 
0.003 
(0.664) 
-0.006 
(-1.454) 
0.041*** 
(8.897) 
0.019*** 
(2.874) 
-0.019*** 
(-2.775) 
british 
0.027 
(1.043) 
-0.061** 
(-2.311) 
-0.043* 
(-1.646) 
0.241*** 
(5.841) 
0.077* 
(1.847) 
french 
-0.143** 
(-2.170) 
-0.125** 
(-2.069) 
-0.112* 
(-1.902) 
0.679*** 
(6.909) 
-0.071 
(-0.760) 
SADC Year Dummy 
0.025 
(1.442) 
-0.065*** 
(-3.896) 
0.129*** 
(7.374) 
0.093*** 
(3.708) 
-0.148*** 
(-5.437) 
Elect_system 
0.034 
(1.078) 
-0.014 
(-0.524) 
0.097*** 
(3.668) 
0.235*** 
(5.791) 
-0.092** 
(-2.280) 
Openness 
-0.030 
(-1.270) 
-0.052** 
(-2.305) 
-0.134*** 
(-5.533) 
0.318*** 
(9.357) 
0.162*** 
(4.294) 
ρ  -0.665*** (-5.073) 0.147 (1.387) -0.549*** (-5.305) 0.048 (0.208) -0.732*** -6.186) 
λ  0.499*** (7.768) 0.019 (0.285) 0.134* (1.922) 0.062 (0.612) 0.192* (1.807) 
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A29.  SADC Expenditures–GS2SLS  
WCONTIGUITY 
Variable         
Gen. Public  
Expenditures 
 
Defense Education Health 
Transport & 
Communication 
constant 
0.133 
(0.396) 
0.262 
(1.489) 
0.942*** 
(6.080) 
0.104 
(0.756) 
0.420*** 
(3.474) 
aid_pc 
-0.053** 
(-2.237) 
0.014 
(0.974) 
0.003 
(0.208) 
-0.001 
(-0.102) 
0.011 
(1.133) 
gdp_pc 
-0.034** 
(-2.358) 
0.003 
(0.316) 
0.000 
(-0.053) 
-0.012** 
(-2.000) 
-0.006 
(-1.093) 
land_area 
0.129*** 
(5.903) 
0.015 
(1.143) 
-0.001 
(-0.060) 
0.023** 
(2.423) 
-0.005 
(-0.560) 
literacy 
-0.509*** 
(-4.209) 
0.056 
(1.015) 
0.058 
(0.982) 
-0.024 
(-0.606) 
-0.281*** 
(-8.349) 
pop_0-14 
0.508 
(1.049) 
-0.075 
(-0.263) 
-0.619** 
(-2.474) 
-0.158 
(-0.717) 
-0.455** 
(-2.291) 
pop_65+ 
-0.109 
(-0.627) 
-0.010 
(-0.091) 
-0.101 
(-1.097) 
0.004 
(0.053) 
0.011 
(0.169) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.004 
(0.220) 
-0.007 
(-0.744) 
-0.024*** 
(-3.069) 
0.002 
(0.324) 
-0.004 
(-0.672) 
pol_right 
-0.007 
(-1.290) 
0.002 
(0.535) 
-0.055*** 
(-16.315) 
-0.002 
(-0.638) 
0.006*** 
(2.967) 
british 
0.122*** 
(3.989) 
-0.017 
(-0.948) 
-0.018 
(-1.183) 
0.034** 
(2.452) 
0.034** 
(2.540) 
french 
0.300*** 
(4.307) 
-0.081* 
(-1.871) 
-0.186*** 
(-4.822) 
0.074** 
(2.271) 
-0.062* 
(-1.874) 
SADC Year Dummy 
0.029 
(1.335) 
0.003 
(0.188) 
0.005 
(0.409) 
0.018* 
(1.715) 
-0.016* 
(-1.712) 
elect_system 
0.066** 
(2.149) 
-0.065*** 
(-3.592) 
-0.010 
(-0.6470 
0.047*** 
(3.411) 
-0.005 
(-0.355) 
Openness 
0.136*** 
(4.793) 
-0.053*** 
(-3.043) 
0.030** 
(1.983) 
0.027** 
(2.020) 
0.051*** 
(4.569) 
ρ  -0.645*** (-4.029) -0.588*** (-3.961) -0.162*** (-6.313) -0.762*** (-5.061) -0.271 (-1.627) 
λ  0.285*** (3.435) 0.499*** (9.792) 0.499*** (11.15) 0.499*** (12.81) 0.500*** (15.16) 
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A30.  Tax Revenue/Expenditures Ratio–SSA  
 SSA 
Variable         WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI 
 GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE 
constant 
1.446*** 
(2.738)  
-0.074 
(-0.147)  
0.107 
(0.965)  
aid_pc 
-0.063 
(-1.308) 
0.059 
(1.034) 
-0.046 
(-0.943) 
0.076 
(1.136) 
-0.006 
(-0.110) 
0.148** 
(2.392) 
gdp_pc 
0.204*** 
(6.448) 
0.140* 
(1.923) 
0.241*** 
(8.070) 
0.225** 
(2.471) 
0.309*** 
(8.122) 
0.465*** 
(5.409) 
land_area 
0.177*** 
(3.267)  
0.163*** 
(2.900)  
0.230*** 
(3.999)  
literacy 
0.560*** 
(3.092) 
0.112 
(0.300) 
0.692*** 
(3.784) 
0.146 
(0.447) 
0.642*** 
(3.991) 
0.596*** 
(2.699) 
pop_0-14 
-1.705* 
(-1.676) 
1.798 
(1.424) 
1.078 
(1.044) 
5.696*** 
(3.771) 
-0.671* 
(-1.691) 
2.951* 
(1.824) 
pop_65+ 
-2.080*** 
(-5.493) 
0.439 
(0.760) 
-1.472*** 
(-3.490) 
0.332 
(0.440) 
-1.122*** 
(-3.651) 
0.505 
(0.654) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.033 
(-0.750) 
0.018 
(0.455) 
-0.022 
(-0.506) 
0.058 
(1.238) 
-0.045 
(-1.183) 
0.018 
(0.4340 
pol_right 
0.041*** 
(3.2140 
0.033** 
(2.510) 
0.044*** 
(3.362) 
0.049*** 
(3.153) 
0.040*** 
(2.857) 
0.065*** 
(4.164) 
ttrend 
-0.002 
(-0.690)  
0.001 
(0.151)  
-0.006* 
(-1.799)  
British 
0.216*** 
(3.168)  
0.260*** 
(3.655)  
0.280*** 
(4.122)  
French 
0.059 
(0.914)  
0.147** 
(2.186)  
0.016 
(0.264)  
COMESA 
-0.036 
(-0.699)  
-0.105** 
(-2.090)  
-0.053 
(-1.093)  
SADC 
-0.191* 
(-1.901)  
-0.057 
(-0.600)  
-0.350*** 
(-3.435)  
Elect_system 
0.071 
(1.536)  
0.149*** 
(3.077)  
0.068 
(1.615)  
Openness 
0.154** 
(2.245) 
0.215** 
(1.974) 
0.088 
(1.308) 
0.277** 
(2.129) 
0.182** 
(2.466) 
0.563*** 
(4.386) 
ρ  -0.095*** (-4.018) -0.399*** (-9.029) -0.136*** (-5.041) -0.204*** (-4.331) 0.028*** (3.079) 0.012 (1.081) 
λ  0.026 (1.244) 0.186*** (7.254) 0.112** (2.308) 0.086 (1.559) 0.166*** (12.090) 0.166*** (11.966) 
R2 0.226 0.349 0.318 0.350 0.18 0.352 
Observations 660 660 660 660 660 660
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A31.  Tax Revenue/Expenditures Ratio–SADC     
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
constant 
1.850*** 
(2.955)  
-0.135 
(-0.341)  
-2.132** 
(-2.052) 
 
aid_pc 
0.166 
(0.978) 
0.153 
(0.999) 
0.047 
(0.346) 
0.212 
(1.386) 
0.100 
(0.645) 
0.482*** 
(5.152) 
gdp_pc 
0.239*** 
(2.703) 
0.362*** 
(2.852) 
0.107* 
(1.840) 
0.523*** 
(3.451) 
0.214*** 
(3.017) 
0.275** 
(2.063) 
land_area 
0.236* 
(1.869)  
0.455*** 
(3.993)  
0.234 
(1.489)  
literacy 
0.703 
(1.240) 
-0.753 
(-0.752) 
0.090 
(0.189) 
-0.155 
(-0.173) 
0.375 
(0.597) 
0.316 
(0.533) 
pop_0-14 
-3.206** 
(-2.304) 
6.332* 
(1.779) 
-1.294 
(-1.364) 
10.446*** 
(2.777) 
4.099* 
(1.903) 
2.291 
(0.863) 
pop_65+ 
-1.751** 
(-2.456) 
-17.308 
(-1.371) 
-0.135 
(-0.221) 
-17.965 
(-1.288) 
-1.465 
(-1.284) 
1.032 
(0.114) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.036 
(0.336) 
0.080 
(0.802) 
0.029 
(0.305) 
0.090 
(0.806) 
0.056 
(0.478) 
-0.069 
(-0.862) 
pol_right 
0.035 
(0.938) 
0.013 
(0.343) 
0.045 
(1.452) 
-0.024 
(-0.609) 
0.049 
(1.337) 
0.044 
(1.593) 
ttrend 
-0.027** 
(-2.365)  
-0.009 
(-1.029)  
-0.003 
(-0.285)  
British 
0.510*** 
(2.990)  
0.882*** 
(5.803)  
0.158 
(0.553)  
French 
0.012 
(0.051)  
0.650*** 
(3.233)  
0.930*** 
(2.749)  
SADC 
Membership 
Dummy 
-0.142 
(-0.914)  
-0.208 
(-1.582)  
-0.005 
(-0.030) 
 
Openness 
0.209 
(1.148) 
0.550** 
(2.017) 
0.403*** 
(2.831) 
0.788*** 
(2.796) 
0.553*** 
(3.123) 
0.033 
(0.153) 
ρ  -0.282*** -6.838) -0.320*** (-7.523) -0.202*** (-8.329) -0.205*** (-4.916) -0.035 (-1.251) -0.145*** (-10.81) 
λ  0.078*** (26.465) 0.149*** (9.579) 0.382** (2.452) 0.136 (0.590) -0.036** (-1.983) 0.247*** (8.658) 
R2 0.314 0.254 0.486 0.269 0.237 0.228 
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A32.  Moran I and LM Spatial Error Tests-SSA 
SSA 
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
Variable         
Moran I 
Statistic 
LM 
Statistic 
Moran I 
Statistic 
LM 
Statistic 
Moran I 
Statistic 
LM 
Statistic 
Moran I 
Statistic 
LM 
Statistic 
Revenues (Shares of Total Revenue) 
Individual Taxes  
-2.696*** 
(0.007) 
7.806*** 
(0.005) 
-0.996 
(0.319) 
1.040 
(0.308) 
-3.501*** 
(0.0004) 
13.448*** 
(0.0002) 
-4.350*** 
(0.00001) 
20.054*** 
(0.000007) 
Corporate Taxes  
3.290*** 
(0.001) 
10.180*** 
(0.001) 
0.998 
(0.318) 
0.910 
(0.340) 
2.686*** 
(0.007) 
5.659** 
(0.017) 
-0.503 
(0.614) 
0.428 
(0.512) 
VAT 
-1.290 
(0.197) 
1.928 
(0.165) 
1.964** 
(0.049) 
3.647* 
(0.056) 
-2.782*** 
(0.005) 
8.787*** 
(0.003) 
-3.062*** 
(-0.002) 
10.227*** 
(0.001) 
Excises 
-2.137** 
(0.033) 
 
4.998** 
(0.025) 
-0.775 
(0.438) 
0.642 
(0.423) 
-3.105*** 
(0.002) 
10.764*** 
(0.001) 
-2.813*** 
(0.005) 
8.707*** 
(0.003) 
International Trade 
-1.327 
(0.185) 
2.031 
(0.154) 
-1.768* 
(0.077) 
3.181* 
(0.074) 
-0.505 
(0.613) 
0.547 
(0.460) 
-0.545 
(0.585) 
0.484 
(0.489) 
Expenditures (Shares of Total Expenditure) 
Gen. Public Services 
0.184 
(0.854) 
0.555 
(0.456) 
-2.654*** 
(0.008) 
6.987*** 
(0.008) 
1.012 
(0.311) 
0.579 
(0.447) 
0.184 
(0.854) 
0.001 
(0.971) 
Defense 
-1.274 
(0.202) 
4.319** 
(0.037) 
-0.026 
(0.979) 
0.004 
(0.953) 
-3.043*** 
(0.002) 
10.372*** 
(0.001) 
-1.274 
(0.202) 
2.009 
(0.156) 
Education 
-2.482** 
(0.013) 
7.002*** 
(0.008) 
-0.233 
(0.815) 
0.069 
(0.792) 
-2.207** 
(0.027) 
5.763** 
(0.013) 
-2.482** 
(0.013) 
6.866*** 
(0.009) 
Health 
-1.751* 
(0.079) 
15.071*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.701 
(0.483) 
0.522 
(0.470) 
-2.308** 
(0.021) 
6.247** 
(0.0123) 
-1.751* 
(0.079) 
3.581* 
(0.058) 
Transport and 
Communication 
-0.939 
(0.348) 
2.226 
(0.135) 
1.892* 
(0.058) 
3.339* 
(0.068) 
-0.050 
(0.959) 
0.079 
(0.777) 
-0.938 
(0.348) 
1.172 
(0.279) 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A33.  Moran I and LM Spatial Error Tests-SADC 
 SADC 
Variable         WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
 
Moran I 
Statistic 
LM 
Statistic 
Moran I 
Statistic 
LM 
Statistic 
Moran I 
Statistic 
LM 
Statistic 
Moran I 
Statistic 
LM 
Statistic 
Revenues (Shares of Total Revenue) 
Individual 
Taxes  
-3.471*** 
(0.005) 
13.987*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.555 
(0.579) 
0.354 
(0.551) 
-2.052** 
(0.040) 
4.833** 
(0.028) 
-2.588*** 
(0.009) 
7.624*** 
(0.006) 
Corporate 
Taxes  
-1.275 
(0.202) 
2.762* 
(0.09) 
-1.219 
(0.222) 
1.534 
(0.215) 
-2.007** 
(0.044) 
4.640** 
(0.031) 
-2.483** 
(0.013) 
7.053*** 
(0.008) 
VAT 
-4.010*** 
(0.0001) 
14.751*** 
(0.0001) 
-1.117 
(0.264) 
1.298 
(0.254) 
-1.085 
(0.278) 
1.530 
(0.217) 
-2.595*** 
(0.009) 
7.666*** 
(0.006) 
Excises 
-0.772 
(0.440) 
1.855 
(0.173) 
-2.763*** 
(0.005) 
7.487*** 
(0.006) 
-1.261 
(0.207) 
1.992 
(0.158) 
-3.579*** 
(0.0003) 
14.117*** 
(0.0002) 
International 
Trade 
-0.528 
(0.598) 
2.131 
(0.144) 
 
-1.289 
(0.197) 
1.709 
(0.191) 
-3.113*** 
(0.002) 
10.580*** 
(0.001) 
-1.888* 
(0.059) 
4.232** 
(0.040) 
Expenditures (Shares of Total Expenditure) 
Gen. Public 
Services 
-1.772* 
(0.076) 
4.059** 
(0.044) 
-2.711*** 
(0.007) 
7.214*** 
(0.007) 
-0.635 
(0.102) 
3.182* 
(0.074) 
-2.652*** 
(0.008) 
7.984*** 
(0.005) 
Defense 
-0.336 
(0.736) 
0.433 
(0.510) 
0.446 
(0.656) 
0.141 
(0.707) 
-0.940 
(0.347) 
1.194 
(0.274) 
-1.012 
(0.311) 
1.383 
(0.240) 
Education 
-0.611 
(0.541) 
0.193 
(0.660) 
-0.256 
(0.798) 
0.093 
(0.760) 
-0.023 
(0.979) 
0.034 
(0.853) 
-0.461 
(0.645) 
0.387 
(0.534) 
Health 
-0.700 
(0.484) 
1.128 
(0.288) 
-1.068 
(0.285) 
1.193 
(0.274) 
-0.101 
(0.919) 
0.067 
(0.796) 
-1.672* 
(0.095) 
3.385* 
(0.065) 
Transport and 
Communicati
on 
2.139** 
(0.032) 
2.905* 
(0.088) 
-1.682* 
(0.092) 
2.851* 
(0.091) 
-1.334 
(0.182) 
2.205 
(0.137) 
0.004 
(0.997) 
 
0.024 
(0.877) 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A34.  Results Summary Table-SSA    
Coefficient   WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
 GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE 
Individual Taxes  
ρ  0.061** (2.149) 0.328*** (12.244) 0.043** (2.114) 0.214*** (5.633) 0.013 (1.178) 0.076*** (5.928) -0.021 (-1.224) 0.052*** (4.744) 
λ  -0.038*** (-3.303) -0.209*** (-9.938) -0.079 (-0.940) -0.056 (-0.416) 0.149*** (17.314) -0.021*** (-23.313) 0.137*** (30.033) 0.224*** (6.720) 
Corporate Taxes 
ρ  0.046* (2.203) 0.092* (2.354) 0.040* (1.669) 0.061 (1.407) 0.022*** (4.062) 0.011* (1.732) -0.017 (-1.270) -0.015 (-1.045) 
λ  -0.003 (-0.603) -0.026*** (-3.355) 0.059** (2.222) 0.040 (0.966) 0.144*** (14.158) 0.119*** (18.602) 0.128*** (36.548) 0.125*** (32.63) 
Value Added Taxes 
ρ  0.236*** (8.031) 0.296*** (8.865) 0.141*** (5.546) 0.012 (0.260) 0.067*** (6.808) -0.005 (-0.323) 0.021 (1.492) 0.060*** (6.626) 
λ  -0.093*** (-120.4) -0.204*** (-5.356) 0.057 (0.872) 0.012 (0.146) -0.038*** (-40.39) 0.106*** (19.261) 0.146*** (19.939) 0.213*** (6.416) 
Excise Taxes 
ρ  0.014 (0.403) 0.399*** (13.228) -0.045 (-1.402) 0.269*** (7.395) -0.114*** (-7.903) 0.049*** (4.696) -0.084*** (-4.694) -0.025 (-1.185) 
λ  -0.037 (-1.281) -0.230*** (-3.731) -0.036 (-0.783) -0.148*** (-2.699) 0.092*** (62.77) -0.046*** (-8.541) 0.136*** (28.768) 0.125*** (19.61) 
International Trade Taxes 
ρ  0.017 (0.898) -0.124** (-2.314) -0.021 (-0.979) -0.040 (-0.735) -0.009 (-0.853) 0.066*** (5.659) 0.024** (2.020) 0.067*** (7.062) 
λ  -0.022 (-0.773) 0.031*** (18.873) 0.231*** (19.723) -0.128*** (-12.751) 0.104*** (28.58) -0.026*** (-50.34) 0.165*** (17.796) 0.277*** (5.526) 
General Public Services 
ρ  0.203*** (5.543) -0.341*** (-6.321) 0.077*** (6.911) 0.011 (0.204) 0.062*** (10.369) 0.042*** (6.188) 0.061*** (5.7500 0.043*** (4.320) 
λ  -0.092*** (-8.261) 0.155*** (2.906) -0.284*** (-3.145) -0.188 (-0.866) 0.213*** (10.49) -0.061*** (-11.44) 0.234*** (6.611) -0.069*** (-29.67) 
Defense 
ρ  -0.052* (-1.763) 0.105* (1.860) -0.195*** (-8.351) -0.206*** (-4.653) -0.001 (-0.059) 0.041*** (4.865) 0.057*** (4.217) 0.073*** (6.307) 
λ  -0.013 (-1.449) -0.041*** (-3.432) 0.500*** (2.614) 0.361** (2.120) 0.164*** (18.966) 0.223*** (11.12) 0.233*** (11.490) 0.307*** (4.643) 
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Coefficient   WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
 GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE 
Education 
ρ  0.102*** (5.617) 0.302*** (8.502) 0.095*** (5.709) 0.262*** (5.190) -0.048*** (-3.405) -0.011 (-0.464) 0.054*** (4.136) 0.083*** (6.154) 
λ  -0.031*** (-42.47) -0.178* (-2.122) 0.022 (0.301) -0.019 (-0.198) 0.111*** (28.329) 0.134*** (21.01) 0.203*** (12.364) -0.113*** (-834.7) 
Health 
ρ  0.171*** (5.021) 0.328*** (8.020) -0.195*** (-9.013) -0.366*** (-8.397) -0.057*** (-3.160) -0.286*** (-7.335) -0.002 (-0.175) -0.027 (-1.1940 
λ  -0.148 (-13.232) -0.176*** (-10.678) 0.489** (2.193) 0.487* (1.913) 0.161*** (25.95) 0.083*** (75.384) -6.088*** (800.11) 0.188*** (16.39) 
Transportation and Communication 
ρ  -0.073*** (-2.707) -0.014 (-0.245) -0.067*** (-2.741) -0.005 (-0.093) 0.014 (1.291) -0.050*** (-2.766) -0.030* (-1.894) 0.031* (1.737) 
λ  0.032 (0.911) 0.026 (1.038) 0.072 (0.568) 0.028 (0.217) 0.202*** (9.230) 0.113*** (31.429) 0.163*** (19.824) 0.205*** (12.55) 
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Table A35.  Results Summary Table-SADC 
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
Individual Taxes 
ρ  -0.132*** (-2.685) 0.319*** (6.032) -0.167*** (-3.709) 0.107 (1.693) -0.010 (-0.595) 0.003 (0.171) -0.435*** (-14.803) 0.405*** (7.532) 
λ  -0.016*** (-22.343) -0.209*** (-67.808) 0.008 (0.038) -0.065 (-0.426) -0.020*** (-3.573) -0.013*** (-12.171) 0.706*** (15.22) -0.247*** (-18.42) 
Corporate Taxes 
ρ  0.181*** (5.219) 0.226*** (6.241) 0.077*** (4.062) 0.144*** (3.590) -0.027*** (-3.4040 0.022 (1.300) -0.079** (-2.164) -0.375*** (-6.809) 
λ  -0.092*** (-11.35) -0.167*** (-42.296) -0.069 (-0.378) -0.090 (-0.549) -0.002 (-0.325) -0.017*** (-3.944) -0.009 (-1.637) 0.160*** (18.381) 
Value Added Taxes 
ρ  0.036 (0.838) -0.196*** (-3.995) 0.091*** (4.708) -0.005 (-0.115) 0.025 (1.237) 0.055** (2.217) -0.001 (-0.037) -0.150*** (-3.212) 
λ  -0.132*** (-121.529) 0.076*** (42.360) -0.218*** (-7.319) -0.104 (-1.113) -0.027** (-2.163) -0.027*** (-3.633) -0.050*** (-4.168) 0.060*** (3.193) 
Excise Taxes 
ρ  -0.133* (-1.746) 0.116** (2.283) -0.008 (-0.155) -0.001 (-0.023) -0.011 (-0.539) 0.017 (1.355) -0.480*** (-5.251) 0.111 (1.623) 
λ  -0.073 (-1.143) -0.101*** (-7.562) -0.171** (-2.070) 0.012 (0.268) -0.031*** (-2.607) -0.014*** (-3.781) -0.048** (-1.999) -0.134*** (-9.238) 
International Trade Taxes 
ρ  -0.067*** (-2.798) -0.193*** (-3.754) -0.041* (-1.945) -0.265*** (-7.008) -0.011 (-0.945) 0.001 (0.086) -0.107** (-2.509) -0.103** (-2.222) 
λ  0.011 (0.776) 0.076** (2.038) -0.315* (-1.653) 0.322*** (10.236) -0.031*** (-6.892) -0.012*** (-3.809) -0.091*** (-6.849) -0.004* (-1.798) 
General Public Services 
ρ  -0.032 (-0.558) 0.292* (1.752) 0.075*** (4.166) 0.205 (1.589) -0.002 (-0.139) 0.104** (2.203) 0.107** (2.162) 0.442*** (3.559) 
λ  -0.094*** (-4.474) -0.182*** (-17.142) -0.215*** (-7.979) -0.264*** (-4.873) -0.018*** (-33.40) -0.161*** (-40.705) -0.149*** (-51.81) -0.431*** (-6.039) 
Defense 
ρ  -0.168*** (-3.2910 0.006 (0.061) -0.230*** (-7.461) 0.163*** (2.654) 0.033 (1.362) 0.001 (0.032) 0.075 (1.400) -0.482*** (-6.820) 
λ  0.075* 0.086*** 0.510 -0.079 -0.024 0.015*** -0.084*** 0.647*** 
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WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI WGDPPC 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE GMM  GMM FE 
(1.679) (6.628) (1.329) (-0.623) (-0.989) (57.953) (-46.98) (107.1) 
Education 
ρ  -0.064*** (-3.203) -0.455*** (-4.7820 -0.074*** (-2.896) -0.193* (-1.707) 0.012** (2.555) 0.072 (1.388) 0.011 (0.407) -0.478*** (-5.649) 
λ  0.006 (0.300) 0.263*** (13.1070 0.189 (1.327) 0.133** (1.989) -0.005 (-0.992) -0.048*** (-66.61) -0.006*** (-3.210) 0.253*** (17.86) 
Health 
ρ  0.078 (1.321) 0.216* (1.903) -0.017 (-0.383) -0.165 (-0.974) 0.001 (0.049) 0.014 (0.4310 -0.176*** (-2.622) -0.080 (-0.456) 
λ  -0.066 (-19.422) -0.230 (-0.729) 0.192 (1.273) 0.158* (1.798) -0.033 (-1.383) -0.007 (-1.312) -0.053*** (-4.252) 0.006 (0.069) 
Transportation and Communication 
ρ  -0.166*** (-4.540) -0.284** (-2.295) -0.051** (-2.1950 -0.213*** (-5.677) 0.033*** (3.657) -0.094 (-1.315) -0.129*** (-3.275) -0.615*** (-6.205) 
λ  0.067*** (3.161) 0.164*** (131.8) -0.108 (-0.736) 0.820*** (3.501) -0.009*** (-5.660) 0.233*** (17.401) 0.023*** (3.261) 0.491*** (106.8) 
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Table A36.  Tax Revenues–Generalized Spatial Two Stage Least Squares (GS2SLS) 
Estimations    
WCONTIGUITY 
Variable         
Individual 
Tax 
Corporate 
Tax  VAT 
Excise 
Taxes 
Int. Trade 
Taxes 
SSA 
ρ  0.038 (1.465) 0.047** (2.234) 0.159*** (8.336) -0.033 (-1.128) -0.002 (-0.097) 
λ  -0.043 (-0.652) -0.004 (-0.049) -0.147* (-1.896) -0.051 (-0.595) -0.030 (-0.200) 
SADC 
ρ  -0.106* (-1.775) -0.332*** (-7.137) -0.299*** (-4.300) -0.281*** (-4.223) -0.342*** (-6.300) 
λ  -0.043 (-0.652) -0.004 (-0.049) -0.147 (-1.895) -0.051  (-0.595) -0.030 (-0.235) 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table A37.  Expenditures–GS2SLS  
WCONTIGUITY 
Variable         
Gen. Public  
Expenditures 
Defense 
Education Health 
Transport & 
Communication 
SSA 
ρ  0.135*** (7.504) -0.054** (-2.090) 0.105*** (6.891) 0.211*** (10.306) -0.090*** (-4.758) 
λ  -0.146* (-1.824) -0.018 (-0.284) -0.043 (-0.942) -0.170*** (-5.446) 0.100*** (3.148) 
SADC 
ρ  -0.106* (-1.775) -0.332*** (-7.137) -0.299*** (-4.300) -0.281*** (0.067) -0.342*** (-6.300) 
λ  0.174 (1.372) 0.179*** (3.036) 0.199***   (2.263) 0.175*** (3.193) 0.206*** (4.931 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A38.  Tax Revenue/Expenditures Ratio  
WCONTIGUITY WDISTANCE WHDI 
Variable         GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE GMM GMM FE 
SSA 
ρ  -0.095*** (-4.018) -0.399*** (-9.029) -0.136*** (-5.041) -0.204*** (-4.331) 0.028*** (3.079) 0.012 (1.081) 
λ  0.026 (1.244) 0.186*** (7.254) 0.112** (2.308) 0.086 (1.559) 0.166*** (12.090) 0.166*** (11.966) 
SADC 
ρ  -0.282*** -6.838) -0.320*** (-7.523) -0.202*** (-8.329) -0.205*** (-4.916) -0.035 (-1.251) -0.145*** (-10.81) 
λ  0.078*** (26.465) 0.149*** (9.579) 0.382** (2.452) 0.136 (0.590) -0.036** (-1.983) 0.247*** (8.658) 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A39.  Spatial Coefficients Results: Selected Periods-SSA    
1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2001 
Coefficient   GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE 
Individual Taxes  
ρ  -0.149** (-2.162) -0.321*** (-9.503) 0.316*** (6.548) 0.317*** (4.492) 
λ  0.059*** (33.735) 0.189*** (36.193) -0.194*** (-42.969) -0.220*** (-5.774) 
Corporate Taxes 
ρ  0.310*** (7.602) 0.300*** (5.545) -0.308*** (-5.959) -0.267*** (-7.306) 
λ  -0.210*** (-6.872) -0.273*** (-6.746) 0.146*** (3.736) 0.130*** (14.562) 
Value Added Taxes 
ρ  -0.452*** (-11.921) 0.144 (1.326) 0.255*** (3.347) 0.267*** (6.769) 
λ  0.517*** (18.414) -0.123* (-1.829) -0.172*** (-3.822) -0.167** (-6.555) 
Excise Taxes 
ρ  0.259*** (4.309) -0.086 (-0.983) -0.345*** (-2.874) 0.244*** (6.275) 
λ  -0.184*** (-4.220) 0.009 (0.111) 0.111** (2.279) -0.145*** (-3.867) 
International Trade Taxes 
ρ  -0.427*** (-5.236) -0.364*** (-5.573) 0.264*** (4.275) -0.222*** (-3.042) 
λ  0.171*** (2.473) 0.178** (2.350) -0.214*** (-4.340) 0.110*** (3.588) 
General Public Services 
ρ  0.301*** (5.772) -0.292*** (-2.924) 0.253** (2.277) 0.030 (0.343) 
λ  -0.195*** (-5.239) 0.138*** (7.438) -0.124*** (-4.709) -0.105*** (-5.809) 
Defense 
ρ  -0.076 (-0.915) 0.412*** (5.116) 0.178** (2.577) 0.095 (1.319) 
λ  0.006*** (5.284) -0.165*** (-4.852) -0.075*** (-155.12) -0.047*** (-5.131) 
Education 
ρ  0.116 (1.371) 0.001 (0.016) 0.260*** (3.198) 0.222*** (3.707) 
λ  -0.133*** (-4.147) -0.004 (-0.304) -0.139*** (-4.526) -0.176*** (-5.247) 
Health 
ρ  0.281*** (7.147) 0.258*** (3.785) -0.355*** (-5.897) 0.166*** (2.747) 
λ  -0.209*** (-324.99) -0.176*** (-4.216) 0.201** (2.268) -0.138*** (-2.756) 
Transportation and Communication 
ρ  0.406*** (4.993) 0.289*** (4.137) 0.406*** (4.643) 0.258*** (3.840) 
λ  -0.182*** (-4.478) -0.123*** (-3.095) -0.300*** (-3.369) -0.066 (-0.943) 
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Table A40.  Spatial Coefficients Results: Selected Periods-SADC    
1980-1985 1986-1990 
 
1991-1995 
 
1996-2001 
Coefficient   GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE 
Individual Taxes  
ρ  -0.513*** (-8.281) -0.140* (-1.720) -0.171 (-1.449) 0.014 (0.166) 
λ  0.154*** (12.57) 0.055*** (2.652) 0.045 (1.272) -0.051*** (-2.875) 
Corporate Taxes 
ρ  0.228*** (3.028) -0.316*** (-4.013) -0.215** (-2.341) 0.100 (1.409) 
λ  -0.178*** (-16.764) 0.130*** (20.03) 0.045*** (205.6) -0.115*** (-24.18) 
Value Added Taxes 
ρ  -0.709*** (-6.187) -0.390*** (-3.007) -0.427*** (-4.680) 0.151** (2.135) 
λ  0.219*** (7.311) 0.129*** (4.997) 0.200*** (3.865) -0.140*** (-22.249) 
Excise Taxes 
ρ  0.299** (2.206) -0.052 (-0.478) 0.077 (0.722) 0.234*** (3.152) 
λ  -0.067 (-0.519) 0.001 (0.020) -0.079*** (-70.29) -0.150*** (-5.373) 
International Trade Taxes 
ρ  -0.381*** (-4.862) -0.214*** (-3.781) 0.212*** (2.615) 0.116* (1.914) 
λ  0.695*** (17.09) 0.093 (1.184) -0.152*** (-3.615) 0.006 (0.507) 
General Public Services 
ρ  -0.549 (-0.941) -0.333 (-1.020) -0.457 (-1.080) 0.093 (0.190) 
λ  0.218*** (10.05) 0.512*** (22.85) 0.244*** (11.58) -0.107*** (-106.4) 
Defense 
ρ  -0.029 (-0.065) -0.299 (-0.626) -0.437** (-1.850) -0.360** (-2.241) 
λ  0.110*** (12.25) 0.437*** (43.333) 0.452*** (61.556) 0.440*** (32.20) 
Education 
ρ  -0.708 (-0.770) -0.615 (-0.822) 0.126 (0.258) 0.016 (0.083) 
λ  0.229*** (33.124) 0.355*** (22.46) -0.072*** (-6.972) -0.022 (-1.600) 
Health 
ρ  0.309 (0.254) 0.045 (0.064) -0.464 (-0.822) 0.227 (0.794) 
λ  -0.135 (-0.401) -0.151 (-1.215) 0.504 (1.268) -0.142 (-0.518) 
Transportation and Communication 
ρ  -0.392 (-0.669) -0.225 (-0.522) -0.153 (-0.252) 0.120 (0.330) 
λ  0.403*** (20.126) 0.129*** (11.15) 0.134*** (10.08) -0.004 (-0.165) 
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Table A41.  SSA Tax Revenues–Maximum Likelihood (MLE) Estimations    
WCONTIGUITY 
Variable         
Individual 
Tax 
Corporate 
Tax  VAT 
Excise 
Taxes 
Int. Trade 
Taxes 
constant 
0.363*** 
(7.507) 
-0.136* 
(-1.657) 
0.796*** 
(25.484) 
0.319 
(1.182) 
0.174 
(1.015) 
aid_pc 
0.005 
(0.744) 
-0.031*** 
(-4.051) 
0.067*** 
(8.449) 
-0.010 
(-0.917) 
-0.021 
(-1.346) 
gdp_pc 
0.004 
(0.926) 
0.049*** 
(10.632) 
-0.027*** 
(-5.252) 
0.011* 
(1.821) 
-0.098*** 
(-10.475) 
land_area 
0.037*** 
(5.835) 
0.021*** 
(3.040) 
0.028*** 
(3.690) 
-0.051*** 
(-5.454) 
-0.075*** 
(-5.232) 
literacy 
0.026 
(1.554) 
-0.080*** 
(-3.912) 
-0.046** 
(-2.336) 
0.060 
1.562) 
0.023 
(0.503) 
pop_0-14 
-0.735*** 
(-5.827) 
0.425*** 
(2.742) 
-1.476*** 
(-10.751) 
-0.359 
(-0.828) 
0.560* 
(1.701) 
pop_65+ 
-0.223*** 
(-4.471) 
-0.009 
(-0.147) 
-0.282*** 
(-5.430) 
-0.483*** 
(-2.964) 
0.535*** 
(4.062) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
0.007 
(1.246) 
-0.001 
(-0.189) 
0.015** 
(2.065) 
-0.024*** 
(-2.700) 
0.009 
(0.676) 
pol_right 
0.004** 
(2.363) 
-0.001 
(-0.322) 
-0.011*** 
(-4.927) 
0.009*** 
(3.534) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.951) 
british 
0.044*** 
(5.250) 
0.027** 
(2.559) 
0.099*** 
(9.279) 
-0.028* 
(-1.923) 
-0.087*** 
(-4.224) 
french 
-0.009 
(-1.168) 
-0.034*** 
(-3.677) 
0.013 
(1.294) 
-0.050*** 
(-3.363) 
0.015 
(0.778) 
COMESA 
0.009 
(0.819) 
0.047*** 
(3.588) 
0.122*** 
(8.712) 
0.082*** 
(4.833) 
-0.105*** 
(-4.175) 
ECOWAS 
-0.010 
(-0.866) 
0.015 
(1.122) 
0.034** 
(2.388) 
0.030 
(1.581) 
-0.046* 
(-1.655) 
Elect_system 
0.043*** 
(7.881) 
0.018*** 
(2.9290 
0.018*** 
(2.607) 
0.000 
(-0.044) 
-0.055*** 
(-4.270) 
Openness 
-0.023** 
(-2.541) 
0.024*** 
(2.631) 
-0.045*** 
(-4.258) 
0.044*** 
(3.492) 
0.120*** 
(6.410) 
ρ  0.127*** (4.285) 0.141*** (10.946) 0.075*** (2.819) -0.019 (-0.220) -0.032*** (-5.394) 
λ  -0.155*** (-8.449) 0.043 (1.100) -0.087*** (-7.720) -0.086*** (-19.40) -0.007 (-0.095) 
R2 0.275 0.352 0.348 0.237 0.347 
Observations 660 660 660 660 660 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A42.  SSA Expenditures–Maximum Likelihood (MLE) Estimations    
WCONTIGUITY 
Variable         
Gen. Public  
Expenditures 
Defense 
Education Health 
Transport & 
Communication 
constant 
0.517*** 
(9.012) 
0.421*** 
(41.951) 
-0.078 
(-1.638) 
-0.013 
(-0.779) 
-0.001 
(-0.024) 
aid_pc 
0.021** 
(2.205) 
-0.010* 
(-1.675) 
-0.016*** 
(-2.997) 
0.007** 
(2.062) 
0.010** 
(2.308) 
gdp_pc 
-0.041*** 
(-5.823) 
-0.019*** 
(-4.277) 
0.021*** 
(4.894) 
0.000 
(-0.176) 
0.003 
(0.699) 
land_area 
-0.015 
(-1.444) 
0.002 
(0.297) 
-0.037*** 
(-7.336) 
0.001 
(0.216) 
-0.013*** 
(-2.994) 
literacy 
-0.027 
(-1.095) 
-0.037** 
(-2.270) 
0.021 
(1.423) 
0.011 
(1.156) 
-0.063*** 
(-5.115) 
pop_0-14 
-0.424*** 
(-7.304) 
-0.262*** 
(-4.213) 
0.371*** 
(10.968) 
-0.048*** 
(-6.782) 
-0.006 
(-0.058) 
pop_65+ 
-0.356*** 
(-5.589) 
-0.237*** 
(-5.918) 
0.086* 
(1.678) 
0.114*** 
(11.619) 
0.097** 
(2.117) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.024*** 
(-2.980) 
-0.028*** 
(-6.264) 
0.001 
(0.207) 
0.002 
(0.898) 
0.003 
(0.906) 
pol_right 
0.001 
(0.353) 
0.003* 
(1.852) 
-0.001 
(-0.981) 
0.001* 
(1.809) 
0.005*** 
(4.702) 
british 
-0.017 
(-1.210) 
-0.033*** 
(-3.884) 
0.012* 
(1.676) 
0.016*** 
(3.466) 
0.008 
(1.385) 
french 
-0.013 
(-1.321) 
0.001 
(0.183) 
-0.010 
(-1.488) 
0.002 
(0.441) 
-0.022*** 
(-4.373) 
COMESA 
-0.003 
(-0.164) 
-0.051*** 
(-5.221) 
-0.012 
(-1.454) 
0.008 
(1.3930 
-0.004 
(-0.607) 
ECOWAS 
-0.047*** 
(-2.830) 
-0.096*** 
(-8.557) 
-0.016* 
(-1.666) 
0.010 
(1.547) 
-0.009 
(-1.227) 
elect_system 
-0.011 
(-1.257) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.636) 
0.006 
(1.192) 
-0.008*** 
(-2.716) 
-0.006 
(-1.520) 
Openness 
0.072*** 
(5.942) 
-0.040*** 
(-5.145) 
0.011* 
(1.756) 
0.006 
(1.3230 
0.057*** 
(11.26) 
ρ  0.194*** (8.760) 0.509*** (15.16) 0.232*** (6.284) 0.551*** (36.85) 0.365*** (10.31) 
λ  -0.318*** (-6.172) -0.649*** (-19.56) -0.151*** (-15.45) -0.619*** (-48.333) -0.306 (-12.34) 
R2 0.255 0.606 0.358 0.452 0.452 
Observations 660 660 660 660 660 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A43.  SADC Tax Revenues–Maximum Likelihood (MLE) Estimations    
WCONTIGUITY 
Variable         
Individual 
Tax 
Corporate 
Tax  VAT 
Excise 
Taxes 
Int. Trade 
Taxes 
constant 
0.853*** 
(3.705) 
-0.389* 
(-1.698) 
1.471*** 
(8.488) 
-1.474*** 
(-3.608) 
-0.081 
(-0.244) 
aid_pc 
-0.025 
(-1.602) 
-0.069*** 
(-4.142) 
-0.005 
(-0.561) 
-0.099*** 
(-3.249) 
0.069** 
(2.425) 
gdp_pc 
-0.012 
(-1.238) 
0.078*** 
(8.455) 
-0.037*** 
(-6.016) 
0.038** 
(2.279) 
-0.112*** 
(-7.409) 
land_area 
-0.031** 
(-1.981) 
-0.079*** 
(-5.317) 
-0.157*** 
(-11.597) 
0.077*** 
(3.013) 
0.118*** 
(5.196) 
literacy 
0.147* 
(1.761) 
-0.182*** 
(-3.143) 
-0.287*** 
(-4.968) 
0.300** 
(2.537) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
pop_0-14 
-1.437*** 
(-4.025) 
1.767*** 
(4.654) 
-1.903*** 
(-7.505) 
2.179*** 
(3.438) 
0.352 
(0.641) 
pop_65+ 
-0.162 
(-1.258) 
0.102 
(0.762) 
-0.190** 
(-2.242) 
0.110 
(0.482) 
0.856*** 
(4.278) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.016 
(-1.382) 
0.023** 
(1.981) 
0.003 
(0.387) 
-0.047** 
(-2.363) 
0.003 
(0.172) 
pol_right 
0.008** 
(92.13) 
-0.004 
(-1.061) 
0.016*** 
(7.192) 
0.017** 
(2.382) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.231) 
british 
0.013 
(0.631) 
-0.067*** 
(-3.334) 
-0.160*** 
(-8.860) 
0.121*** 
(3.425) 
0.089*** 
(3.029) 
french 
-0.220*** 
(-6.092) 
-0.102*** 
(-2.917) 
-0.333*** 
(-11.23) 
0.300*** 
(4.729) 
0.101* 
(1.886) 
SADC Year Dummy 
0.013 
(0.926) 
-0.055*** 
(-3.539) 
0.029*** 
(3.236) 
0.054** 
(2.003) 
-0.136*** 
(-5.340) 
Openness 
-0.118*** 
(-4.854) 
-0.052*** 
(-2.879) 
-0.142*** 
(-8.403) 
0.232*** 
(6.926) 
0.203*** 
(6.709) 
ρ  -0.035 (-0.211) 0.034 (0.345) 0.748*** (25.362) -0.082 (-0.442) -0.515*** (-6.242) 
λ  -0.369** (-2.182) -0.143 (-1.174) -1.314*** (-289.3) 0.005 (0.025) 0.408*** (4.502) 
R2 0.574 0.575 0.859 0.414 0.691 
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A44.  SADC Expenditures-Maximum Likelihood (MLE) Estimations    
WCONTIGUITY 
Variable         
Gen. Public  
Expenditures 
Defense 
Education Health 
Transport & 
Communication 
constant 
-0.235 
(-0.755) 
-0.268 
(-1.378) 
0.378*** 
(2.677) 
0.179* 
(1.681) 
0.293*** 
(2.689) 
aid_pc 
-0.034* 
(-1.741) 
0.019 
(1.295) 
-0.008 
(-0.880) 
0.005 
(0.586) 
0.008 
(0.944) 
gdp_pc 
-0.036*** 
(-3.138) 
0.003 
(0.408) 
0.005 
(0.917) 
-0.002 
(-0.354) 
-0.002 
(-0.514) 
land_area 
0.095*** 
(4.665) 
0.036*** 
(2.787) 
-0.037*** 
(-3.943) 
0.008 
(1.062) 
-0.009 
(-1.278) 
literacy 
-0.144 
(-1.444) 
0.072 
(1.396) 
0.044 
(0.988) 
0.012 
(0.363) 
-0.185*** 
(-5.824) 
pop_0-14 
0.464 
`(1.025) 
0.518 
(1.628) 
-0.368* 
(-1.687) 
-0.273 
(-1.538) 
-0.367** 
(-2.090) 
pop_65+ 
0.103 
(0.638) 
0.086 
(0.755) 
-0.169** 
(-2.163) 
0.042 
(0.654) 
0.011 
(0.166) 
IMF/WB_SAPs 
-0.005 
(-0.369) 
-0.018 
(-1.831) 
-0.030*** 
(-4.112) 
0.003 
(0.561) 
-0.010* 
(-1.888) 
pol_right 
-0.003 
(-0.652) 
0.008** 
(2.446) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.360) 
0.003 
(1.480) 
0.008*** 
(3.851) 
british 
0.105*** 
(3.776) 
0.047*** 
(2.638) 
-0.003 
(-0.236) 
0.012 
(1.227) 
0.011 
(1.081) 
french 
0.165*** 
(3.568) 
0.058* 
(1.891) 
-0.096*** 
(-4.083) 
-0.018 
(-1.006) 
-0.070*** 
(-4.118) 
SADC Year Dummy 
0.031* 
(1.774) 
0.004 
(0.258) 
0.000 
(-0.025) 
0.012 
(1.401) 
-0.012 
(-1.529) 
Openness 
0.167*** 
(7.063) 
-0.041** 
(-2.573) 
0.009 
(0.797) 
0.003 
(0.314) 
0.060*** 
(6.528) 
ρ  0.318** (2.520) 0.003 (0.012) 0.380*** (3.140) -0.534*** (-4.474) 0.143 (0.886) 
λ  -0.547*** (-4.235) -0.055 (-0.216) -0.466*** (-3.422) 0.508*** (4.975) -0.004 (-0.022) 
 0.475 0.36 0.620 0.250 0.559 
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 
 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics.  
 
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Corporate Taxes-SADC 
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Figure 2.  VAT-SADC 
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Figure 3.  Excise Taxes-SADC 
Excise Taxes - SADC
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Figure 4.  International Trade Taxes-SADC 
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Figure 5.  General Public Services-SADC 
Gen. Public Services - SADC
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Figure 6.  Defense Expenditures-SADC 
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Figure 7.  Individual Taxes-SSA 
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Figure 8.  Corporate Taxes-SSA 
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Figure 9.  VAT-SSA 
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Figure 10.  Excise Taxes-SSA 
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Figure 11.  International Trade-SSA 
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APPENDIX C:  Total Differentiation-The Expenditure Theoretical Model 
 
In this appendix we give the full differentiation of Equation (4.4) with utilities as given in 
Equation (4.5).  
)(/(.)/(.) iiiii TYVGV −∂∂=∂∂       (B.1) 
But iii TYC −= is private consumption, and incorporating jG in (B.1) we get;   
0)(/),,(/),,( =∂∂−∂∂ ijiiiijiii CGCGVGGCGV      (B.2)  
Totally differentiating (B.2) yields:  
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From iii TYC −=  we get dTdYdC −= , but dGdT = , dGdYdC −=⇒ and if 
0=dY then dGdC −= . 
We can re-write the last two terms of the above function (B.3) as: 
ii
i GGC
∂∂
∂+∂∂∂
∂− 2i
2
i
2
)C(
V(.)
G
V(.)         (B.4) 
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Substituting (e) into (d) and collecting like terms from (d) yields: 
0(.)(.)(.)(.)(.)(.)
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and this simplifies to: 
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Consequently, 
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Multiplying both the numerator and denominator by (-1) and simplifying the above 
expression we get the following which is Equation (B.6):  
φ=
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